Tax Evasion, Social Norms and Conditional Cooperation by Traxler, Christian
Tax Evasion, Social Norms and
Conditional Cooperation
Inauguraldissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Mu¨nchen
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakulta¨t
2005
vorgelegt von
Christian Traxler
Referent: Prof. Dr. Andreas Haufler
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Klaus Schmidt
Datum der mu¨ndlichen Pru¨fung: 26. Januar 2006
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 08. Februar 2006
Acknowledgements
First of all, I would like to gratefully acknowledge the supervision of Professor Andreas Hau-
fler, who provided me with a perfect mix of instructive criticism and constant encouragement.
This thesis has gained substantially from his invaluable comments and suggestions.
During the past three years, I have also received a lot of support from my colleagues
at the Munich Graduate School of Economics respectively the Economics Department at
the University of Munich. In particular I would like to thank Stefan Brandauer, Marcus
Drometer, Florian Herold, Simone Kohnz, Andi Leukert, Katri Mikkonen, Tobi Seidel and
Hans Zenger for helpful advices and many fruitful lunch and coffee break discussions.
Major parts of the work to chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis have been done during my stay
at CREED, University of Amsterdam. I would like to acknowledge the hospitality and the
wonderful atmosphere at CREED. I am especially grateful to Professor Frans van Winden,
who supervised me during the visit, as well as to Eva van den Broek, Astrid Hopfensitz,
Ernesto Reuben and Aljazˇ Ule for great feedback at the ‘broodjes’-seminar-series. Many
thanks are also due to Ruslan Gurtovoy, Fabrice Le Lec, Friederike Mengel, Tom Truyts and
the other participants at the Trento Summer School in 2004 for stimulating discussions. I
am especially grateful to Friederike for detailed suggestions and brilliant comments.
While preparing this thesis, I have benefited enormously from collaborations with Ernesto,
Frans, Gerlinde Fellner, Rupert Sausgruber as well as Mathias Spichtig and Sven Sto¨whase.
It was – and continues to be – a pleasure to work with you!
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) is gratefully ac-
knowledged.
Finally, I want to thank my parents for their support during all these years. I am forever
indebted to you for your understanding, patience and encouragement!
Christian Traxler
Munich, September 2005
Contents
Preface 1
1 Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy1 12
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 Auditing Policy without Fiscal Equalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Auditing Policy with Fiscal Equalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.1 Gross Revenue Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.2 Net Revenue Equalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2 Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers 33
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2 The Allingham-Sandmo Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 A Social Norm for Tax Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3.1 Optimal Evasion Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3.2 Partial Equilibrium Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4 Social Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1This chapter is based on joint work with Sven Sto¨whase, Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Infor-
mation Technology FIT, Bonn.
Contents ii
2.4.1 Equilibrium Effect of Deterrence Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.4.2 Equilibrium Effect of a Tax Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.4.3 Policy Choice with Social Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5 Social Structure and Inter-Group Spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5.1 Social Equilibrium and Policy Spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.5.2 Revenue Maximizing Taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5.3 Tax Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3 Social Norms, Voting and the Provision of Public Goods 62
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 A Model of Internalized Social Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.1 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.2 Individual Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3 Social Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.1 Equilibrium Share of Free-Riders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.2 Social Equilibrium State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.4 Welfare Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.4.1 Tax Policy and Equilibrium Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.4.2 Welfarist versus Non-Welfarist Methods of
Policy Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.5 Voting with Social Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.5.1 Marginal Incentives for Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.5.2 Local Voting Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.5.3 Global Voting Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.5.4 Social Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.6 Public Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Contents iii
3.6.1 The Enforcement Subgame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.6.2 The Complete Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4 Social Norms and the Evolution of Conditional Cooperation2 109
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.2 Social Norms and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.2.1 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.2.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.3 Evolutionary Quantitative Genetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.4 The Indirect Evolution of Conditional
Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.4.1 Evolutionary Adaptation to a Homogenous
Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.4.2 Evolutionary Adaptation to a Heterogeneous
Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.5 Extension: Endogenous Social Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.6.1 The Applicability of a Quantitative Genetic Approach . . . . . 134
4.6.2 Replicator Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.6.3 Heterogeneous Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Bibliography 142
2This chapter is based on joint work with Mathias Spichtig, Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosys-
tem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam.
List of Figures
2.1 Optimal Evasion with a Social Norm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 Partial Equilibrium Effect of a Tax Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3 Social Equilibrium – Impact of a Tax Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1 Multiple Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2 Social Equilibrium States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.3 Laffer curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.4 Revenue Maximizing Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.1 Equilibrium Share of Free-Riders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.2 Fitness Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.3 Evolutionary Equilibrium in a Heterogenous Environment . . . . . . . 129
4.4 Trust Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Preface
In February 2003, Simon Ga¨chter gave a stimulating lecture on the ‘Behavioral
Economics of Trust and Voluntary Cooperation’ in course of the CESifo lecture se-
ries at the University of Munich. Based on a variety of experimental economic studies,
he discussed and analyzed behavioral regularities in public good games. In particu-
lar, he provided convincing evidence on the coexistence of different types of subjects:
There seems to exist a ‘large minority’ of individuals who free-ride as predicted by
standard economic theory, assuming rational and selfish agents. In addition to the free-
riders, however, there also exists a larger group of individuals who can be classified as
conditional cooperators, i.e. ‘people who are willing to contribute the more to a public
good, the more others contribute’ (Fischbacher, Ga¨chter and Fehr, 2001, p.397). In
the concluding discussion of his lecture, Simon Ga¨chter pointed out the importance of
these findings for many real-life situations – such as team production problems, the
abuse of welfare payments, criminal behavior and tax evasion – and invited for future
research to link the experimental evidence with the (theoretical) study of these policy
relevant issues. In the present thesis we take up this invitation and elaborate on tax
evasion, social norms and conditional cooperation.
In chapter 1, we follow a conventional approach, studying tax evasion of firms and
the provision of optimal auditing incentives in a federal economy. In chapter 2–4, we
consider – next to economic incentives – the impact of social norms on voluntary tax
compliance respectively cooperation. While the first three chapters provide a policy
oriented analysis, chapter 4 addresses the evolutionary origin of conditional coopera-
tion. Though all four parts can be read independently, we will now briefly discuss the
relation of this thesis to other behavioral and public economic literature and provide
an outlook on each chapter.
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Customs vs. Conventions, Social Norms vs. Social Preferences
In the last decades, economists became more and more interested in the study of
social norms. Unfortunately, however, the term ‘social norm’ is now used for several
very different concepts. Some economists use norms as an analog to conventions, where
conventions can be defined as ‘equilibrium behavior in games played repeatedly by many
different individuals in society, where the behaviors are widely known to be customary ’
(Young, 1998a, p.823). Driving on the right side of the road, for example, represents
such a convention. Next to the question, how particular conventions emerge (Young,
1989b), it is of course crucial to understand why some conventions are possible at all.
If we donate to charity every year at Christmas, standard economic theory, assuming
rational, self-interested agents, fails to explain such an equilibrium behavior. While
there are now plenty approaches which explain non-selfish behavior, one strand of
literature directly links to conventional, respectively customary behavior.
The literature on social customs – initiated by the seminal work of Akerlof (1980) –
studies the interplay of monetary and non-monetary incentives. Non-monetary incen-
tives thereby arise from social or personal, external or internal sanctions which agents
incur if they deviate from a social custom. If your child asks you to contribute to
the primary schools annual Christmas charity project, you may do so, because you
want to avoid being considered as greedy and cold-hearted by your social environment
(e.g. your family or other parents), because you are afraid of be excluded from the
next parents meeting, or simply because you do not want to expose your child to any
form of punishment from classmates or teachers. While the first argument is based on
an internal, personal sanction, related to emotional reactions (Elster, 1989a, 1989b),
the second and third argument derives from external social sanction, associated with
stigmatization and social disapproval (Ullmann-Margalit, 1977). Hence, if we deviate
from the social custom – i.e. what is considered to be ‘normal ’ – we incur a form of
punishment, which induces compliance with the custom.
In this thesis we build upon the social customs approach. We thereby follow the
more recent literature (e.g. Lindbeck et al., 1999), which terms social customs in the
sense of Akerlof (1980) as social norms (Elster, 1989b). A social norm is a pattern of
behavior, which is enforced by external or internal sanctions. Note that a social norm
(like charity giving) may also represent a convention in the sense of Young. Yet, not
all conventions are social norms: Once a society has coordinated to drive on the right
side of a street, it may become a convention. This equilibrium outcome, however, is
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then supported by standard rational agents. As there are no social sanctions at play,
which enforce the convention, we do not call it a social norm.
In chapter 2 and 3, and to some extent also in chapter 4, we focus on the role of
internalized social norms (Elster, 1989a). A norm is said to be internalized, if deviant
behavior is accompanied ‘by internal sanctions, including shame, guilt and loss of self-
esteem, as opposed to purely external sanctions [...] ’ (Gintis, 2003, p.407). Jon Elster,
illustrates the point considering an anti-littering norm: ‘I dont throw away litter in
the park, even when there is nobody around to observe me.’ Even if there is no scope
for external sanctions, we may follow a social norm. ‘Shame or anticipation of it is a
sufficient internal sanction’ to enforce norm compliance (Elster, 1989b, p. 104-105).1
As the subject in Elsters example, tax evaders are, in a certain sense, also ‘alone in
the park’: Given that individual evasion decisions take place in privacy, direct forms of
social sanctions are mainly limited to the household level. Neglecting within-household
interaction, we focus on the role of internal sanctions.
Following the tradition of the social customs literature (Akerlof, 1980; Naylor,
1989), we study the interplay of economic incentives and norm-guided behavior, where
the power of the social norm, represented by the strength of norm enforcing sanctions,
is endogenously determined: The more people adhere to a norm, the stronger it be-
comes. If everybody deviates from it, the norm has eroded. In an environment where
all parents support the schools charity fund, not donating represents a more severe
wrong doing – associated with stronger sanctions – as compared to an environment
where hardly anybody contributes to the project. In this case, the same society could
coordinate on different equilibria (conventions): self-enforcing situations where many
agents comply with the norm (contribute to charity) or a self-enforcing situation where
most agents deviate from it, and act according to their pecuniary self-interest (Elster,
1989a, 1989b). Hence, taking the strength of a social norm as endogenous opens the
scope for conditional cooperative behavior.
We shall remark that patterns of conditional cooperative behavior can also be
explained by theories of fairness and inequity aversion (Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or theories of reciprocity and intentions (Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2005). However, we do not adopt one
of these social preference approaches, summarized by Fehr and Falk (2002). While
we are convinced that all these concepts provide important and relevant insights for
1Note that in recent years, a significant body of literature has emerged, which demonstrates the
importance of emotions in economic decision making. Compare e.g. Elster (1998), van Winden (2001).
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the explanation of human behavior, we think that one should be careful with their
application on specific policy problems. In particular, we doubt that these models are
appropriate to study cooperative behavior in a large population context, where direct
interaction and therefore direct forms of reciprocity are limited – as in the case of
tax evasion: As we have noted above, individual evasion mostly takes place in privacy.
Since public information about the evasion decision of friends or co-workers is in general
not available, direct (reciprocal) responses to evasion are of limited importance. Of
course, in the context of tax evasion there is one significant direct interaction, namely
that of the taxpayers with the government respectively with tax authorities. However,
the two interacting players appear overly heterogenous, which renders the immediate
application of the social preference models inappropriate, as these models are to a large
extent based on payoff-comparisons between players.2
Nevertheless, one could relate a social norm for tax compliance to fairness norms.
Tax compliance may be considered as the fair behavior, if most other taxpayers follow
this fairness concept, while cheating on taxes may become the norm, if others do so
as well. Such a pattern, however, is covered by our approach. In principle, one could
interpret our concept of an internalized tax compliance norm as a ‘boiled down’ version
of a more complex fairness rule, like the specific form of self-centered inequity aversion
introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). However,
these approaches are based on an interpersonal payoff comparison, which is of limited
plausibility for the scenario under consideration. In any case, the results derived in
this thesis would also hold in these alternative frameworks. Having considered all
that, we are convinced that our approach, focussing on the role of internalized norms,
constitutes a reasonable and valid way to study tax evasion decisions.
On the Role of Tax Evasion and Auditing
An implicit assumption in a large part of the public economics literature is that taxes
are fully enforced; consumers, respectively firms, are supposed to honestly report all
their taxable activities. Although for some taxation problems, this assumption repre-
sents a useful simplification, it is evidently wrong. In the US, for example, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) estimated the ‘tax gap’ – the difference between actual and hy-
2We shall remark, however, that theories of intentions may provide an interesting tool to study
interactions between taxpayers and tax authority, as these models could explain how stricter enforce-
ment can induce higher levels of evasion (Sheffrin and Triest, 1992; Feld and Frey, 2002). In terms
of intention based approaches, such counterintuitive results can be related to the signaling of distrust
associated with stricter auditing (compare Falk and Kosfeld, 2004).
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pothetical tax revenues without evasion – to amount to a total of approximately $350
billion (as opposed to $1767 billion paid ‘voluntarily’) in the year 2001 (Sawicky, 2005).
For the same year, the evasion of value-added taxes in Germany was estimated at e 15
billion, which represents a VAT gap of about 10% (Gebauer and Parsche, 2003). In
Switzerland, Frey and Feld (2002) assess the income tax gap at more than 17%. This
figures clearly indicate the dimension of tax evasion and highlight the relevance of
incorporating imperfect tax collection systems into standard public economic analysis.
The public side of the economy faces these losses with extensive investments into
tax enforcement. The IRS, for example, is endowed with an annual budget of $10
billion. This budget, however, is comparably slim, if we take into account that in 2001
the IRS raised more than $50 billion taxes from direct enforcement measures (Sawicky,
2005). Hence, the provision of incentives supporting tax compliance, e.g. related to
the implementation of auditing policies, constitutes a serious undertaking. This also
holds true for Germany, where authorities raised approximately e 1.5 billion from tax
investigations in 2001 (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2003). In contrast to the
US, however, the total public spendings on tax enforcement are difficult to assess,
since in Germany the La¨nder are in charge of tax collection and tax enforcement.
Moreover, there exists an – at least for an economist – seemingly incredible institutional
arrangement: While the La¨nder bear the full costs of tax enforcement, the revenues
are redistributed between different regions according to the La¨nderfinanzausgleich, the
German equalizing transfer scheme. Hence, there is a clear distortion of the regions’
incentives to provide an optimal auditing policy. As a consequence, one should expect
an inefficiently low level of tax enforcement. In chapter 1, however, we will demonstrate
that this is not necessarily the case in the context of a federal economy, where regions
engage in fiscal competition.
Chapter 1: Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy3
We consider the case where each region provides a local tax enforcement policy, asso-
ciated with a particular auditing frequency. If regions use their local auditing policy
as a strategic tool to attract mobile capital, fiscal competition will lead to an ‘under-
provision’ of auditing. Analogous to the standard tax competition result (Zodrow and
Mieszkowski, 1986), unconfined interregional competition will result in too little tax
enforcement efforts and thereby in inefficiently high levels of tax evasion. In this case,
3This chapter is based on joint work with Sven Sto¨whase, Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Infor-
mation Technology FIT, Bonn.
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the introduction of a German-styled revenue sharing system causes a clear distortion,
as the mechanism drives a wedge between each region’s marginal revenue benefit and
costs. In addition, however, the revenue sharing scheme also has a beneficial effect: it
provides an incentive for each region to partly internalize the positive fiscal external-
ities from auditing. If this latter effect dominates the distortion, revenue sharing will
induce the provision of stricter tax enforcement as compared to the case without any
interregional transfers.
In a next step, we propose an alternative revenue sharing system, which redis-
tributes not only the revenues but also the costs of tax enforcement. Such a mechanism
would provide a correction incentive to account for the fiscal externality of auditing,
without introducing any distortion. Hence, this mechanism typically induces stricter
auditing associated with less tax evasion. Yet, there are some limitations which ren-
der the implementation of such a mechanism difficult: In the context of informational
asymmetries between different layers of government, this alternative mechanism could
provide regions with an incentive to overreport tax enforcement costs.
Our study contributes to different strands of the public economics literature. First
of all, chapter 1 relates to the literature on the tax evasion of firms (Marrelli, 1984;
Wang and Conant, 1988; Yaniv, 1988). In particular, we extend the approach from
Cremer and Gahvari (1993) and incorporate it into a standard tax competition setting.
Thereby, our model provides a more general framework for studying the interaction of
tax evasion and tax competition than Cremer and Gahvari (2000), who focus on the
special case of tax competition between two regions. Secondly, the analysis of chapter 1
also contributes to the literature on fiscal federalism. We expand the analysis of optimal
interregional redistribution (especially Ko¨thenbu¨rger, 2002), considering tax evasion
and tax enforcement incentives. In addition, we highlight the role of decentralized tax
collection in the context of fiscal competition.
One can conclude from this chapter that, in order to understand the level of tax
evasion, it is not only relevant to study the incentives to comply with the tax laws. It is
equally important to analyze different layers of incentives embedded in the institutional
settings which shape the public sector’s provision of tax enforcement measures and
thereby the level of tax compliance.
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Individual Income Tax Evasion and Tax Morale
While the behavior of firms, studied in the first chapter, is typically assumed to be
unaffected by social norms, chapter 2 elaborates on the role of social norms for tax
evasion decisions by consumers. The standard framework for the analysis of individual
tax evasion goes back to the seminal contribution of Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
They model consumers’ income tax evasion as choice under risk, similar to Becker’s
(1968) analysis of crime. Taxpayers decide on how much of their income to conceal,
taking into account the tax rate on the one and the enforcement policy on the other
hand. Tax evasion resembles a ‘risky gamble’, since a tax evader stands a chance to
avoid an audit and thereby succeed with the evasion. The individual decision problem
becomes equivalent to an optimal portfolio choice problem: concealing income is anal-
ogous to an investment into a risky asset, whereas declaring income honestly resembles
an investment into an asset with a safe return. Although this portfolio choice approach
was highly influential for the theoretical research on tax evasion in the past decades
(see e.g. Cowell, 1990; Andreoni et al., 1998), it fails to explain several important
empirical facts. Most of all, the approach does not explain the level of tax compli-
ance observed in western economies. Considering the rather low levels of auditing and
relatively moderate penalties which characterize modern fiscal systems, we should –
according to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) – expect far more people concealing taxes,
than we actually do (Bernasconi, 1998; Graetz and Wilde, 1995; Skinner and Slemrod,
1985). As has been noted by Wilson (1993, p.3), ‘[w]hat most needs explanation is
not why some people are criminals but why most are not.’ Hence, the open question is
simply, why do people ‘voluntarily’ pay taxes?
A huge body of empirical literature has demonstrated the crucial impact of ‘soft
issues’ on individual tax compliance, which are typically neglected in traditional public
economic analysis. Perceptions about the fairness of a tax system (Seidl and Traub,
2001), the treatment by tax authorities (Sheffrin and Triest, 1992; Feld and Frey, 2002),
or political participation rights (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996) shape at-
titudes towards tax compliance (Lewis, 1986; Reckers et al., 1994) and the perceived
civic duty to comply with tax laws (Scholz and Pinney, 1995; Orviska and Hudson,
2002). Taken together, these (and many other) factors determine what is often called
tax morale (e.g. Torgler, 2005) – the individuals’ intrinsic motivation to refrain from
tax evasion (Frey, 1997; Frey and Feld, 2002). Thereby, a central aspect which deter-
mines the agents’ tax morale are their beliefs about other citizens’ tax compliance (e.g.
Spicer and Hero, 1985; Porcano, 1988; Rothstein, 2000; Torger, 2005).
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Chapter 2: Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers
In chapter 2 we account for these findings and provide a formal analysis of tax morale
in the framework of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Tax morale is modelled as an
internalized social norm for tax compliance. The power of the social norm, and so the
strength of the norm enforcing sanctions, are negatively related to the number of tax
evaders in the society: The more people deviate from the norm, the weaker it becomes
and the easier it is for an individual to legitimate the own norm violation. Within
this framework, agents act as conditional cooperative taxpayers : They condition their
compliance on the honesty of other citizens. We demonstrate that our model accounts
for several shortcomings of the standard framework: In particular, our analysis predicts
that higher taxes trigger more norm violations and typically higher levels of evasion.
This is in sharp contrast to the conventional approach, according to which there exists
a negative relation between the tax rate and the evasion level (Yitzhaki, 1974).
We extend the basic model and embed the individual evasion decision in a broader
social context. We study a society consisting of different subgroups, where some agents
are in the position of a ‘moral role model’: They have a decisive impact on the evasion
level in society, as their behavior is crucial in the determination of the others’ tax
morale. Hence, a high level of norm compliance among societies’ leaders – e.g. high
profile individuals such as politicians – provides a significant contribution to the infor-
mal institutions supporting tax compliance. Finally, we also discuss the implications
of this point for the optimal tax and enforcement policy.
Chapter 2 links two different strands of the literature: The classical tax evasion
literature (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Kolm, 1973; Yitzhaki, 1974) on the one
hand, and the formal literature on social norms on the other hand (e.g. Lindbeck,
1999). Our analysis also contributes to the recent discussion on the role of belief
management as a policy tool (Rothstein, 2000; Ga¨chter, 2005). Moreover, the study
of tax evasion within a multi group context provides a theoretical complement to a
recent contribution by Ga¨chter and Renner (2005). While they demonstrate the strong
impact of the ‘leaders’ behavior on voluntary cooperation of ‘followers’ in a public good
experiment, our model shows how the evasion of the societies’ role models influences
the tax compliance of the ‘followers’ within the social structure of a large society.
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The central conclusions one can draw from chapter 2 is that social interaction mat-
ters in the study of tax evasion. Cheating on taxes is more than a risky gamble: it
is a social decision, embedded in a social environment. Considering this dimension
improves the predictive power of the model and gives rise to interesting policy impli-
cations.
Chapter 3: Social Norms, Voting and the Provision of Public Goods
In chapter 3 we simplify the model from the previous chapter: First, we consider risk
neutral agents and second we study a discrete instead of a continuous decision problem.
The new framework then allows for a broader analysis of ‘voluntary’ tax compliance
respectively compliance with the law in the context of a large society public good
problem. Similar to the case of tax evasion, we consider non-deterrent law enforcement,
i.e. the expected punishment from a law violation is too low to induce a rational, selfish
agent to adhere to the legal norm. (Since standard theory predicts law violations, we
call compliance ‘voluntary’, despite the legal obligation to do so.) In the context of
legally regulated situations there typically exist clear societal expectations about how
to behave ‘adequately’ (Cooter, 1998). In other words, the formal law reflects and
expresses an informal rule, a social norm. Hence, public law enforcement together with
social norm enforcement may evoke law obedience.
Within this framework, we approach several, quite different issues: First, we study
individual compliance behavior. According to different levels in norm sensitivity, agents
can be characterized as free-riders, unconditional cooperators and conditional cooper-
ators. Hence, the model captures the type heterogeneity discussed at the beginning of
this preface. Second, we consider the implications of these behavioral patterns for the
public good provision problem. We provide a detailed discussion of the multiplicity
of equilibria, which typically arise in the context of social norms. Interpreting public
good contributions as taxes and free-riding as tax evasion, we study the relationship
between tax level and collected revenues. We discuss the quite unusual shape of Laffer
curves, associated with the multiplicity of equilibria, as well as the resulting policy
implications. Third, we study the endogenous choice of law enforcement, respectively
auditing policy and study the interaction between the formal institution – the strength
of the law enforcement – and the informal institution – the social norm. Finally, we
study the endogenous choice of a tax policy, according to a majority voting procedure.
The voting outcome in the context of tax evaders is found to be always inefficient, re-
sulting in a suboptimally low level of taxation and an underprovision of public goods.
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This result contrasts sharply with the advantages of direct democratic institutes in
the context of tax evasion, as discussed e.g. by Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann
(1996).
Akin to the structure of this third chapter, the literature relations are quite het-
erogenous. Our framework allows a structured discussion of various issues related to
law enforcement in the context of social norms, which were so far tackled only in a
verbal way (e.g. Posner, 1997, 2000; Kahan, 1997, 2005). The analysis contributes to
the literature on law enforcement and social stigmatization (Rasmusen, 1996; Arbak,
2005) and provides scope for a Beckerian analysis of optimal deterrence (as e.g. in
Kolm, 1973). However, in contrast to the previous literature, we thereby incorporate
formal as well as informal law enforcement institutions. The voting analysis in chapter
3 is closely related to the approach of Lindbeck et al. (1999), who study majority vot-
ing in the context of social norms and unemployment benefits. The main difference to
their approach is that we consider heterogeneity in the incentives related to the social
norm, while they study heterogenous incentives related to different income levels. In
addition, we focus on the welfare analysis of the voting outcome, omitted in Lindbeck
et al. (1999). Thereby we find that in the context of free-riding, the voting outcome
determined by the median voter will result in an inefficient equilibrium. Depending
on whether cooperators or free-riders are in a majority, voting will result in an under-
respectively overprovision of public goods. In this vein, we contribute to the stan-
dard literature on collective choice over tax respectively redistribution policies, which
neglects the case of free-riding respectively tax evasion (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977;
Meltzer and Richard, 1981).
Chapter 4: Social Norms and the Evolution of Conditional Cooperation4
In the final chapter of this thesis, we study the evolutionary origin of conditional coop-
erators. In particular we ask, under which circumstances the preferences considered in
the previous chapter are evolutionary stable. We address this question using an indirect
evolutionary approach (Gu¨th and Yaari, 1992; Gu¨th, 1995). Agents learn about the
success (‘fitness’) of different types of players, characterized by heterogenous degrees of
norm sensitivity. According to differences in success, individuals adapt their own level
of norm internalization. In this way, the learning and adaptation process shapes the
evolution of preferences; cooperative behavior evolves indirectly. Hence, this section
4This chapter is based on joint work with Mathias Spichtig, Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosys-
tem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam.
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endogenoulsy derives the preference distribution – in particular, the distribution of
the norm sensitivity within a society – which was considered as exogenously given in
chapters 2 and 3.
Taking up an idea from biology (e.g. Via and Lande, 1987), we consider agents
to adapt to a ‘heterogenous environment’, i.e. a social situation where they face two
different types of environments: Occasions where the norm enforcement is powerful
and free-riders suffer from harsh sanctions, as well as scenarios where norm violations
are widespread, the social norm has hardly any impact and free-riding constitutes
the fitness dominant strategy. We link the multiplicity of equilibria, which arises in
our basic model, to the heterogeneity of the environment. We demonstrate that in
such environments, conditional cooperators, i.e. agents with an intermediate level
of norm sensitivity, dominate free-riders as well as unconditional cooperative players.
The intuition for this result is quite straightforward: Conditional cooperators react
flexibly to different environments: They cooperate, if the norm is strong and free-ride
otherwise. Thereby, they avoid severe sanctions in the first and reap the high free-rider
payoff in the second case. This way, they dominate the two unconditional strategies.
The main contribution of chapter 4 is the introduction of a ‘multi-habitat’ con-
cept of adaptation to a heterogenous environment, which is novel in the evolutionary
economic literature. Our analysis highlights a simple and plausible explanation of the
evolutionary forces which shape conditional cooperative behavior. Moreover, using an
indirect evolutionary approach we endogenously derive a preference structure which so
far has been taken as exogenously given (e.g. Akerlof, 1980; Naylor, 1989; Lindbeck,
1999).
Chapter 1
Tax Evasion and Auditing in a
Federal Economy∗
1.1 Introduction
Many contributions to the taxation literature take tax collection as given or costlessly
executed, assuming that tax authorities have full information about individuals or
firms’ tax liabilities. Of course, this is not very realistic. In fact, we observe significant
levels of tax evasion in almost all developed countries. According to estimations of
Schneider and Enste (2000), the informal sector accounts for approximately 10 to 30
percent of total GDP in OECD countries and for more than 50 percent in some less
developed countries. In order to fight evasion, tax authorities have to spend resources
on auditing. From the perspective of revenue maximization, tax authorities should raise
auditing up to the point where the marginal gains (less tax evasion, higher revenues
from taxation and detected evasion) equal the marginal costs from an increase in tax
collection efforts.1 However, there is some evidence that tax authorities spend too little
on tax enforcement.
In Belgium, there were repeatedly public discussions arguing that the Flemish re-
gion is too lax in its tax enforcement policy (Cremer and Gahvari, 2000). Recent
evidence supports this claim (Crabbe´ et al., 2004). For Germany, Lenk et al. (1998)
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Sven Sto¨whase, Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Infor-
mation Technology FIT, Bonn.
1This is the point made in the early literature on tax evasion, see for example Kolm (1973). For
the case of welfare maximizing governments Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) argue for a lower level of
auditing.
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argue that some regions put too little effort into tax investigation.2 Anecdotal ev-
idence supports their view: In 1998, German tax authorities inspected hundreds of
banks which were under suspicion to support income tax evasion by transferring non
declared income of their customers to bank accounts abroad. Although the operation
was highly successful in detecting tax evasion, authorities could only examine a small
fraction of all cases in detail: Due to a low number of tax investigators, most evaders
escaped without any sanctions and a considerable amount of revenue was lost. If we
take this evidence as indicating too low auditing efforts, we have to ask for the reasons
that lead to this inefficiency.
One possible reason is tax competition at the regional level. Even if regional gov-
ernments can not impose their own taxes, there may be scope for fiscal competition if
these governments are - at least partially - responsible for tax collection. This is the
case for several federal countries, like Australia, Canada, Germany and the US.3 In the
presence of tax evasion, tax revenues are not determined exclusively by the statutory
tax rate, but also by the enforcement policy. By choosing a certain auditing level,
each region can determine its effective tax rate. Accordingly, the audit policy becomes
an alternative strategic tool for tax competition and regions might compete via their
effective rather than their statutory tax rate.4 As has been shown by Cremer and
Gahvari (2000), countries will then end up with less than optimal audit rates, even if
(statutory) tax rates are harmonized. This may be an important aspect in the context
of a EU wide tax harmonization if tax collection remains in commission of the member
states.
Another incentive for reducing auditing efforts may derive from fiscal equalization.
As shown by Bordignon et al. (2001), tax collection incentives may be distorted if
higher revenue reduces the amount of transfers received. Empirical support for this
argument is provided by Knight and Li (1999) and Baretti et al. (2002). They find
a negative impact of fiscal equalization on revenues collected by Chinese respectively
German regions. For the German case, the latter authors argue that disincentives
associated with fiscal equalization account for 15% lower tax revenues.
2See also a report by the Arbeitnehmerkammer Bremen (2001).
3While in many countries - e.g. Austria, Belgium, China, Denmark, Spain and the UK - auditing
is carried out by regional governments (in some cases together with the central state), only in few
countries, like France, tax auditing is completely centralized. Compare Bordignon et al. (2001, p.719),
Knight and Li (1999).
4Following this reasoning, Crabbe´ et al. (2004) explain the relatively low effective taxation in the
Flemish part of Belgium.
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However, there is also scope for fiscal equalization to increase efficiency. As
Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2002) demonstrates, interregional redistribution may induce regions to
internalize the fiscal externalities associated to their policy. Hence, fiscal equalization
could induce higher tax rates – respectively higher audit frequencies – as compared to
the case of unrestricted fiscal competition. Taken these two opposing effects together,
the net effect of fiscal equalization is ambiguous then and does crucially depend on the
design of the equalization scheme.
As has been outlined above, the choice of audit rates may be affected by fiscal
competition as well as by the design of the fiscal equalization scheme. While these
aspects have been discussed separately in the literature, we combine them in a single
framework. This allows us to study the joint incentives from interregional redistribution
and competition for the decentralized choice of the audit policy.
We introduce a modified version of the standard model of tax evasion by the firm
(e.g., Cremer and Gahvari, 1993) and incorporate it into a tax competition setting.
In each region of a perfectly symmetric federal economy a representative firm uses a
fixed factor and mobile capital to produce a consumption good. Firms have to pay
a tax on capital and decide on how much of the taxes to evade. In making these
decisions, each firm takes its evasion costs, the tax rate and the auditing probability
into account. Local tax authorities choose their audit rates in order to maximize net
revenues, trading off higher auditing costs with revenue increases. The statutory tax
rate is determined at the federal level and taken as exogenously given by each region.
In this model, we compare the regions’ choice of audit rates for three different cases.
The first scenario describes a situation without any fiscal equalization where the choice
of the audit rate is only affected by fiscal competition. We show that this will result in
inefficiently low levels of auditing, which resembles the classical tax competition result
(Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986) as well as the findings of Cremer and Gahvari (2000).
In scenario two we introduce a system of gross revenue sharing (GRS). The GRS reflects
the main properties of the German interstate transfer system (La¨nderfinanzausgleich)
and introduces an explicit asymmetry: While tax revenues get shared, auditing costs
are fully borne by each region.5 Finally, scenario three describes an alternative fiscal
equalization scheme, net revenue sharing (NRS), under which not only the revenues
from taxation, but also the regions auditing costs get shared. For the case of symmetric
regions, we show that a system of GRS in general leads to even lower spending on tax
5We pick up this example, since the mechanism is particularly illustrative for our analysis. More-
over, the findings from Baretti et al. (2002) allude to the quantitative relevance of the associated
disincentives.
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enforcement than in the case of unconfined competition. However, NRS would then
increase audit rates in comparison to both, the benchmark case and the case of GRS.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the basic model. Section
1.3 introduces a benchmark scenario where regions choose their audit policies in the
absence of any fiscal equalization scheme. In section 1.4, we analyze the decentralized
choice under GRS and NRS. Before concluding with some policy implications we discuss
our results in section 1.5. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
1.2 Basic Model
Consider an economy with n regions, each inhabited by a single representative house-
hold. In a perfectly competitive industry firms produce one homogenous private good
(numeraire). The production process in each region i uses perfectly mobile capital ki
and a fixed, immobile factor. The technology is represented by a standard neoclassical
production function f(ki), where the fixed factor is suppressed. We assume a perfectly
symmetric economy where all regions use the same technology and are endowed with
the same amount of the fixed factor. Firms have to pay a unit tax on capital at a
rate t. This statutory tax rate is equal for the whole economy. However, each firm can
try to evade taxes by concealing a share ei of the capital employed. To conceal inputs
requires the use of resources by the firm. Following the literature, we assume that the
costs of evasion are convex in ei and linear in the tax base:
6 g(ei)ki with g
′ > 0 and
g′′ > 0. With a probability pi the evasion gets detected, and the firm has to pay the
statutory taxes plus a fine that is proportional to the taxes evaded (Yitzhaki, 1974).
For all regions, the penalty rate is s− 1, with s > 1. With probability 1− pi the firm
gets away with the evasion and pays only taxes on the declared amount of capital.
Expected profits piei are defined as
piei = f(ki)− rki − g(ei)ki − pi(tki + (s− 1)eitki)− (1− p)(1− ei)tki
where r is the factor price for capital. We can simplify this expression to
piei = f(ki)− (r + g(ei) + tei )ki (1)
6This assumption makes the firms’ evasion decision independent of the amount of capital employed
(compare equation 2). Our main results derived below, do also hold for more general assumptions.
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with tei ≡ t(1 − ei + eipis), the expected or effective tax rate in region i. Note that
revenues from detected evasion (including penalties) are also included in the definition
of the effective tax rate.
Taking the policy variables as given7, a risk neutral firm chooses ki and ei to maxi-
mize its expected profit. The firms optimal choice is then given by the following system
of first order conditions
g′(ei) = (1− pis)t, (2)
f ′(ki) = r + g(ei) + tei . (3)
For the rest of the chapter, we will assume that there is an interior solution with evasion
in equilibrium (i.e., pis < 1). From (2) and (3) one can easily derive two basic results
(see the Appendix). First, firms will conceal more if the statutory tax rate increases or
the detection probability decreases – a standard result for models of firm tax evasion
(Cremer and Gahvari, 1993). Second, an increase in the audit rate will raise (per
unit) capital costs and hence decrease capital demand. This triggers an effect which is
analogous to the impact of a tax increase on mobile capital in tax competition models.
Finally, we describe the capital market. In each region i a representative household
is endowed with capital k¯i and one unit of the immobile factor. The total capital supply
to the economy k¯ is fixed and market clearing requires
n∑
i=1
k¯i = k¯ =
n∑
i=1
ki (4)
Individuals invest their capital in a large number of firms distributed over the whole
economy. By holding a fully diversified portfolio, they avoid the potential risks as-
sociated with tax evasion by firms. In the capital market equilibrium the arbitrage
condition
f ′(ki)− g(ei)− tei = r (5)
has to be fulfilled for all regions i.
7For an analysis of commitment problems, see Reinganum and Wilde (1986).
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1.3 Auditing Policy without Fiscal Equalization
Let us now turn to the regional planners’ policy choice. Throughout the whole chap-
ter we assume perfectly symmetric regions8. As a benchmark scenario we consider a
federal economy without any interregional redistribution. Following the literature on
tax evasion, the objective of the regional governments (or tax authorities) is revenue
maximization9.
The tax and the penalty rate are (exogenously) determined at the federal level.
Hence, the only policy variable controlled by the regional government is the audit rate,
which determines the capital allocation and thereby the regions’ revenues from taxes
and penalties. Each region bears the full costs associated with auditing. Assuming
that these costs are linear in the tax base (i.e. the level of firms’ capital inputs), we
define the total detection costs of a region as c(pi)ki, where c(pi) denotes the auditing
costs per unit of capital (as a function of pi), with c
′ > 0, c′′ > 0 and c(0) = 0.10,11 In
the absence of an interregional redistribution mechanism the net revenue of region i is
given by
ki(t
e
i − c(pi)), (6)
with the effective tax rate tei as defined above.
12 While the statutory tax rate in the
economy is ‘harmonized’ and hence there is no scope for standard tax competition
between regions,13 the detection policy acts as a strategic substitute for the regional
policymaker: By reducing its auditing rate, a region can lower the effective tax rate.
This will reduce capital costs and attract mobile capital from other regions. Taking the
capital market responses into account and considering the policy of the other regions
as fixed, the first order condition becomes
ki
∂tei
∂pi
+ tei
∂ki
∂pi
=MCi, (7)
8The results derived in section 3 do also hold for the case of asymmetric regions.
9This can be justified either by a ‘Leviathan’ government or by a welfare maximizing government
in the case of consumers which receive significantly higher marginal utilities from public than from
private consumption (see e.g. Kanbur and Keen, 1993).
10We suppose that this cost function is exogenously given in the short run and that it can not be
influenced by the regional government.
11One could consider a detection technology characterized by marginal auditing costs which are
increasing or decreasing in the tax base. However, non-linearity would not affect our results in a
qualitative way.
12At first sight it is not clear why evasion should be possible in the presence of a planner who
perfectly knows the size of the tax base. However, if there are many producers and the tax authority
does not know the exact distribution of the capital among the firms, there is scope for tax evasion.
13In this point we follow the institutional arrangements in Germany.
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with
MCi = c
′(pi)ki + c(pi)
∂ki
∂pi
.
(The term ∂tei/∂pi is derived in the Appendix. There we also show that t
e
i is concave in
pi.) Condition (7) implies a system of reaction functions which determine the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of the uncoordinated auditing choice.14
In the optimum, marginal benefits from auditing, depicted by the terms on the
LHS of (7), have to be equal to MCi which denotes the ‘extended’ marginal costs of
auditing.15 The marginal benefit on the LHS consists of two effects: The marginal
increase in the effective tax rate (weighted with the tax base) and the marginal capital
outflow which follows from an increase in pi (weighted with the effective tax rate).
These capital outflows clearly lower the marginal benefit of the region.
Let us now compare the decentralized choice to the centralized solution of the
problem. Suppose that a central planner would choose a detection policy for each
region in order to maximize the sum of all revenues,
max
p1,...,pn
n∑
i=1
ki(t
e
i − c(pi)).
The n first order conditions are given by
ki
(
∂tei
∂pi
− c′(pi)
)
+
∂ki
∂pi
(tei − c(pi)) +
∑
j 6=i
∂kj
∂pi
(tej − c(pj)) = 0 (8)
While the first two terms also appear in condition (7), the third term in (8) represents
the revenue spillovers created by a region’s detection policy.16 For the case of sym-
metric regions, the planner will chose one unique auditing level pi = pj ∀i, j and hence
tei = t
e
j ∀i, j. Since capital flows must be balanced, the second and third term in
condition (8) cancel out and we get
∂tei/∂pi = c
′(pi) (9)
Comparing (7) with (9) we can derive
14One can easily show that the regions’ audit rates are strategic complements for all scenarios
considered.
15Of course, a revenue maximizing planner neglects any further costs associated from auditing (e.g.
compliance costs).
16Note that condition (8) corresponds to the case where one would provide each region with a
corrective subsidy in order to internalize its fiscal externalities. This replicates the result of Wildasin
(1989) for the case of fiscal competition in audit rates.
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Proposition 1 In the absence of fiscal equalization, the uncoordinated choice of au-
diting policies in an open economy with mobile capital will lead to audit rates which are
below the auditing level a central planner would choose.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: For an open region the capital
outflows reduce the marginal benefit of an increase in detection efforts. However,
the capital outflows from one region will enlarge the ‘foreign’ tax base and, ceteris
paribus, raise net revenues in the rest of the economy. Since regional decision makers
ignore these well known fiscal externalities, they set lower detection probabilities than
a central planner. Hence, the uncoordinated policy choice leads to audit rates which
are ‘inefficiently low’ from the perspective of total revenue maximization. This further
means that firms will choose a level of evasion, which is ‘inefficiently high’ – again from
a revenue maximizing perspective.
Proposition 1 describes our benchmark result. In the next section, we will compare
this result with the regions’ uncoordinated policy choice in the presence of different
fiscal equalization schemes.
1.4 Auditing Policy with Fiscal Equalization
In this section we introduce fiscal equalization into the model. We analyse two different
schemes of equalizing transfers: Gross revenue sharing (GRS) and net revenue sharing
(NRS).
1.4.1 Gross Revenue Sharing
Consider the following simple redistribution mechanism: Each of the n regions con-
tributes a share 0 < α < 1 of its gross revenues teiki to the redistribution system and
receives a share 1/n of the total revenues distributed, α
∑
tejkj. This fiscal equaliza-
tion scheme captures a central feature of the current German interstate transfer system
(La¨nderfinanzausgleich): While revenues obtained under a given detection policy have
to be shared with all other regions, the costs for maintaining a certain audit rate have
to be fully borne by the region itself. The net revenue of a region is then given by
(1− α)teiki − c(pi)ki +
α
n
n∑
j=1
kjt
e
j (10)
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We assume tei À c(pi) and redistribution is not ‘too extreme’, such that (1−α)tei > c(pi)
holds in equilibrium. The first order condition for the uncoordinated choice of a revenue
maximizing regional government is
(1− α)
(
ki
∂tei
∂pi
+ tei
∂ki
∂pi
)
+
α
n
(
n∑
j=1
tej
∂kj
∂pi
+ ki
∂tei
∂pi
)
=MCi (11)
withMCi as defined above. The first term on the LHS depicts the distortion introduced
by the fiscal equalization scheme, whereas the second term shows that a part of the
fiscal spillovers will be internalized via the redistribution mechanism. For a proper
analysis, we have to distinguish between an economy with many small or few large
open regions.
Small open regions
In the case of many small regions (n→∞ ), the impact of a single region’s detection
policy on total tax revenues in the economy becomes negligible. Hence, the second
term on the LHS of (11) vanishes and the first order condition becomes
(1− α)
(
ki
∂tei
∂pi
+ tei
∂ki
∂pi
)
=MCi (12)
If we compare (12) with condition (7), the result in the scenario without any inter-
regional redistribution, one can easily see that GRS distorts the region’s choice of
detection efforts:17 While the marginal costs MCi are unaffected, the redistribution
system clearly reduces the marginal gains from an increase in the audit rate. This
is the case, since fiscal equalization leads to an implicit taxation of a region’s gross
revenue. Hence, regions will unambiguously choose a lower audit frequency than in the
absence of fiscal equalization.
17In general, the equilibrium audit rates will differ between the compared scenarios. However, in
a symmetric equilibrium between symmetric regions this will not affect the capital allocation. This
is the case, since total capital supply is exogenous and for a given scenario equilibrium audit rates
will be the same in all regions. Hence, for any equilibrium there holds ki = k¯/n, which allows us to
compare first order conditions across scenarios.
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Proposition 2 Under a system of gross revenue sharing, a small open region maxi-
mizing its net revenue will choose a detection probability which is even lower than in
the case without fiscal equalization.
This result is equivalent to Proposition 3 in Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2002). As in his analysis,
the inefficiency due to the distorted incentives adds to the inefficiency due to fiscal
competition: Detection efforts will be reduced further below the ‘efficient’ level a central
planner would set and the amount of taxes evaded will be higher than in our reference
case without any interregional redistribution system. Moreover, it is straightforward
to show that the audit rate will decrease as α increases.
Large open regions
Since the decision maker of a large region takes into account the impact of the local
detection policy on the total revenues distributed, we can rearrange condition (11) and
get (
1− α
(
1− 1
n
))(
ki
∂tei
∂pi
+ tei
∂ki
∂pi
)
+
α
n
n∑
j 6=i
tej
∂kj
∂pi
=MCi (13)
As in the case of small open regions, GRS introduces a distortion. However, since large
regions consider the strategic effect of their policies – the impact of their audit rate on
total revenues redistributed – the distortion becomes smaller: 1 − α + α/n > 1 − α.
Stated differently, for large regions the implicit taxation of gross revenues drops below
the rate α observed for small regions. Moreover, there is a further incentive embedded
in the GRS: As reflected in the second term on the LHS of condition (13), a part of the
fiscal externalities18 gets internalized. Again, this is due to the fact that large regions
– in contrast to small ones – take into account the strategic effect of their policies.
If we compare this case with the benchmark scenario, the introduction of GRS
shows an ambiguous effect on the choice of audit rates. While the implicit taxation of
gross revenues tends to lower auditing efforts, the internalization of the spillovers will
act in the other direction. Comparing condition (13) and (7), we can find a threshold
18Note that the total spillover would be
∑
j 6=i
∂kj
∂pi
(tej − c(pj)).
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level such that, for n < nˆ, with
nˆ = 1 +
n∑
j 6=i
tej
∂kj
∂pi
ki
∂tei
∂pi
+ tei
∂ki
∂pi
, (14)
the second effect dominates. We sum up these results in
Proposition 3 Suppose large open regions and revenue maximizing governments un-
der gross revenue sharing. There exists a threshold 1 < nˆ < ∞, such that for n < nˆ
(n > nˆ) the detection probabilities chosen under a system of gross revenue sharing are
higher (lower) than in the case without fiscal equalization.
While GRS has an unambiguously negative effect in the case of small regions (see
Proposition 2), it could increase audit rates for large open regions.19 This result is
to some extent surprising. At first glance, a GRS scheme seems to lead to a clear
inefficiency: The asymmetric treatment of auditing costs on the one hand, and tax
revenues on the other, unambiguously distorts a region’s choice of the auditing effort.
However, in the presence of fiscal competition, the redistribution system has a further
effect: It works as a corrective subsidy and induces large regions to internalize a part
of the fiscal externalities. While the distortion from the implicit taxation tends to
lower audit rates, the corrective subsidy works in the opposite direction. If there are
n < nˆ jurisdictions, the second effect dominates the first one and GRS makes the
decentralized choice more ‘efficient’ (in terms of revenue maximization), compared to
the benchmark scenario. The intuition for this result is clear-cut: If the number of
regions diminishes, the implicit taxation of gross revenues becomes smaller and the
degree of internalization gets higher - irrespective of α (see condition (13)). Following
this line of reasoning it is straightforward to show that an increase in α further amplifies
the efficiency enhancing (reducing) effect of GRS, as long as the mechanism induces
a region to raise (lower) its auditing effort for the case of n < nˆ (n > nˆ). One can
also show that an increase in n, the number of regions, would result in lower audit
rates. This is the case, since more regions will always increase the distortion of the
redistribution and decrease the degree of internalization.
19Another issue we do not take up here, is the fact that large regions face a lower capital elastic-
ity than small regions because of a different impact of their detection policies on the interest rate.
Compare e.g. Bucovetsky (1991).
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1.4.2 Net Revenue Equalization
Let us now introduce an alternative system of interregional redistribution. Instead
of gross revenue sharing, we consider a mechanism which is based on net revenue
sharing. Each region contributes a share 0 < α < 1 of its net revenues – tax revenues
net of auditing costs – and receives a share 1/n of the total revenues distributed,
α
∑
kj(t
e
j − c(pj)). With this mechanism, the revenue of a region becomes
(1− α)ki(tei − c(pi)) +
α
n
n∑
j=1
kj(t
e
j − c(pj)). (15)
The first order condition is given by
(1− α)
(
ki
∂tei
∂pi
+ tei
∂ki
∂pi
−MCi
)
+
α
n
(
n∑
j=1
∂kj
∂pi
(tej − c(pj)) + ki
(
∂tei
∂pi
− c′(pi)
))
= 0
(16)
As before, we discuss this condition separately for the cases of small and large open
regions.
Small open regions
As under GRS the second term on the LHS of condition (16) vanishes for the case of
many small regions. We can rewrite (16) as
ki
∂tei
∂pi
+ tei
∂ki
∂pi
=MCi, (17)
which is identical to condition (7) in the benchmark scenario. While GRS distorts the
auditing policy of small regions (Proposition 2), the distortion disappears under NRS.
We can state
Proposition 4 Under a system of net revenue sharing a small open region maximizing
its net revenue will choose the same audit rate as in the benchmark scenario without
fiscal equalization.
The intuition for this result is clear: In contrast to the scenario of GRS, there is no
asymmetric treatment of revenues and auditing costs under NRS. Therefore, revenue
maximizing regions would unambiguously choose a higher audit rate after a change
from GRS to NRS. The only inefficiency remaining arises from the competition for the
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mobile tax base. As in the benchmark scenario, auditing efforts will be ‘inefficiently’
low and the evasion level of the firms will be ‘inefficiently’ high from the perspective
of total revenue maximization.
An interesting point to note is that Proposition 4 holds true for any α. Since inter-
regional redistribution does not introduce any distortion, there is no equity-efficiency
trade off in the choice of α.20
Large open Regions
As before, the government of a large open region considers the impact of its auditing
policy on the tax base in the rest of the economy. We can rearrange condition (16) and
get
ki
∂tei
∂pi
+ tei
∂ki
∂pi
+ β
n∑
j 6=i
∂kj
∂pi
(tej − c(pj)) =MCi (18)
with
β ≡ α
n(1− α) + α
As in the case of small open regions discussed above, NRS does not distort the decen-
tralized choice of detection probabilities. The inefficiency due to the fiscal competition
between regions still remains. However, since the decision maker of a large open re-
gion incorporates the strategic effect of the auditing policy, a fraction β of the fiscal
externality gets internalized. Compared to our benchmark scenario, the NRS will lead
to higher audit rates in the case of large regions. If we contrast the impact of NRS
with that of GRS, the former system introduces no distortion but – in most cases – a
higher corrective subsidy.21
Proposition 5 (i) Under a system of net revenue sharing, a large open region maxi-
mizing its net revenue will set an audit rate which is higher than the rate chosen in the
benchmark scenario without any fiscal equalization. (ii) Moreover, if n > nˆ, the audit
rate is also higher than the rate chosen under gross revenue sharing.
20This property (as well as Proposition 4 per se), only holds true since in our model we have
excluded any income effect from redistribution.
21Although β > α/n the comparison with the case of GRS - condition (13) - is not trivial, since
the redistribution volume is smaller under NRS.
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Proposition 5 is the main result of our analysis: For large open regions, a NRS
scheme partly internalizes fiscal externalities without introducing any distortion. Given
that the sufficient condition n > nˆ holds, the decentralized choice of detection policies
under NRS will result in higher auditing efforts as compared to both, the case without
any equalization transfers and the case with a GRS. Incorporating auditing costs into
the redistribution mechanism will only slightly reduce the amount redistributed (for a
given α) but increase detection probabilities. Firms would evade less and tax revenues
would be higher. Interestingly, for n < nˆ a GRS mechanism could in principle induce
higher audit rates than a NRS mechanism. This result stems from the fact, that NRS
slightly reduces the redistributive volume and that for small n the distortion embedded
in the GRS vanishes. However, in the Appendix we show that n > nˆ is only a sufficient
condition, and Proposition 5 (ii) will in general also hold for n < nˆ.
From (18) one can further show, that an increase in the number of regions would
lead to a lower degree of internalization and therefore to a decline in audit rates. In
contrast, raising the level of redistribution would result in a stronger internalization of
externalities, without causing any distortion. Hence, as discussed above in the context
of Proposition 4, there is no equity-efficiency trade-off.
1.5 Discussion
Asymmetric Information
In the last section we concluded that a switch from GRS to NRS will typically enhance
tax collection efforts. However, our modeling approach neglects a severe disadvantage
associated with NRS which renders this transfer mechanism relatively unattractive.
Under NRS, regions have a clear incentive to overstate their auditing costs, if there
is asymmetric information between different layers of the government22. Hence, as
Bordignon et al. (2001) point out, information asymmetries introduce a new source
of inefficiency for the choice of tax enforcement efforts. As long as there are no insti-
tutional rules which prevent regions from abusing their informational advantage, the
feasibility of NRS is unclear.23
22Regions could simply declare other administrative costs as expenditures on auditing.
23To the best of our knowledge, the concept of NRS is so far only a theoretical one as it is not
implemented in any country.
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Nevertheless, if the (gross) revenue of a region is observable to the federal govern-
ment, the central authority could use this information as a proxy for the underlying
audit rate and the corresponding costs. This could imply an upper bound for the
declared costs. While it is not clear, whether in this case a NRS would increase en-
forcement efforts compared to GRS, the former mechanism would clearly reduce the
level of fiscal equalization.
Asymmetric Regions
In deriving our main results, we have restricted our analysis to a perfectly symmetric
economy: Evasion as well as auditing technologies are the same for all regions, jurisdic-
tions are of the same size and production technologies are identical. The equilibrium
is therefore characterized by symmetric capital allocations and equal (net) revenues.
Hence, there is no need for equalization transfers. While in such a scenario the anal-
ysis of interregional redistribution seems rather artificial, the incentives embedded in
different revenue sharing mechanism are equally at work in a scenario of heterogeneous
regions. In the case of different production technologies, however, asymmetric capital
allocations would render the comparison of GRS and NRS less clear cut. Since these
size-related effects are well studied in the literature24 and work here in a very similar
way,25 incorporating them would only blur the results of the study without gaining
further insights.
Of course, one could allow for further levels of heterogeneity, e.g. with respect to
auditing and evasion costs. However, this may better fit into a simulation based rather
than an analytical approach. Calibrating the model and comparing the results with
existing empirical evidence – especially Baretti et al. (2002) – would be an interesting
task for further research.
Welfare Maximization
One could easily provide a standard welfare analysis within this framework, by explic-
itly modelling consumers, who receive income from their endowments of capital and the
fixed factor and who derive utility from private consumption as well as from a regional
public good. A welfare maximizing regional planner would then choose an audit rate
that maximizes the utility of the representative consumer.
24Compare e.g. Bucovetsky (1991).
25Small regions with a lower level of capital employed tend to use ‘more aggressive’ strategies.
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The most important difference to the case of revenue maximization is the appear-
ance of a further externality. A welfare maximizing planner will also consider the
pecuniary effects of its detection policy: A higher audit rate will reduce the capital
income as well as the fixed factor income of the regional consumer. The latter effect
arises, since a capital outflow will lower the marginal productivity of the fixed factor.
However, the loss of capital in one region will lead to an inflow of capital and there-
fore to higher fixed factor incomes in the rest of the economy. On the other hand, all
capital owners, domestic as well as foreign, will receive lower income from capital since
an increase in audit rates will decrease the interest rate. Since a regional planner does
not take into account the impact on factor incomes in the rest of the economy, there
is a pecuniary externality - which can be either positive or negative. Hence, in the
case of unconfined fiscal competition, there are now two externalities - a fiscal and a
pecuniary one - which render the decentralized choice of audit rates inefficient.
How does the introduction of gross or net revenue equalization affect efficiency
in this case? As discussed above, revenue equalization provides a mechanism which
makes the decentralized planner (partially) internalize the fiscal externalities. This also
holds for welfare maximizing planners. The pecuniary externality, however, will not
get internalized via an interregional redistribution mechanism. With this additional
externality, different revenue sharing mechanism will not induce a first best solution.
In general, however, the choice of decentralized auditing policies will be more efficient
under NRS than under GRS.
Central Government Policy
Another limitation of our model is the exogenous choice of the tax policy. Following the
institutional framework in Germany, we have assumed that there is a harmonized tax
rate, chosen by the federal government. The central government might counterbalance
low detection probabilities by raising the statutory tax rate. However, in our framework
this policy is not necessarily feasible. A comparative static analysis for the different
scenarios shows the ambiguous result
dpi
dt
T 0
Hence, an increase in the statutory tax rate might further reduce auditing efforts.
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The other policy instrument available to the central government is the penalty rate.
Since punishment is costless and enforces a lower level of evasion, a central planner
could set s → ∞ and there would be no evasion at all (see Kolm, 1973). However,
strong penalties are probably not feasible: If a firm would go bankrupt because of
a very severe punishment, the penalty may not be credible. Keeping this restriction
in mind and assuming that s is fixed at some credible rate (with pis < 1) appears
plausible.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed the decentralized choice of audit rates for the case of
symmetric regions. As a benchmark result we show that fiscal competition will lead to
detection probabilities which are inefficiently low from the perspective of revenue maxi-
mization. In such a framework, a fiscal equalization scheme has an efficiency enhancing
potential, since interregional redistribution provides a mechanism to internalize fiscal
externalities (see Ko¨thenbu¨rger, 2002). We first consider a system of GRS, which
makes regions bear the full auditing costs while tax revenues get shared. This asym-
metric treatment of costs and revenues introduces a further distortion, which tends to
lower audit rates. As an alternative to GRS, we introduce a system of NRS. Under
this mechanism both costs and revenues are shared and therefore NRS does not create
any distortion. We show that NRS generally induces higher detection probabilities for
large regions. Results for small regions are equal to those in the benchmark case of
unconfined fiscal competition.
The policy implications of these results are straightforward. A federal government
which, on the one hand, equalizes tax revenues between its regions but, on the other,
imposes the costs of tax collection upon these regions, will face a higher degree of tax
evasion. This may well be the case for Germany, since the current fiscal equalization
system corresponds to a GRS scheme. Switching to NRS should lead to more auditing,
less tax evasion and to higher net revenues, while redistribution, the primary objec-
tive of fiscal equalization, would hardly be affected. However, if there is asymmetric
information between central and local governments regarding a region’s auditing costs,
a system of NRS may not be a feasible instrument since jurisdictions could easily
overstate their enforcement costs.
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An alternative which could induce the first best solution would be the centralized
choice of tax enforcement policies – as practiced in centralized countries such as France
and as recently proposed by the German Ministry of Finance. Nevertheless, following
the literature on fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972), there may exist several disadvantages of
a centralized policy our model does not account for. Hence, we can not argue in favor of
a centralization. Furthermore, if we consider the scenario of tax harmonization within
the EU, centralized tax collection appears infeasible. Similarly, the harmonization of
enforcement policies would be a difficult (if not impossible) task, since – in contrast to
taxation – there are hardly any transparent and contractible indicators for the level of
tax enforcement. In this case, audit policies become alternative strategic tools for fiscal
competition. To limit competitive forces, it is therefore important to study different
mechanisms, which help to induce efficiency in decentralized tax collection. Clearly,
further research is needed in order to design a mechanism which is also feasible in the
context of information asymmetries.
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Appendix
Comparative Statics (Section 1.2)
Using the implicit function theorem on (2) we get
∂ei
∂pi
= − st
g′′
< 0, (A.1)
∂ei
∂t
=
1− pis
g′′
> 0 (A.2)
Applying the implicit function theorem on equation (3) and making use of (2) we get
∂ki
∂pi
=
stei +
∂r
∂pi
f ′′
< 0. (A.3)
Effective Tax Rate (Section 1.3)
The effective tax rate is given by tei ≡ t(1− ei + eipis). We can easily derive
∂tei
∂pi
= t
(
st
g′′
(1− pis) + eis
)
> 0 (A.4)
where we made use of (A.1) and pis < 1. From (A.4) and substituting (A.1) we get
∂2tei
∂p2i
= −(st)
2
g′′
(
2− tg
′′′ (1− pis)
(g′′)2
)
< 0 (A.5)
where we assume that the first order effect dominates.
Proof of Proposition 1. We can rewrite condition (7) as
∂tei
∂pi
+Ψ(tei − c(pi))− c′(pi) = 0 (A.6)
with
Ψ =
1
ki
∂ki
∂pi
and condition (9) as
∂tei
∂pi
− c′(pi) = 0. (A.7)
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We know from (A.3) that Ψ < 0. Therefore the second term in (A6) is negative and
the LHS of (A.6) is smaller then the LHS of (A.7) for any pi.
Proof of Proposition 2. In order to compare conditions (7), respectively (A.6),
and (12), we rearrange the latter and get
(1− α) ∂t
e
i
∂pi
+Ψ((1− α) tei − c(pi))− c′(pi) = 0 (A.8)
Note that in general the equilibrium audit rates will differ between the compared
scenarios. However, in a symmetric equilibrium between perfectly symmetric regions,
different levels of pi do not affect the capital allocation, since the capital supply in the
economy is exogenous and audit rates will be the same in all regions. This implies that
(for any pi) Ψ is the same for the different scenarios compared.
The comparison of (A.6) and (A.8) shows that for α > 0 the LHS of (A.8) is smaller
than the LHS of (A.6) for any pi.
Proof of Proposition 3. Comparing (13) with (7) we get the threshold defined in
(14). Note that in the case of symmetric regions there must hold
∑
j 6=i
tej
∂kj
∂pi
+ tei
∂ki
∂pi
= 0 (A.9)
in any symmetric equilibrium. Applying (A.9) on (14) we get
nˆ ≡ ki
∂tei
∂pi
ki
∂tei
∂pi
+ tei
∂ki
∂pi
. (A.10)
Since the denominator of nˆ is positive it follows from (A.3) that nˆ > 1. For the limit∣∣∣tei ∂ki∂pi ∣∣∣→ ki ∂tei∂pi we get nˆ→∞.
Using (A.9) we can rewrite condition (13) in the following way(
1− α
(
1− 1
n
))
∂tei
∂pi
+Ψ((1− α) tei − c(pi))− c′(pi) = 0 (A.11)
One can easily show that for n < nˆi (n > nˆi) the LHS of condition (A.11) is higher
(lower) than the LHS in (A.6) for any pi.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Since the capital allocation is the same for the different
scenarios under consideration (see the Proof of Proposition 2), condition (17) and (7)
are identical.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Analogous to (A.9) there also has to hold
∑
j 6=i
∂kj
∂pi
(
tej − c(pj)
)
+
∂ki
∂pi
(tei − c(pi)) = 0. (A.12)
Using (A.12) we can rearrange (18) and get
∂tei
∂pi
+ γΨ(tei − c(pi))− c′(pi) = 0 (A.13)
with
γ =
1− α
1− α + α
n
.
Since Ψ < 0 and 0 < γ < 1 (for α > 0), the LHS in (A.13) is larger than the LHS of
(A.6) for any pi.
(ii) The LHS of (A.13) is larger than the LHS of (A.11) for any pi, if
α
((
1− 1
n
)
ki
∂tei
∂pi
+ tei
∂ki
∂pi
)
+
α
(1− α)nki
(
∂tei
∂pi
− c′(pi)
)
> 0 (A.14)
Since the first order conditions imply
∂tei
∂pi
> c′(pi), the second term in (A.14) is positive.
Therefore it is sufficient for condition (A.14) to hold, if the expression in the round
brackets in the first term is positive. Using (A.10), one can show that this is equivalent
to n > nˆ.
Chapter 2
Social Norms and Conditional
Cooperative Taxpayers
2.1 Introduction
Income tax evasion is a serious problem in most OECD countries and even more so
in less developed economies (Andreoni et al., 1998). In order to come up with appro-
priate policy measures to fight evasion, a deep understanding of taxpayers behavior is
essential. The conventional economic approach to tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo,
1972) only provides an unsatisfactory fundament for this understanding, as it conflicts
with empirical findings in several major points. Based on Gary Beckers (1968) ap-
proach to the economics of crime, tax evasion is modeled as a risky gamble, where
taxpayers trade off the risk and cost of detection with the chance of getting away with
the evasion.1 The evasion decision is thereby equivalent to an optimal portfolio choice
problem, as individuals decide on how much of their income to declare – invest in a
safe asset – and how much to conceal – invest in a risky asset. As most fiscal systems
are characterized by rather low audit rates and penalties (Skinner and Slemrod, 1985),
a rational taxpayers with a reasonable degree of risk aversion should invest into the
risky asset and conceal some income (Bernasconi, 1998). In contrast to this prediction,
however, we observe that many households fully comply with tax laws. The main flaw
of the theory is therefore its failure to explain the level of tax compliance documented
in many countries.2 Consequently, research in the past two decades has focused on the
1Cowell (1990) provides a comprehensive discussion of the basic model framework and several
extensions. Compare also Andreoni et al. (1998) and Sandmo (2004).
2Compare e.g. Alm et al. (1992), Graetz and Wilde (1995) as well as Andreoni et al. (1998).
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question why people pay taxes (Alm et al., 1992; Slemrod, 1992).
Recent attempts to solve the compliance puzzle rest upon prospect theory and other
deviations from standard expected utility theory.3 However, there is evidence which
cast doubt on the relevance of these approaches for the case of tax evasion. Baldry
(1986), for example, shows that individuals who are prepared to take a certain amount
of risk in a conventional lottery, stick to the safe asset once the lottery is framed as a
tax evasion game.4,5 Hence, cheating on the government seems to be more than just a
gamble. As expressed by Agnar Sandmo (2004, p.11), ‘people refrain from tax evasion
[...] not only from their estimates of the expected penalty, but for reasons that have
to do with social and morale considerations.’ This statement is supported by ample
empirical evidence, which demonstrates the importance of ‘tax morale’ – taxpayers
attitudes, moral values and perceptions about civic duty – for the decision to conceal
income.6 Several studies emphasize that the perceived evasion of other taxpayers plays
a crucial role in the determination of tax morale (e.g. Porcano, 1988; Spicer and Hero,
1985). Survey data typically show that those individuals who believe that most other
taxpayers are honest, consider evasion as a more serious wrongdoing than those, who
overestimate the level of evasion (Ko¨rner and Strotmann, 2005; Torger, 2005). This
evidence can be also linked to the observed interdependency of evasion decisions: If
evasion is believed to be widespread this increases the propensity to cheat on taxes
(Feld and Tyran, 2002; Geeroms and Wilmots, 1985).
In this chapter we account for these findings and provide an analytical framework
which incorporates the concept of tax morale into the standard approach by Allingham
and Sandmo (1972). We model tax morale as an internalized social norm for tax
compliance (Elster, 1989). This norm works as a soft constraint on action, which
render evasion ‘costly’: If a taxpayer deviates from the norm and conceals income,
conduct is not in line with the individuals self-image as a ‘good’ member of society, who
complies with societal norms and expectations. The strength of the social norm, and
thereby the self-imposed sanctions associated with a norm violation, are determined
by the individual specific degree of norm internalization as well as the share of evaders
3Bernasconi (1998), Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004), Dhami and Ali al-Nowaihi (2005), Eide (2002).
4According to prospect theory, framing should only matter if the ‘reference point’ of the prospect,
e.g. related to the initial endowment, would change.
5Compare also Reckers et al. (1994). Further experimental evidence is discussed by Ge¨rxhani and
Schram (2005).
6See e.g. Alm et al. (1992, 1995), Feld and Frey (2002), Frey and Feld (2002), Gu¨th and Sausgruber
(2004), Gu¨th et al. (2005), Lewis (1986), Orviska and Hudson (2002), Reckers et al. (1994), Scholz
and Pinney (1995). Compare also Chapter 6 in Cowell (1990) and Torgler (2002) as well as vast survey
evidence summarized by Torgler (2005).
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in the society. The more people deviate from the norm, the weaker the compliance
norm becomes. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative,7 as they condition their tax
compliance on the honesty of other members of the society. This interdependence of
evasion behavior will typically result in a multiplicity of equilibria.
We consider a large, heterogenous population. While some agents only maximize
the expected return from the evasion gamble, others are also guided by the social norm.
The power of the social norm relative to the monetary incentives is determined by an
agent’s norm sensitivity. For a given level of taxation and enforcement we can then
derive a threshold for this norm sensitivity, which separates the population into those
who adhere to the norm and those who conceal some of their income. As the tax
rate increases, the threshold will rise and more taxpayers will start to evade taxes. A
similar effect arises in the model of Myles and Naylor (1996).8 In their approach, the
social norm also constrains some individuals to a corner solution where they refrain
from evasion. However, they consider a fixed cost of evasion, which implies that those
agents who evade do so in the way predicted by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In
contrast, we assume that the utility loss of a norm violation is increasing in the own
evasion level. This assumption is supported by survey evidence, which indicates that
people differentiate in their moral judgements between small and large amounts of tax
evasion (Aitken and Bonneville, 1980; Lewis, 1986). Hence, the evaders in our approach
trade-off the monetary benefits from evasion with the non-pecuniary costs associated
with a norm violation.9 The optimal amount an individual conceals then depends –
next to monetary incentives and risk preferences – also on the agent’s norm sensitivity
and the behavior of the other taxpayers; Norm guided individuals will not choose an
optimal portfolio but ‘overinvest into the safe asset’. This result is closely related to the
findings in Gordon (1989), who also considers variable costs from evasion, associated
to ‘private stigma concerns’. In an extension he incorporates ‘social stigma’ costs
which depend on the behavior of other agents. While Gordon’s and our framework
strongly overlap, our model is more compact and allows a clearer analysis. Moreover,
we provide a detailed examination of tax and deterrence policies in the context of
interrelated evasion decisions, which is neglected in Gordon (1989).
7Compare Keser and van Winden (2000) and Fischbacher et al. (2001) as well as Ga¨chter (2005)
for a comprehensive survey.
8Further behavioral economic approaches modelling tax evasion are provided by Bordignon (1993),
Erard and Feinstein (1994), Falkinger (1995) and Schnellenbach (2002). Compare also Chapter 6 in
Cowell (1990).
9There is clear empirical evidence which suggest that people trade off between monetary and
‘emotional’ incentives. Compare e.g. Bosman and van Winden (2002).
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The main contribution of this chapter is the analysis of the relationship between
a society’s social structure and the level of tax evasion, which is completely novel
in the tax evasion literature. In particular, we consider a society which consists of
different subgroups, and show, that the impact of a group specific tax increase may
cause a spillover on the level of evasion in other groups of the society. This is the case,
since a higher tax will trigger an increase in the level of evasion within the targeted
group. If this group works as a ‘moral reference group’ for other peers, more frequent
cheating among the reference group can have an intense impact on the tax morale and
thereby on the level of compliance in the rest of the society. Therefore, a change in the
incentives to evade for one small group could have a large impact on the overall level of
evasion. Following this line of reasoning, our model also highlights the crucial role of
taxpayers’ beliefs, and the ‘management’ of these beliefs. Hence, next to conventional
enforcement policies (deterrence), appropriate information and belief management also
constitute a measure to support tax compliance.
Finally, our model solves another weakness of the portfolio choice approach. For
the plausible assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, the standard theory
implies that higher taxes will lead to a lower level of evasion. If the penalty imposed
on detected evaders is proportional to the concealed income, a tax increase does not
trigger any substitution effect, as both the gains from evasion as well as the costs
(associated with a higher expected fine) rise (Yitzhaki, 1974). The negative income
effect then makes taxpayers less willing to bear risks. Therefore, they will conceal less
income. We demonstrate that this counterintuitive result, which is also at odds with
most empirical studies (e.g. Clotfelter, 1983), vanishes in our model, if individuals
are strongly affected by the social norm. Moral taxpayers hold a biased portfolio
with too little evasion, where the marginal expected return from evasion is positive.
Any tax increase then further raises the marginal return from cheating and thereby
provides an incentive to extend the level of evasion. We can find a threshold, where
this substitution effect outbalances the income effect and the counterintuitive result
turns around – evasion would increase with a higher tax rate. This result, however, is
not new in the literature, as it has already been discussed by Gordon (1989).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly
present the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model as a benchmark for our analysis. In
section 2.3 we introduce a tax compliance norm and discuss optimal evasion within this
framework. Section 2.4 provides an equilibrium concept for a heterogenous population
of taxpayers. We analyze the equilibrium impact of the policy variables and study the
choice of a tax and deterrence policy within this framework. In section 2.5, we extend
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our model to a society consisting of different subgroups, and demonstrate how group
specific policy measures can cause spillovers on other subgroups of the society. The
paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of this study.
2.2 The Allingham-Sandmo Model
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) (hereafter labeled AS) consider an individual with an
exogenous gross income y. Each taxpayer i decides on how much of this income to
declare and how much to conceal. Income concealed is labeled e ∈ [0, y]. The declared
income, y − e, gets taxed with a proportional income tax at rate τ . With a fixed
probability p the evasion gets detected. In this case, the tax evader has to pay the full
taxes and a penalty, which is proportional to the taxes evaded (Yitzhaki, 1974). With
probability 1 − p the evasion remains undetected and the evader only pays taxes on
the declared income. The corresponding levels of net income x for state a – getting
detected – respectively state b – escaping undetected – are given by
xa = xa(e) = y − (y − e) τ − τe− τes = (1− τ) y − τes
xb = xb(e) = y − (y − e) τ = (1− τ)y + τe
where s > 0 denotes the penalty rate. The preferences of a risk averse taxpayer are
represented by the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
E [u(x(e))] = p u(xa(e)) + (1− p) u(xb(e)) (1)
with u′(x) > 0 and u′′(x) < 0. Agents choose e so as to maximize expected utility.
The first- and second-order condition to this problem is given by
E [u]′ ≡ −psτ u′(xa) + (1− p) τ u′(xb) = 0 (2)
respectively
E [u]′′ ≡ p(sτ)2 u′′(xa) + (1− p) τ 2 u′′(xb) < 0, (3)
Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers 38
Condition (2) characterizes eAS, the optimal level of income concealed.10 One can
easily show that the level of evasion decreases as tax enforcement becomes stricter:
deAS
dp
< 0 (4)
deAS
ds
< 0. (5)
Implicitly differentiating E [u]′ with respect to τ yields
deAS
dτ
=
(1− p) τ u′(xb) [(y − e) (ρ(xb)− ρ(xa))− e (s+ 1) ρ(xb)]
−E [u]′′ (6)
where we made use of (2) and the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion,
ρ (x) = −u′′(x)/u′(x). For the case of non-increasing absolute risk aversion, i.e. ρ′ ≤ 0
and hence ρ(xai ) ≥ ρ(xbi), the sign in the squared brackets in (6) is negative. Hence,
we get the paradoxical result deAS/dτ < 0. According to the AS-framework, taxpayers
with constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion conceal less income, if the tax rate
rises. This counterintuitive finding is driven by the structure of the fine. Here we follow
Yitzhaki (1974), who assumes that the penalty is assessed on the level of taxes evaded,
rather than income concealed, as in the original AS paper. An increase in taxes will
therefore raise both, the marginal gain from undetected evasion, i.e. taxes saved, as
well as the marginal costs associated with higher fines in the case of detection. In the
optimum, these two effects exactly offset each other. There is no substitution effect
and the impact of a tax increase on the optimal evasion level is solely driven by the
income effect. In the case of decreasing absolute risk aversion, a rise in taxes will reduce
evasion, as a lower income makes taxpayers less willing to bear risks.
We will take this finding as a benchmark and show that it might vanish if taxpayers
are not only guided by monetary incentives but also by ‘moral concerns’ (defined be-
low). In order to guarantee the comparability of results, we maintain the assumption
of non-increasing absolute risk aversion throughout the whole chapter.
10We focus on interior solutions with eAS ∈ [0, y].
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2.3 A Social Norm for Tax Compliance
As we have discussed in the introduction, tax evasion seems to be more than a risky
gamble. We here focus on the impact of tax morals on evasion behavior. Tax morals is
modelled as a social norm for tax compliance – or equivalently, a norm against evasion.
Declaring all income correctly is considered to be the ‘morally right’ behavior, while
cheating on the taxes represents a violation of a social norm. Each member of the
society has internalized these moral connotations to a certain degree. If a taxpayer
conceals income, behavior is in conflict with morals. Conduct is not in line with the
individuals’ self-image as a ‘good’ member of society, who complies with societal norms
and expectations. Tax evasion is then accompanied by ‘emotional costs’ which stem
from self-imposed sanctions such as feelings of guilt or remorse. The impact of these
sanctions varies with the endogenous strength of the norm. Following the literature
on social norms (e.g. Akerlof, 1980), we assume that a norm is perceived as stronger,
the more people adhere to it. If tax evasion becomes more common, the social norm is
less strong and individuals’ costs to deviate from the norm decline: It becomes easier
for taxpayers to justify their wrong-doing to themselves, the more other people violate
the societies’ code of conduct.11
We incorporate such a social norm for tax compliance, considering a simple, additive
preference structure expressed by the utility function
v (ei, θi) = E [u(x(ei))]− θi ei c(n). (7)
E [u(x(ei))] represents the expected (monetary) utility as defined in (1) and θi ei c(n)
represent the moral costs of tax evasion.12 Moral costs are linearly increasing in ei, the
amount of income concealed by agent i.13 The (marginal) moral costs of evasion are
determined by θi ≥ 0, the individual specific degree of norm internalization, and the
11In addition to internal, self-imposed sanctions, norm deviation are typically associated with
external, social sanctions, such as social disapproval, stigmatization or ostracism. We focus here on a
purely private decision, assuming that any consequence of evasion (e.g. legal consequences in the case
of detection) are private information. Since the scope for social sanctioning is then limited to within
household interaction, we do not consider any external norm enforcement mechanism. (Note, however,
that these within-household interactions seem to play an important role. As many empirical studies
highlight, single households evade significantly more taxes than members of non-single household do.
Compare e.g. Andreoni et al. 1998 an references therein.)
12As self-imposed sanctions occur irrespectively whether evasion gets detected or not, there is no
risk associated with this payoff.
13Empirical support for this assumption is provided by Aitken and Bonneville (1980) and Lewis
(1986). Note that non-linearity would not change our results qualitatively.
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continuous function c(n), which captures the strength of the norm for a given share of
tax evaders n in the society.14 We assume that c(n) > 0 and c′(n) ≤ 0 for n ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, the more taxpayer deviate from the norm, the lower are the moral costs of
evasion.
Gordon (1989) considers a very similar preference structure: He considers ‘private
psychic costs’, which are homogenous for all agents, as well as social costs, which
are linearly decreasing in the share of evaders. This separation into different cost
components unnecessarily complicates his analysis. While the form of v(.) introduced
in (7) is still very specific, it is simpler and – using the function c(n) – more general
than the preference structure studied by Gordon (1989).
2.3.1 Optimal Evasion Decision
Taking the policy variables as well as the number of evaders n as given, an agent
maximizes v (ei, θi) with respect to ei. The first order condition
15 for an interior solution
is
−psτ u′(xai ) + (1− p) τ u′(xbi) = θi c(n). (8)
As the left hand side of (8) is equal to E [u]′ from (2), we can express condition (8) as
E [u]′ = θi c(n). Norm guided taxpayers will choose a level of evasion such that E [u]
′,
the marginal expected monetary utility, equals θi c(n), the marginal moral costs from
an increase in the level of income concealed. Homo oeconomicus does not care about
norms or morals, i.e. θi = 0. Such an agent chooses an optimal portfolio, increasing
evasion up to the point where the marginal expected utility is equal to zero. This yields
the level of evasion predicted by the AS framework, eAS. In contrast, taxpayers with
high levels of θi may be in a corner solution and refrain from evasion. Let us define
the marginal expected utility for the first unit of evasion,
z ≡ E [u (x(0))]′ = (1− p (1 + s)) τ u′ ((1− τ) y) , (9)
14Given that the total level of evasion is hardly observable and difficult to assess for a single
individual, it appears plausible to assume that agents draw on the share of evaders rather than e.g.
the mean level of evasion in society as a measure for the level of norm deviations.
15The second order condition is equivalent to (3).
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with z > 0.16 From (3) and (8) it then follows that any taxpayer with θic(n) > z does
not conceal any income. From this follows the definition
θˆ(n) ≡ z
c(n)
, (10)
which allows us to characterize the optimal individual evasion behavior eˆi for a given
level of n:
eˆi =
0 for θi > θˆ(n)e∗i for θi ≤ θˆ(n) . (11)
Individuals with θi > θˆ(n) will stick to the compliance norm. On the other hand,
those with θi ≤ θˆ(n) will choose an interior solution e∗i according to condition (8). A
graphical representation of the optimal evasion level is provided in figure 2.1.17
Figure 2.1: Optimal Evasion with a Social Norm
While an agent with θi = θˆ(n) will adhere to the tax compliance norm, taxpayers
with θi = 0 will choose e
AS, which maximizes E[u]. Individuals with 0 ≤ θi ≤ θˆ(n)
will choose an intermediate level of evasion, e∗i ∈ [0, eAS]. Note that e∗i depends – next
to the policy variables p, s, τ , income y and norm sensitivity θi – also on the n, the
share of evaders in a society. Hence, evasion decisions are interdependent. Before we
16For z < 0 the would hold (1− p (1 + s)) < 0. In this case, evasion would not be a ‘fair gamble’,
in the sense that concealing income yields a negative expected return. The enforcement policy would
be deterrent, as no rational agent would conceal any income.
17Despite the fact that E [u]′ is typically non-linearly decreasing in ei, we have used a linear form
for the sake of graphical simplicity.
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characterize an equilibrium which accounts for this interdependence, we provide a brief
comparative static analysis.
2.3.2 Partial Equilibrium Analysis
Applying the implicit function theorem on (8) we get18
∂e∗i
∂p
=
sτ u′(xai ) + τ u
′(xbi)
E [u]′′
< 0 (12)
∂e∗i
∂s
=
pτ (u′(xai )− sτe∗i u′′(xa))
E [u]′′
< 0 (13)
∂e∗i
∂θi
=
c(n)
E [u]′′
< 0 (14)
∂e∗i
∂n
=
θi c
′(n)
E [u]′′
≥ 0. (15)
As in the AS framework, stricter enforcement will reduce evasion. Raising the penalty
or the audit rate will induce agents to declare more income. Next to the formal tax
enforcement institution, also the social norm has a deterrent effect: A boost in the
norm sensitivity θi will result in a lower level of evasion. In terms of figure 2.1, the
θic(n) line would shift upwards and e
∗
i would decline. Furthermore, (15) shows that
taxpayers condition their evasion on the behavior of others. As more people start to
evade taxes, agents with 0 < θi ≤ θˆ(n) react by concealing more income. The more
taxpayers deviate from the compliance norm, the weaker the social norm, the lower are
the moral cost of concealing income. In this sense, cheating has a positive externality
on other evaders – it partially legitimates their wrong-doing, and thereby provides an
incentive to evade more. From (10) we can derive
∂θˆ(n)
∂n
= −θˆ(n)c
′(n)
c(n)
≥ 0 (16)
since c′(n) ≤ 0. With a higher level of n, the compliance threshold θˆ(n) rises. Some
agents with θi ≥ θˆ(n), who used to refrain from evasion, will start to conceal income
after an increase in n. These taxpayers condition their compliance with the tax law
on the behavior of others. They act as conditional cooperative taxpayers. We will
18Note that in (12)-(14) we hold the share of evaders n constant.
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elaborate on the implications of this behavior in the following section.
Let us now turn to the impact of a tax increase. From (8) we obtain
∂e∗i
∂τ
=
1
−E [u]′′
{
θi c(n)
τ
+ psτ u′′(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− (1− p) τ u′′(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
. (17)
Note that for θi = 0 the first term in the curly brackets is zero, and the right hand side
is equivalent to the effect derived in the AS framework, depicted in (6). Making use of
the measure of absolute risk-aversion, we can derive from (17) a threshold θ˜(n),19
θ˜(n) =
(1− p) τ 2u′(xbi)
{
ρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− ρ(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
c(n) (1 + τρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i ))
, (18)
such that
∂e∗i
∂τ
 ≥ 0 for θi ≥ θ˜(n)< 0 for θi < θ˜(n) (19)
While for low levels of θi the counterintuitive effect from the AS model carries over to
our framework, the result turns around for agents with a sufficient strong tax morale:
As θi > θ˜(n) we get the more plausible result that tax evasion increases with a higher
tax rate. Moreover, from (18) and c′(n) ≤ 0 follows that θ˜(n) is increasing in the levels
of norm deviations. The lower the share of tax evaders in the society, the lower is θ˜(n)
and thereby
∂e∗i
∂τ
≥ 0 holds for a broader range of θ-values.20
The intuition for this finding, which is similar to Proposition 1 in Gordon (1989),
is straightforward. As we have discussed above, a tax increase will raise the marginal
benefits from evasion, as well as the marginal costs (associated with higher expected
fines). For the optimal evasion level of the AS model these two effects offset each other.
Hence, there is no substitution effect and the negative income effect associated with a
tax rise triggers a reduction in the evasion level. In our context, however, we find a
positive substitution effect for all agents with θi > 0 (depicted in the first term in the
curly brackets in (17)). These agents will choose an evasion level such that E [u]′ > 0.
Marginal expected benefits from evasion are above marginal expected costs.21 In terms
of optimal portfolio choice, moral taxpayers over-invest into the safe asset – they conceal
too little and declare too much income. An increase in the tax rate then raises the wedge
19Compare the Appendix.
20Note, however, that non-increasing absolute risk aversion implies θ˜(n) > 0, since for ρ′(x) ≤ 0⇒
ρ(xai ) ≥ ρ(xbi ). Hence, there is always a range [0, θ˜(n)] where the result from AS also holds in our
framework.
21Stated more formally, there holds (1− p) τ u′(xbi ) > psτ u′(xai ).
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between marginal expected benefits and cost even further. This will raise marginal
expected utility E [u]′ for all agents with θi > 0 (respectively e∗i < e
AS). As the moral
costs of evasion are unaffected by a tax change,22 the substitution effect provides an
incentive to increase evasion. While the (negative) income effect is still present, the
(positive) substitution effect dominates for θi > θ˜(n). For these agents, tax evasion
increases as taxes rise. Figure 2.2 provides a graphical representation of the partial
equilibrium effects associated with an increase in the tax rate.
Figure 2.2: Partial Equilibrium Effect of a Tax Increase
From the definition of z above, we can easily derive ∂z/∂τ > 0. From the AS model
we know that E [u]′ evaluated at eASi decreases with an increase of the tax rate. Hence,
the E [u]′ curve turns clockwise as we increase τ , with the turning-point somewhere
between eASi and ei = 0.
23 The intersection of the marginal expected utility curve
before and after the change in the tax rate defines the threshold θ˜(n). In the example
from figure 2.2, individual 1 with θ1 < θ˜(n) will reduce evasion as the tax rate raises.
Individual 2 however, will conceal more income. Moreover, taxpayer 3, who has been
paying taxes honestly before the tax increase, will switch to an interior solution after
the policy change. From this example one can also see, that a change in one policy
variable typically has an impact on the share of evaders. In the following we study this
effect in an equilibrium framework.
22If moral costs depend on the level of taxes evaded rather than on the amount of income concealed,
a higher tax rate would also raise the moral evasion costs. As long as the increase in marginal expected
utility dominates the increase in the marginal costs, we would still observe a rise in the evasion level
for some individuals.
23This also implies 0 < θ˜(n) < θˆ.
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2.4 Social Equilibrium
We consider a continuous population with unit mass. The norm parameter θ is dis-
tributed according to a continuously differentiable, cumulative distribution function
F (θ), which has full support on the interval [0, θ¯]. The corresponding density function
is f(θ) and the inverse of the distribution function is denoted F−1(n). As we know
from (11), people choose to evade income if θi ≤ θˆ(n). The equilibrium population
share of evaders n∗ is then given by the fixed-point equation
n∗ = F
(
z
c(n∗)
)
(20)
The right hand side of (20) is a continuous function in n, mapping the compact interval
[0, 1] into itself. Assuming that θ¯c(1) ≥ z – and thereby θˆ(1) ≤ θ¯ – there always exists
at least one stable equilibrium n∗ ∈ (0, 1],24 where stability is defined by
∂F−1(n)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
n∗
≥ ∂θˆ(n)
∂n
∣∣∣∣∣
n∗
(21)
For a given set of policy variables (τ, p, s) such a stable equilibrium characterizes a self
supporting share of evaders. For n∗, the strength of the norm is such that a population
share of 1 − n∗ will declare their income honestly, while the remaining n∗ will choose
an interior solution e∗i . While there is at least one solution to (20), the system is
typically characterized by a multiplicity of equilibria. If evasion has become prevalent,
the compliance norm is weak and society might find itself in a stable equilibrium with
widespread cheating. For the same policy (τ, p, s) and distribution F (θ), however, the
society could in principle coordinate on a different equilibrium, where most agents
adhere to the norm. The social norm would be stronger and the level of tax evasion in
the society would be smaller. Such a scenario is depicted in figure 2.3.
In the example of figure 2.3 we have assumed that θ is uniformly distributed. The
shape of θˆ(n) is defined by the function c(n). In this example, there are two stable
equilibria - a ‘good’ one, where only a small fraction n∗l deviates from the norm and
a ‘bad’ equilibrium with widespread evasion, n∗h. Between these two stable equilibria,
there is a third, instable one, with n∗m. Starting from any share n < n
∗
m, the system
converges to the good equilibrium (respectively to the bad equilibrium, for any n > n∗m).
24An equilibrium with n∗ = 0 is not supported. As we allow for a θi = 0, this type of agents always
chooses to evade eAS > 0 for any level of n.
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In the following, we will focus our analysis on stable equilibria.
Figure 2.3: Social Equilibrium – Impact of a Tax Increase
2.4.1 Equilibrium Effect of Deterrence Policies
Let us take a look at the impact of the tax enforcement variables s and p on the
equilibrium share of evaders as well as on the equilibrium level of evasion. From (20)
we derive in the Appendix that in a stable equilibrium there holds
dn∗
dp
< 0, (22)
dn∗
ds
< 0. (23)
An increase in either p or s will shift the θˆ(n)-curve downwards and the population
share of evaders drops. Using (22) and (23), we get the equilibrium impact of a stricter
enforcement policy:
de∗i
dp
=
∂e∗i
∂p
+
∂e∗i
∂n
dn∗
dp
< 0 (24)
de∗i
ds
=
∂e∗i
∂s
+
∂e∗i
∂n
dn∗
ds
< 0 (25)
In addition to the first-order effects ∂e∗i /∂p and ∂e
∗
i /∂s derived above in (12) and (13),
there is now a second order effect: As auditing or penalty rates become higher, the
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resulting drop in the share of evaders makes the social norm for tax compliance stronger
– the moral costs of tax evasion increase. This will trigger a further reduction in the
level of evasion. Hence, in our framework, the equilibrium impact of tax enforcement is
stronger than suggested by the partial equilibrium analysis, respectively the AS model.
2.4.2 Equilibrium Effect of a Tax Increase
We now turn to the other policy variable, the tax rate. As already addressed above,
individuals with θi above θˆ(n) may switch from a corner solution to an interior solution
after a tax increase. These new evaders will weaken the social norm, moral costs of
evasion decline and some honest taxpayers will start concealing income. The equilib-
rium effect is captured by an upward shift of the θˆ(n)-curve in figure 2.3, which results
in an extension of the share of evaders: n∗l respectively n
∗
h increase. As we show in the
Appendix, we we can derive from (20)
dn∗
dτ
> 0. (26)
With a higher tax rate, the marginal expected utility from concealing the first unit
of income increases ( ∂z
∂τ
> 0). Accordingly, the evasion threshold θˆ(n) rises for any n.
The equilibrium impact on the optimal level of evasion is then given by
de∗i
dτ
=
∂e∗i
∂τ
+
∂e∗i
∂n
dn∗
dτ
(27)
with ∂e∗i /∂n and ∂e
∗
i /∂τ from (15) respectively (17). As we have shown above in (19),
the sign of the first order effect is ambiguous and depends on the norm parameter θi.
In contrast, the second order effect is unambiguously positive for all θi > 0. We can
derive a new threshold θ˜′(n∗),25
θ˜′(n∗) =
(1− p) τ 2 u′(xbi)
{
ρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− ρ(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
c(n∗)
(
1 + τρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− τ c
′(n∗)
c(n∗)
dn∗
dτ
) , (28)
such that
de∗i
dτ
 ≥ 0 for θi ≥ θ˜′(n∗)< 0 for θi < θ˜′(n∗) (29)
25Compare the Appendix.
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In equilibrium, there are two effects which tend to raise evasion. First, there is a
positive substitution effect, discussed in the partial equilibrium analysis above. Second,
a tax increase is accompanied by an increase in the equilibrium share of norm breaking
individuals. This second order effect lowers the moral cost of evasion and thereby
provides a further incentive to conceal more income. For taxpayers with θi ≥ θ˜′(n∗)
these two effects dominate the negative income effect – they will react with more
evasion on an increase in the tax rate. Moreover, it follows from this discussion that
θ˜′(n∗) < θ˜(n∗).26 Hence, compared to the partial equilibrium analysis, de∗i /dτ ≥ 0
holds for a broader range of θ-values.
2.4.3 Policy Choice with Social Norms
We now discuss the choice of the policy variables within this framework. The total
level of income concealed in a society, e¯, is represented by the grey shaded area in figure
2.1. Formally this is
e¯ =
θ¯∫
0
e(θ, τ, p) dF (θ), (30)
where e(θ, τ, p) denotes the optimal evasion level eˆi as defined in (11). From (30) we
easily get
de¯
dτ
=
θ˜′(n∗)∫
0
de(θ, τ, p)
dτ
dF (θ) +
θˆ(n∗)∫
θ˜′(n∗)
de(θ, τ, p)
dτ
dF (θ) (31)
From (29) we know that first term on the right hand side is negative, since agents
with θi < θ˜
′(n∗) conceal less income as the tax rate rises. The second term, however,
is positive, since taxpayers with θi > θ˜
′(n∗) evade more.27 If, for a given tax τ and
equilibrium state n∗, the population mass in the latter group is sufficiently high – that
is, if there is a sufficient number of taxpayers who are significantly affected by the
social norm – the second term in (31) dominates and de¯/dτ > 0. Note, however, that
the magnitude of the two integral terms in (31), as well as the integral limit θ˜′(n∗),
depends on the tax rate respectively the equilibrium state. Hence, there may also exist
equilibria with de¯/dτ < 0. Let us assume that this is indeed the case for low levels of
τ and that d
2e¯
dτ2
≥ 0 holds. A tax policy which minimizes the level of income concealed
26As the equilibrium (second order) effect is always positive, de
∗
i
dτ > 0 does also hold in a range
where the substitution effect is dominated by the income effect.
27Figure 2.2 illustrates the partial equilibrium impact on e¯. The light-grey shaded area captures
the increase in evasion, the dark shaded area the reduction in concealed income.
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is then characterized by
de¯
dτ
= 0. (32)
The tax rate would be chosen such that the two effects depicted in (31) exactly offset
each other.28
Consider now revenue maximization as an alternative policy objective. The problem
of a revenue maximizing planner becomes
max
τ
R = τ (y − e¯ (1− p (1 + s))) .
The first order condition for an interior solution is
y − e¯ (1− p (1 + s))− τ (1− p (1 + s)) de¯
dτ
= 0,
which can be expressed as
de¯
dτ
τ
e¯
=
R
τy −R (33)
The left hand side of this condition represents the elasticity of (total) income concealed
with respect to a tax increase. The right hand side gives the actual revenues relative to
the tax gap – the difference between tax revenues in the case without any evasion, τy,
and the actual revenues, R. A revenue maximizing planner increases the tax rate up
to the point where the ratio of actual to missing revenues equals the evasion elasticity.
As τy ≥ R > 0, the right hand side is positive. For a revenue maximizing tax rate
there has to hold de¯
dτ
> 0. As we assume e¯ to be convex in the tax rate, it immediately
follows from (32) that such a tax is higher than the tax which minimizes total incomes
concealed. Note that this result is in sharp contrast with the policy choice suggested
by the AS framework, where the revenue maximizing tax is equivalent to the evasion
minimizing tax characterized by τ → 1.29
Let us now turn to the enforcement policy. Taking the penalty rate s as exogenously
given,30 we consider an authority which maximizes revenues R net of tax enforcement
28In case de¯/dτ > 0 for all τ ∈ [0, 1] and e¯ is convex in τ , the total level of incomes concealed would
be minimized at τ = 0.
29This is of course driven by the fact that in the AS model evasion is decreasing in the tax. Compare
equation (6).
30As already noted by Kolm (1973), one could induce full compliance by setting s→∞. However,
since there are several good reasons why most modern societies do not use capital punishment, we
simply assume that s is fixed at a certain level. The upper bound for s might be constrained due to
the credibility of penalties in the case of limited liability.
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costs d(p), with d′ > 0 and d′′ > 0 for p ∈ (0, 1). The problem is then given by
max
p
τ (y − e¯ (1− p (1 + s)))− d(p)
and an interior solution is characterized by
τ e¯ (1 + s)− d′(p)− τ (1− p (1 + s)) de¯
dp
= 0, (34)
with
de¯
dp
=
θˆ(n)∫
0
de(θ, τ, p)
dp
dF (θ) < 0. (35)
(The second order condition holds as long as d
2e¯
dp2
≥ 0.) Rearranging (34) and substi-
tuting for R we get
de¯
dp
p
e¯
=
p (τ e¯ (1 + s)− d′(p))
τy −R , (36)
where the left hand side captures the elasticity of concealed incomes with respect to
the detection probability. The denominator on the right hand side is the revenue gap,
as above in (33) and the numerator reflects the direct impact of a higher detection rate
on net revenues – the first and second term in (34) – weighted by p.31 As it follows
from (24) that de¯
dp
< 0, the left hand side is negative. Hence, for a revenue maximizing
enforcement policy the numerator on the right hand side must be negative, i.e. the
marginal costs from auditing must be larger than the direct marginal benefits.
As we have discussed in section 2.4.2, the second order effect of tax enforcement
(associated with a strengthening of the social norm) renders the impact of auditing
stronger as compared to the AS framework. The elasticity of evasion in our framework
is therefore higher, which implies that the revenue maximizing audit rate is above the
level predicted by AS.
2.5 Social Structure and Inter-Group Spillovers
In order to discuss the potential impact of a society’s social structure on tax evasion, we
present a simple extension of the basic model. To the best of the author’s knowledge,
this approach is novel in the literature on tax evasion. Consider an economy with
31Note that in (33), the nominator can also be interpreted as the direct revenue gains from a tax
increase, weighted by the tax.
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two classes of individuals: Those who receive (exclusively) capital incomes and those
who earn labor income. The income level within each group is denoted by yj where
the index j indicates the income source, j ∈ {K,L}. Allowing the tax policy to
discriminate between different income sources, the utility of an agent i from group j is
given by
vj (eij, θij) = p u(x
a
j (eij)) + (1− p) u(xbj(eij))− θij eij (αjc(nj) + (1− αj) c(nk)) (37)
with
xaij = x
a
j (eij) = (1− τj) yj − τjeijs,
xbij = x
b
j(eij) = (1− τj)yj + τjeij,
where nj ∈ [0, 1] respectively nk ∈ [0, 1], denotes the share of evaders among agents
with income source j respectively k 6= j. In (37) we assume that the moral costs
of evasion depend on the norm compliance behavior in both groups. The parameter
αj ∈ [0, 1] thereby captures the sensitivity of the norm strength in group j with respect
to norm deviations in the own respectively the other group. If αj = 1, the norm is
completely group specific, as its strength is solely determined by the behavior of the
own peers. If 0 < αj < 1, however, the norm strength is co-determined by the actions
taken by agents from both income groups. If αj → 0, members of group k take over
the position of moral role models for group j. Norm deviations within this reference
group then have a crucial impact on the tax morale of taxpayers from group j.32
Taking the policy variables as well as nj and nk as given,
33 individuals choose eij
maximizing utility given by (37). Analogously to (8), the first order condition for this
problem is
−psτj u′(xaij) + (1− p) τj u′(xbij) = θij (αjc(nj) + (1− αj) c(nk)) (38)
and the threshold for an interior solution becomes
θˆj(nj, nk) =
zj
αjc(nj) + (1− αj) c(nk) (39)
32If we assume that moral costs are shaped by the structure of direct social interactions, one could
also interpret the parameter α as the degree of population segregation or viscosity ( compare Myerson
et al., 1991). If αj is high, the interaction frequency with types from the other group is low (and vice
versa).
33We assume that groups are large such that self-perceived insignificance holds.
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with
zj = (1− p (1 + s)) τj u′ ((1− τj) yj) > 0. (40)
For θij ≤ θˆj(nj, nk), condition (38) characterizes the optimal evasion level e∗ij. All
agents with θij above this threshold are in a corner solution and pay all their taxes
honestly.
2.5.1 Social Equilibrium and Policy Spillovers
How can we describe a social equilibrium for a society consisting of two groups? Let
each income group be represented by a continuum [0, 1]. Assuming that there is no
difference in the degree of norm internalization between the two income groups, and
θij ∈ [0, θ¯] is distributed according to F (θ) for both types.34 A stable social equilibrium
is then given by the pair
(
n∗j , n
∗
k
)
with
n∗j = F (θˆj(n
∗
j , n
∗
k 6=j) for j ∈ {K,L} (41)
and stability is characterized by
∂F−1
∂nj
∣∣∣∣
nj=n∗j
≥ dθˆj(nj, nk)
dnj
∣∣∣∣∣
nj=n∗j ,nk=n
∗
k
(42)
One can show that such an equilibrium exists as long as θˆj(1, 1) < θ¯ holds.
35
What is the impact of a change in the tax policy in this extended framework?
Consider an increase in the tax rate for income group j. As before, we can derive that
dn∗j
dτj
≥ 0 (43)
holds in any stable equilibrium.36 A tax increase still induces more people to cheat on
taxes. However, a higher level of n∗j now has a negative impact on the perceived norm
strength in the other group, and thereby triggers more norm deviations within that
34Allowing for between-group heterogeneity – e.g. with respect to risk-preferences, income or the
distribution of θ – would not change our results in any qualitative way.
35Note that θˆj(0, nk) > 0 holds as c(0) is finite.
36All the results of this section are derived in the Appendix.
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group k. In particular, we get from (41)
dn∗k
dn∗j
≥ 0. (44)
The impact of a higher tax rate τj on the optimal evasion decision of a taxpayer with
income from source j is then given by
de∗ij
dτj
=
∂e∗i
∂τj
+
(
∂e∗ij
∂nj
+
∂e∗ij
∂nk
dn∗k
dn∗j
)
dn∗j
dτj
(45)
where one can derive the partial equilibrium effects ∂e∗i /∂τj and ∂e
∗
ij/∂nj > 0 anal-
ogously to the effects presented in the previous section.37 Hence, the impact of an
increase in the tax on income of type j on the evasion level of agents of type j is similar
as before. The power of the social norm will decline, as the change in the group specific
tax policy raises the share of evaders in both income groups. Since ∂e∗ij/∂nk > 0, this
provides a similar second order incentive to increase e∗ij, as discussed in the previous
section.38 In addition, however, the tax policy creates an externality on tax compliance
in the other income group:
de∗ik
dτj
=
(
∂e∗ik
∂nj
+
∂e∗ik
∂nk
dn∗k
dn∗j
)
dn∗j
dτj
≥ 0. (46)
Although the change in the tax rate does not alter the monetary incentives of these
taxpayers, they react with an increase in evasion. As more taxpayers from the other
group start cheating, tax morale and therewith compliance in the own group drops as
well. Again, this result is triggered by conditional cooperative taxpayers. While in
the basic framework this effect occurred within one group (the homogenous society), it
now works between different peers. As a consequence, any group specific policy change
typically causes a spillover on other communities within the society. Only in the case
of groups with fully segregated norm perceptions (i.e. αj = αk = 1), tax policies will
not cause any externalities. In this case, the tax compliance norm is a group specific
rather than a social norm.
This point also reveals that the strength of the externality of a tax τj on evasion
e∗ik is determined by the social relevance of group j for group k. The lower αk, the
more weight is attributed to the behavior of j-agents in determining tax morals within
37Note that all derivatives in (45) as well as in (46) below have to be evaluated at nj = n∗j and
nk = n∗k.
38We could again derive a threshold for θij where de∗ij/dτj > 0 holds.
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group k, the stronger is the spillover. One could easily extend this argument to a society
consisting of many different communities. If there exists one (small) group with high
social respectively moral prestige, which serves as a moral reference group for other
peers, norm violations within this small subgroup have a strong erosive impact on the
social norm in the economy. In this case, the behavior of a few members of society can
have a huge impact on the overall level of tax evasion. Moreover, we could characterize
parameter values, where small changes in the behavior within such a reference group
eliminate the existence of ‘good’ equilibria (as discussed in section 2.3 in the context of
figure 2.3) for other peers. Even a small tax evasion scandal of a high-profile member of
society (e.g. a politician or a manager) could shift a bulk of society from an equilibrium
state with a large extent of tax compliance to a state with widespread evasion.39
2.5.2 Revenue Maximizing Taxation
Let us briefly discuss the implications of the spillovers discussed above for the choice of
a revenue maximizing tax rate. Considering the case of two income groups introduced
before, the planners problem becomes
max
τL,τK
mLRL +RK
where revenues are defined as
Rj = τj (yj − e¯j (1− p (1 + s))) (47)
andmL ≥ 0 depicts the share of taxpayers with labor income relative to capital income.
The first-order conditions for this problem are given by
mL
(
RL
τL
− τL (1− p (1 + s)) de¯L
dτL
)
= τK (1− p (1 + s)) de¯K
dτL
and
RK
τK
− τK (1− p (1 + s)) de¯K
dτK
= mL τL (1− p (1 + s)) de¯L
dτK
.
39We shall further note, that different subgroups of society do not necessarily have to be in a
symmetric type of equilibrium. Social structure may well supports equilibria, where some groups
predominantly cheat while the members of other communities act according to the norm. Compare
the discussion in Ostrom (1998) respectively Ichino and Maggi (2000), who study shirking in team-
production problems embedded in different local communities.
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(Second Order Conditions are assumed to hold.) Using (47) and rearranging the two
first-order conditions, we can characterize the revenue maximizing taxes by
τL (1− p (1 + s)) = mLRL εKK −RK εKL
mLe¯L (εKKεLL − εLKεKL) (48)
and
τK (1− p (1 + s)) = RK εLL −mLRL εLK
e¯K (εKKεLL − εLKεKL) (49)
where εjj ≥ 0 and εjk ≥ 0 denote the elasticity of the evasion of group j with re-
spect to a tax change for group j respectively k (e.g εjk =
de¯j
dτk
τk
e¯j
). The second term
in the numerator of (48) respectively (49) depicts the negative spillover the tax has
on the revenues from the other income group. As both denominator are positive,40 a
revenue maximizing tax τj is smaller, the higher its externality is. From the discussion
above follows that this would constitute an argument for lower taxes for the moral
reference group. A higher tax rate on the members of such a group can trigger a signif-
icant increase in the level of evasion among other subgroups of society. Therefore, the
between-group spillover provides a new effect for optimal taxation problems. Assum-
ing that the role as reference group stems from higher social prestige associated with
higher income, the effect is of particular interest in the context of redistributive policy
targets. A thorough analysis of the addressed tradeoff is left for further research.
2.5.3 Tax Enforcement
Next to the impact of group specific tax rates, it is also interesting to study a dis-
criminatory auditing policy. The results we would obtain, follow immediately from
the analysis discussed so far. Stricter tax enforcement among one income group has a
deterrent spillover on the other group. As a first-order effect, more frequent auditing
reduces the share of evaders in the group targeted by the policy. From (44) then fol-
lows a second-order effect such that the compliance rate in the other group also rises.
Hence, overall norm adherence increases, the compliance norm will become stronger
and agents of both income groups will conceal less income. The implications of the
spillover for a revenue maximizing auditing strategy are straightforward. The tax en-
forcement authority can raise higher revenues, if more resources on auditing are spent
on the moral reference group. Enforcing a high level of compliance among this group
has a strong spillover, and thereby yields a high marginal return from auditing. If we
40For both income groups, the elasticity of evasion with respect to the own tax rates should be
higher than the cross-tax elasticity for a reasonable set of parameters.
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again assume that the social reference group is characterized by a higher income, this
provides an additional argument to implement stricter auditing for this group, since
higher incomes are cet.par. associated with higher levels of evasion41 and hence more
evaded taxes to detect. Summarizing this discussion, our model suggest that a revenue
maximizing enforcement policy should focus on those groups of society, who act as
public role models and determine the extent of tax morale within the society.
2.6 Conclusion
Given the rather low level of deterrence applied in most economies, the standard ap-
proach to tax evasion predicts an amount of cheating which is way above the level
of evasion in OECD countries (Andreoni et al., 1998). According to Allingham and
Sandmo’s (1972) optimal portfolio model, the present level of compliance could only
be explained by extremely high degrees of risk aversion (Bernasconi, 1998; Skinner
and Slemrod, 1985). Even if this would be the case, the model can not explain why
we observe quite different levels of evasion for countries with very similar enforcement
policies. The model presented in this paper provides an explanation to these puzzles.
We studied the evasion behavior of ‘moral taxpayers’, where we model tax morale as
an (internalized) social norm for tax compliance. As the strength of the social norm
behavior depends on the level of norm adherence within the society, evasion decisions
become interdependent. Evaders are conditionally cooperative – they will conceal more
income the more other taxpayers deviate from the compliance norm. This behavioral
pattern results in multiple equilibria: An economy with a given tax and enforcement
policy, could either end up in a state with a strong social norm, where most taxpayers
pay all their taxes honestly, or a state with a weak social norm, where individuals
predominantly cheat on taxes. Hence, the model offers an explanation why ‘Palermo
is not Milan, and Stockholm is not Moscow’ (compare Rothstein, 2000).
One counterintuitive prediction implicit in the standard approach is that – for
decreasing absolute risk-aversion – evasion should decrease if taxes increase (Yitzhaki,
1974). For norm-guided taxpayers this result may turn around. Such individuals hold
a biased portfolio, as they overinvest into the safe asset: They declare more income as
compared to an immoral gambler, who maximizes the expected return of evasion. Any
tax increase then triggers an incentive to raise evasion. In addition to this substitution
effect, there is a further effect, related to the decline in the power of the social norm.
41Remember that we assume decreasing absolute risk aversion.
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As the tax rate rises, some individuals will switch from norm compliance to an interior
evasion level – which constitutes a norm violation. As more people cheat on taxes,
it becomes easier for each taxpayer to justify the own norm-deviation to themselves,
which provides a further incentive to conceal more income. For the tax enforcement
measures, the audit and the penalty rate, this mechanism tends to reinforce the power
of deterrence policies. A higher auditing rate, for example, makes evasion more costly
in a pecuniary as well as in a non-pecuniary way, since both the expected monetary
costs and the moral costs increase. Hence, our model suggest that deterrence is more
effective than predicted by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Note, however, that this
result relies on the assumption that the agents’ norm sensitivity is unaffected by any
policy change. Empirical evidence suggest, however, that a switch towards a deterrence
policy which is perceived as unreasonable harsh might lead to a negative shock of the
individuals’ moral obligation to pay taxes. ‘Brute detection might backfire’ (Sheffrin
and Triest 1992), if too strict enforcement crowds out the ‘intrinsic motivation’ to
comply with tax authorities (Scholz and Lubell 1998, Feld and Frey 2002). While
this effect points at the upper limit of tax enforcement, our finding suggest that a
reasonable, i.e. not too harsh, deterrence policy can have a strong positive impact on
the citizens’ tax moral.
Finally, we have discussed a simple framework to understand tax evasion within a
structured society. In contrast to the individualistic approach of the standard theory,
the decision makers in our model are embedded in a social structure. They belong
to a certain group and adjust their perception of the social norm and hence, their
tax morale, according to the behavior among their own peers as well as actions taken
in other subgroups of society. In such a framework, any group specific policy change
creates an externality on the rest of the society. If, for example, a higher capital
taxation causes more capital owners to conceal income, labor income receivers will also
evade more, even though monetary incentives stay unchanged for them. The magnitude
of these spillovers depends on the links between different peers. If the conduct of the
members from one group strongly shape what is considered to be the social norm, this
group takes over the position of a moral role model. The behavior within this group
has an intense impact on the strength of the norm for all other subgroups. A tax
evasion scandal within such a reference group can then have a huge negative impact on
overall tax compliance in an economy. In the light of this analysis, public cases of tax
offenses by politicians, managers or other high-profile members of society, can cause
tremendous harm to an economies informal institutions supporting tax compliance.
This is also supported by recent empirical research, which demonstrates the strong
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impact a group leaders’ decision has on the beliefs and consequently the behavior of
followers (Ga¨chter and Renner, 2005). Implicity, our model also stresses the importance
of belief management (Rothstein, 2000; Ga¨chter, 2005). If, for example, a government
announces the switch to a stricter tax enforcement due to a recent rise in evasion
activities, this may convey a different signal to taxpayers – and might trigger a different
behavior –, as if the same policy steps would be presented as preventive measures to
maintain the high level of compliance.
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Appendix
Ad Section 2.3:
From (19) we can easily derive
θ˜(n) =
−τ 2
c(n)
{
ps u′′(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− (1− p) u′′(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
. (A.1)
Using ρ (x), the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, rearranging and sub-
stituting for (8), we get
θ˜(n) =
(1− p) τ 2u′(xbi)
[
ρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− ρ(xbi) (y − e∗i )
]
c(n) [1 + τρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )]
> 0. (A.2)
Non-increasing absolute risk aversion is sufficient for θ˜(n) > 0 to hold, since for ρ′(x) ≤
0⇒ ρ(xai ) ≥ ρ(xbi).
Ad Section 2.4:
Equilibrium Impact of the Policy Variables
Applying the implicit function theorem on (20) yields
dn∗
dp
=
− (1 + s) τ u′ ((1− τ) y) 1
c(n)
∂F−1
∂n
− ∂θˆ(n)
∂n
< 0. (A.3)
where we used (9) to derive∂z
∂p
. As we know from (21), the denominator must be positive
in a stable equilibrium. This determines the negative sign of (A.3).
Following the same steps as before, we get
dn∗
ds
=
−pτ u′ ((1− τ) y) 1
c(n)
∂F−1
∂n
− ∂θˆ(n)
∂n
< 0 (A.4)
and
dn∗
dτ
=
∂z
∂τ
1
c(n)
∂F−1
∂n
− ∂θˆ(n)
∂n
> 0 (A.5)
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with
∂z
∂τ
= (1− p (1 + s)) [u′ ((1− τ) y)− τy u′′ ((1− τ) y)] > 0. (A.6)
The Threshold θ˜
′
(n∗)
Substituting for (15) we can express (27) as
de∗i
dτ
=
1
−E [u]′′
{
θi c(n
∗)
τ
+ psτ u′′(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− (1− p) τ u′′(xbi) (y − e∗i )− θi c′(n∗)
dn∗
dτ
}
.
(A.7)
The sign of the expression is determined by the term in the curly brackets. Using ρ (x)
and (8), we get the threshold
θ˜′(n∗) =
(1− p) τ 2 u′(xbi)
{
ρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− ρ(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
c(n∗)
(
1 + τρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− τ c
′(n∗)
c(n∗)
dn∗
dτ
) . (A.8)
For θi > θ˜
′(n∗) the term in the curly brackets is positive and hence de∗i /dτ > 0. Finally,
we compare this threshold with the partial equilibrium threshold, θ˜(n∗) from (A.2). As
the numerator of (A.2) and (A.8) are the same, but the denominator of (A.8) is bigger,
it immediately follows that θ˜(n∗) > θ˜′(n∗). Moreover, from (A.5) also follows that the
denominator of (A.8) is strictly positive. Therefore θ˜′(n∗) > 0.
Ad Section 2.5:
From the first order condition (38) we obtain
∂e∗ij
∂nj
=
θij αjc
′(nj)
E [uj]
′′ ≥ 0 (A.9)
∂e∗ij
∂nk
=
θij (1− αj) c′(nk)
E [uj]
′′ ≥ 0. (A.10)
Note that
∂e∗ij
∂nk
= 0 if αj = 1.
Implicitly differentiating (41) yields
dn∗j
dn∗k
=
−zj (1− αj) c′(n∗k)
(
αjc(n
∗
j) + (1− αj) c(n∗k)
)2
F ′(n∗j)
(
αjc(n∗j) + (1− αj) c(n∗k)
)2
+ zjαjc′(n∗j)
≥ 0 (A.11)
as the denominator must be positive in any stable equilibrium.
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If αj = 1, we get
dn∗j
dn∗k
= 0.
From (39) and (41) we can derive
dn∗j
dτj
=
∂zj
∂τj
(
αjc(n
∗
j) + (1− αj) c(n∗k)
)
F ′(n∗j)
(
αjc(n∗j) + (1− αj) c(n∗k)
)2 − zj (αjc′(n∗j) + (1− αj) c′(n∗k)dn∗kdn∗j ) > 0.
(A.12)
From (42) we know that in any stable equilibrium the denominator must be positive.
As
∂zj
∂τj
> 0, we get
dn∗j
dτj
> 0.
Chapter 3
Social Norms, Voting and the
Provision of Public Goods
Introductory Remark: This part of the thesis is the only chapter which is not in the
format of a conventional journal article. Here we will discuss several different results
within one unifying framework.
3.1 Introduction
Modern societies have established legal norms and public law enforcement systems
which support cooperative behavior in many public good problems. Polluting the en-
vironment, evading taxes, free-riding on public transports or simply littering a public
place constitutes a violation of law in almost all modern jurisdictions. Free-riders
might get detected and punished by a law enforcing authority. In practice, however,
we often observe low detection probabilities together with mild sanctions.1 Hence, law
is typically ‘non-deterrent’, in the sense that free-riding is still the dominant strategy
for rational agents with a reasonable degree of risk-aversion.2 Nevertheless, in many
societies broad majorities obey the law and collective action problems are successfully
solved (Tyler, 1990). One explanation for this observation is based on the role of
social norms (Ullmann-Margalit, 1977, Elster, 1989a, 1989b). In legally regulated situ-
1Compare e.g. Andreoni et al. (1998) for the case of tax evasion and Cohen (2000) on environ-
mental regulations.
2For a survey on the economic analysis of law, see Polinski and Shavell (2000).
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ations, there are typically clear societal expectations about how to behave adequately
(Cooter, 1998). If there exists a social norm for cooperation, a formal (legal) and an
informal (social) norm concur in supporting compliance with the law.3 In this case,
public deterrence policies together with social norm enforcement may evoke pro-social
behavior.
We study this idea in a model of public good provision within a large population.
Individuals choose to either contribute a fixed amount to the public good or to free-ride.
In the latter case, an agent might get detected by a centralized institution (‘police’) and
has to pay the public good contribution plus a fine. We assume that these sanctions are
non-deterrent, such that a rational agent would always choose to free-ride. However,
next to the monetary incentives shaped by the legal system, behavior is also guided by
an internalized social norm for cooperation (Elster, 1989a). Agents are heterogenous
with respect to their norm sensitivity: While some are completely unaffected by the
social norm, others suffer from self-imposed sanctions (feelings like guilt or remorse)
if they deviate from the norm. The strength of these internal sanctions depends –
next to the individual specific degree of norm internalization – on the strength of the
social norm in the society. Following the literature,4 we assume that the ‘power of
a norm to command adherence is positively associated with its level of adherence in
the population.’ (Kreps, 1997, p. 359). If free-riding is widespread, the perceived
obligation to follow the social norm is weak and norm-based sanctions for free-riding
are low. The opposite holds for high levels of cooperation. According to this logic,
the strength of the norm is then endogenously determined, raising the possibility of
multiple equilibria.5
Within this framework we first characterize individual behavior. Depending on the
degree of norm sensitivity, individuals can be characterized as free-riders, unconditional
contributors or ‘conditional contributors’ (Keser and van Winden, 2000, Fischbacher
et al., 2001). The first two types of agents – with a very low respectively high degree
of norm internalization – will always free-ride respectively cooperate. Agents with an
intermediate norm-sensitivity condition cooperation on the behavior of other members
in society: They tend to cooperate, if norm-adherence in society is strong, but free-ride
3On social norms and legal institutions compare e.g. Kahan (1997), Posner (1997, 2000) and the
special issue on ‘Social Norms, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Law’ in Journal of Legal
Studies 27 (June 1998).
4E.g. Akerlof (1980), Gordon (1989), Lindbeck et al. (1999), Myles and Naylor (1996), Naylor
(1989).
5Related approaches studying multiple equilibria of criminal activities are Sah (1991), Rasmusen
(1996) and Arbak (2005).
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if norm violations become widespread. Here, this behavior is triggered by a cooper-
ation norm with an endogenous strength. Hence, our model provides an alternative
to the notion of a ‘norm of conditional cooperation’, recently introduced by Fehr and
Fischbacher (2004a, 2004b).
We then determine the equilibrium level of contributions depending on the pecu-
niary incentives as well as on the strength of the social norm. Within this context, we
discuss the role of belief management as a policy tool for equilibrium selection. More-
over, we provide an alternative explanation for the broken windows effect (Wilson and
Kelling, 1982): The strong deterrent impact of a zero-tolerance policy, as implemented
by the former NY City Mayor Rudolf Giuliani, may not only rely on its direct effect
– higher (expected) sanctions associated with the strict enforcement of public order.
Removing public signs of social disorder – ‘fixing broken windows’ – also conveys a sig-
nal about widespread compliance with norms of pro-social conduct, strengthen these
norms and thereby reduce the frequency of norm violations.
While the basic model framework describes a broad class of large-scale collective
action problems, we then focus on the interpretation of a tax evasion game. We show
that in equilibrium, higher taxes raise the share of evasion, whereas stricter law enforce-
ment works into the opposite direction. Taking this behavior into account, we derive
the Laffer curve for this model. We find that for some levels of taxation the multiplicity
of equilibria results in discontinuous jumps in collected revenues. Next, we study the
endogenous choice of the tax policy. We first discuss welfare optimal taxation in the
context of social norms. Following the approach taken up by Lindbeck et al. (1999) we
then analyze individual voting behavior. We show that majority voting will result in
a suboptimal low level of taxation and an underprovision of public goods. This result
is driven by an endogenous difference between the mean marginal costs of public good
provision and the costs faced by the decisive voters. In the voting equilibrium, the
decisive voter is a cooperator who ‘voluntarily’ pays taxes and therefore bears the full
costs of any tax increase. However, there are also free-riders who pay the tax only
if they get detected. Hence, the mean costs of public good provision considered by
the social planner are below the costs taken into account by the decisive voter. Thus,
contributors will always prefer a lower level of taxation and public good provision than
would be optimal.
One can generalize this result in the following way: Given that public good contri-
butions are not fully enforced, any voting equilibrium where society consists of contrib-
utors and free-riders, will result in an inefficient level of taxation respectively public
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good provision. If, as in our case, the contributors form a majority, taxation will be in-
efficiently low resulting in an underprovision of public good. If, however, the free-riders
form a majority, voting will result in an inefficiently high tax rate. This provides the
main result of our analysis, which has so far been neglected in the literature on voting
and public good provision. Hence, our analysis complements the conventional under-
respectively overprovision result from the classical collective choice literature (Romer,
1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981).
The inefficiency of voting outcomes in standard textbook models is driven by ex-
ogenous differences in the mean and the median voters’ benefits respectively costs from
public good provision (compare e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2000). In our approach the
discrepancy between mean and median preferences arises from an endogenous mecha-
nism: The voting outcome defines a tax, for which agents – depending on their norm
sensitivity – decide on whether to evade or to contribute. The (exogenous) heterogene-
ity in norm sensitivity together with the endogenous level of taxation then translates
into an endogenous heterogeneity in behavior, which results in different costs of taxa-
tion. This drives the wedge between the decisive voter’s and the social costs of public
good provision, resulting in an underprovision of public goods.
Furthermore, we also contribute to the recent discussion on the role of social norms
for law enforcement. While this literature is mainly based on verbal reasoning (e.g.
Posner, 1997, 2000; Kahan, 1997, 2005) or empirical studies (e.g. Galbiati and Vertova,
2005; Tyran and Feld, 2005), we provide a simple model framework which combines a
conventional Beckerian approach to the economics of crime with the literature on inter-
nalized norms (Akerlof, 1980). Within this framework, we endogenize the strength of
law-enforcement. We consider the revenue maximizing choice of the detection frequency
together with the welfare optimal tax policy. We then study, amongst others, the effect
of an exogenous shock in the norm sensitivity on the detection policy. Though such
a shock always leads to a higher level of cooperation, the reaction of the law enforc-
ing authority is ambiguous: A strengthening of the social norm could be accompanied
by a stricter legal norm: In this case, formal and informal enforcement mechanism
would work as complements. However, a stronger social norm could – to some extent
– also substitute the legal norm. Hence, our model provides a theoretical foundation
for the verbal arguments of Richard Posner (1997, p.369), according to which ‘law both
complements and substitutes for norms ’.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we introduce the basic model and
discuss the individual contribution decision. Next we characterize the social equilibrium
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of the model. In section 3.4 we provide a welfare economic analysis, and compare it
to the voting equilibrium, derived in section 3.5. Section 3.6 describes the endogenous
choice of law enforcement and section 3.7 summarizes the main results. All proofs
appear in the appendix.
3.2 A Model of Internalized Social Norms
A large scale society is represented by a continuum of agents with unit mass. Players
simultaneously choose x ∈ {0, 1}, either to follow the law and contribute a fixed amount
t (‘tax’) to the public good or to violate against the law and contribute nothing. Let us
denote the first choice by x = 1 (contributing) and the latter by x = 0 (free-riding). If a
player decides to free-ride, she will get punished by a public law enforcement institution
with probability p and has to pay t plus a fine f .6 With probability 1− p she will get
away undetected. Throughout the whole analysis we assume that t ≥ p(t + f) holds.
In our model this implies that a rational, risk neutral agent who is only concerned
about monetary payoffs (homo economicus) will always choose to free-ride: The law is
non-deterrent.
3.2.1 Preferences
Agents preferences are defined over private consumption, a public good and a norm-
based payoff. Consumption is given by an exogenous income minus the expected
payments for each strategy x.7 The utility from the public good g is given by δv(g),
with v(.) being twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave, v′ > 0, v′′ < 0
and δ > 0. Finally, the norm-based payoff is given by −θic(n) in the case of free-riding
and zero otherwise.8 The individual specific parameter θi, with θi ≥ 0, reflects differ-
ent degrees of norm-sensitivity. The function c(n) reflects the ‘social’ strength of the
norm, depending on n, the share of free-riders in the society. Assuming an additively
separable preference structure and risk neutrality,9 the utility function of agent i is
6The tax t and the fine f are assumed to be non-negative and 0 ≤ p < 1.
7In the following we will omit the constant income.
8In an earlier version of this chapter, we considered a negative payoff from free-riding as well as a
positive norm-payoff associated with cooperation. However, since this decomposition only change our
results quantitatively, we dropped this model component.
9Introducing risk-aversion would not change the main results of our analysis in a qualitative way.
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given by
ui(x, n) = −xt− (1− x) (p (t+ f) + θic(n)) + δv(g). (1)
We can express individuals’ utility as
ui(1, n) = −t+ δv(g) (2)
for x = 1, respectively as
ui(0, n) = −p (t+ f)− θic(n) + δv(g) (3)
for x = 0.
This preference structure describes a society with a social norm for cooperation or
equivalently, a norm against free-riding. If an agent deviates from this norm, she will
incur sanctions which transform into a utility loss of θic(n). While the origin of these
sanctions could in principle be external (e.g. social disapproval), we here assume that
they stem from an internal mechanism, based upon an internalized cooperation norm
(Elster, 1989).10 One important mechanism which represents such a system of ‘inter-
nal’, self-imposed sanctions are emotions in the context of norm guided situations.11
A deviation from an internalized norm is typically accompanied ‘by internal sanctions,
including shame, guilt and loss of self-esteem, as opposed to purely external sanctions
[...]’ (Gintis, 2003, p.407). Hence, emotional costs may induce an agent to abstain
from breaking the norm. The parameter θi can be interpreted as a measure for the
degree of norm-internalization:12 Low values of θi describe individuals who are hardly
affected by the emotions associated with a norm violation (relative to the monetary
incentives), whereas the well-being of agents with a high θi is very sensitive towards
norm-deviations: they suffer from strong feelings of guilt or remorse if they deviate
from the norm.
While θi captures interpersonal differences in the level of norm-sensitivity, c(n)
depicts variations of the sanctions’ magnitude for different levels of norm violations.
We employ the following
10Compare also Becker (1996, p.225) on internalized norms. For models of social norms with
external sanctions see e.g. Holla¨nder (1990) and Rege (2004).
11A review on the role of emotions in economic theory is provided by Elster (1998). For empirical
research, which has demonstrated the importance of emotions for economic decision making, compare
Ben-Shakhar et al. (2004), Hopfensitz and van Winden (2005), Reuben and van Winden, (2005).
Compare also the theoretical models in van Winden (2001), Bowles and Gintis (2003).
12Note that we exclude negative values of θ. While we could easily allow for ‘punks’, who derive
benefits from a norm-violation, we would not gain any additional insights.
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Assumptions: (A1) The finite-valued function c(n) is continuously differentiable in
n, mapping the unit interval into the R+. (A2) Moreover, the extent of the norm-
enforcing sanctions is non-increasing in n, i.e. c′(n) ≤ 0 for all n ∈ [0, 1],
where we write c′(.) for ∂c/∂n. This assumption is in line with the literature on social
norms(Akerlof, 1980, Naylor, 1989, Lindbeck et al., 1999), assuming that a norm-
deviation is (emotionally) less costly, if norm-violations are widespread. The intuition
behind this assumption is straightforward: the more people in society follow a social
norm, the stronger it is and the higher are the individual costs of acting against it.
The more people deviate, however, the easier it becomes for an agent to justify her
own norm-violation. Empirical support for this line of reasoning comes from studies
on norm guided behavior in economic (e.g. Azar, 2004, Nyborg and Rege, 2003), in
the law literature (e.g. Grasmick and Green, 1982, Liu, 2003) as well as in social
psychology (e.g. Cialdini et al., 1990, Reno et al., 1993).
3.2.2 Individual Decision
Let us call the triplet (t, p, f) a policy, consisting of a tax policy t and an enforcement
policy (p, f), and remember from above that we assume t ≥ p(t+f). Note further, that
in a large community the impact of a single individual on n respectively g is negligible.
Hence, taking the policy as well as n as given, a player i will choose to contribute iff
ui(1, n) ≥ ui(0, n). It is easy to show that this holds iff θi ≥ θˆ(n) with
θˆ(n) :=
t− p (t+ f)
c(n)
. (4)
For agent i, who has internalized the norm to a degree θi ≥ θˆ(n), the utility loss from
the norm violation would be bigger than (or equal to) the monetary benefits from free-
riding.13,14 Hence, the player will contribute t to the public good. If the enforcement
policy gets stricter or if the tax decreases, the monetary incentive to free-ride becomes
weaker and θˆ(n) declines. For the special case of t = p(t+ f) we get θˆ(n) = 0. In this
case, law enforcement is strong enough to enforce contributions of all (risk neutral)
agents with θi ≥ 0. As long as the numerator of θˆ is strictly positive, the law is non-
deterrent for agents with θi = 0; i.e., expected monetary sanctions alone do not result
13For the case of equality we assume that the player follows the norm.
14We assume here that people rationally solve the trade off between monetary and emotional
incentives. Empirical support for this assumption is provided by e.g. Bosman and van Winden (2001,
2002), Hopfensitz and van Winden (2005).
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in cooperative behavior. However, the (centralized, external) monetary punishment
together with the (decentralized, internal) norm-based sanctions may induce public
good contributions.
For a given policy and distribution of θ, this model captures three different be-
havioral patterns: On the one hand, individuals with θi < θˆ(0) will always free-ride.
These players are hardly affected by the social norm and the economic incentive to
free-ride is always dominant, even if the whole society would comply with the norm.
On the other hand, the action of an individual with θˆ(0) ≤ θi < θˆ(1) depends on the
level of n. Assumption A2 implies that the threshold θˆ(n) is increasing in n: with
a higher share of free-riders, the social norm becomes weaker and it is less costly to
deviate from the norm. Hence, an agent might contribute to the public good for low
levels of norm-deviations, while he would free-ride if the norm becomes weak. One
can characterize such agents as conditional contributors.15 (3) Finally, agents with
θi ≥ θˆ(1) act as unconditional contributors : the utility loss from a norm violation
always dominates the monetary incentive to free-ride, even for the (hypothetical) case
where everybody in society would break the norm. The model therefore explains the
typical patterns of individual behavior observed in experimental economic studies of
public good games (e.g. Keser and van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001) as
well as in field studies (e.g. Croson, 2005; Frey and Meier, 2004a, 2004b). We shall
emphasize that here conditional contributors appear in the context of a cooperation
norm with an endogenous norm strength. Hence, conditional contributions are not nec-
essarily triggered by a ‘norm of conditional cooperation’, as recently proposed by Fehr
and Fischbacher (2004a, 2004b). While they consider a norm which commands agents
to ‘cooperate in this case’ but ‘free-ride under that conditions’, it has been stressed in
the social norms literature (e.g. Elster, 1989a, 1989b), that norms are typically simple
moral rules and guidelines. Therefore, our approach seems to be more in line with the
standard literature on social norms.
Digression: Congestion in the Detection Technology
Consider the case where the detection technology of the law-enforcing institution de-
pends on the frequency of law violations in the society. It seems plausible to assume
that, for a given investment into law-enforcement (e.g. a fixed number of policemen),
the detection probability is decreasing with the number of illegal actions. Stated differ-
ently, there is congestion in the detection technology: If a policeman is busy sanctioning
15Keser and van Winden (2000), Fischbacher et al. (2001).
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agent i, it is more likely that the wrongdoing of agent j stays undetect as compared to
a situation where i would comply with the law and the policeman could fully focus on
detecting law violations.16
We can easily include this idea into the model, assuming that the detection prob-
ability is given by p = pi(n) with pi′ < 0. The threshold level for cooperation from (4)
would then be given by
θˆ(n) :=
t− pi(n) (t+ f)
c(n)
.
It is straightforward to show, that θˆ(n) still is increasing in n. As before, the emotional
costs of free-riding are decreasing in n. With pi′ < 0, however, norm violation have
an additional positive externality on other free-riders: The more people break the law,
the lower are the expected monetary sanctions and the temptation to free-ride rises.
Hence, the pecuniary incentives related to congestion point into the same direction
as the incentives associated with the endogenous norm strength. They both trigger
conditional cooperative behavior. As the congestion effect would only change our
results quantitatively, we will assume pi′ = 0 in the remainder of this chapter.
3.3 Social Equilibrium
Let θ be distributed over the interval [0,∞] according to a cumulative distribution
function F (θ), which is continuously differentiable and common knowledge. The cor-
responding density function f(θ) has full support on the interval [0,∞] and f(θ) > 0.
F−1(n) denotes the inverse function of F (θ).
3.3.1 Equilibrium Share of Free-Riders
For a given policy an equilibrium share of free-riders n∗ is defined by n∗ = F
(
θˆ(n∗)
)
,
or equivalently
n∗ = F
(
t− p (t+ f)
c(n∗)
)
. (5)
Equation (5) is a fix-point equation in n, where F (θˆ(n)) maps the unit interval into
itself. The solution to (5) yields a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a self-supporting share of
free-riders. Given the fraction of norm-violations n∗, the strength of the norm in the
16Anecdotal evidence, in particular for the case of tax enforcement, supports this line of reasoning.
Compare chapter 1 of this thesis. A theoretical discussion is provided by Sah (1991).
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society is such that there are exactly n∗ agents with θi < θˆ(n∗). We call such an
equilibrium locally stable, if
∂F−1(n∗)
∂n
≥ ∂θˆ(n
∗)
∂n
. (6)
With this, we can derive
Proposition 1 (i) For any policy (t, p, f) with t ≥ p(t + f), any distribution F (θ)
and any c(n) fulfilling A1 and A2, there exists at least one locally stable equilibrium
share of free-riders, n∗ ∈ [0, 1]. (ii) If c′(n) = 0 for all n ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique
globally stable equilibrium share of free-riders, n∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See Appendix.
Note, that the equilibrium n∗ = 0 can only occur for the special case t = p (t+ f)
and n∗ = 1 is only supported if t → ∞.17 If we exclude these special cases, we get
n∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of at least one stable equilibrium share n∗.
If the emotional costs of a norm deviation were independent of the others’ behavior
(i.e. c′(n) = 0), there would exist exactly one solution to (5). Typically, however, there
will be a multiplicity of equilibria: one policy could result in several equilibrium levels
of n∗. An example is depicted in figure 3.1.
In the case represented in figure 3.1 (see next page), there are three possible equi-
libria. A ‘good’ equilibrium, with a low share of norm violators n∗l , a ‘bad’ equilibrium
with a large fraction of free-riders n∗h, and a third equilibrium, n
∗
m, somewhere in
between. As condition (6) holds, whenever the θˆ-curve intersects the cumulative dis-
tribution from above, there are two (locally) stable equilibria, n∗l and n
∗
h, and one
unstable equilibrium, n∗m.
While our modelling approach is a static one, the underlying dynamics of this
system are straightforward. Assume that the game is played repeatedly and agents
neither know the distribution F (θ) nor do they observe the level of n in the present
period. If, however, they can infer from the public good level the last period’s share of
free-riding, society would converge towards a locally stable equilibrium: Starting from
any off-equilibrium share n < n∗m [n > n
∗
m], society would end up in an equilibrium
with n∗l [n
∗
h].
18
17This is driven by assuming c(1) > 0 together with F−1(1) =∞.
18For a more detailed discussion of the dynamics of this class of models see Lindbeck et al. (1999,
2002) and Rege (2004).
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Figure 3.1: Multiple Equilibria
A comparative static analysis within this framework yields the following results:
Proposition 2 A marginal increase in t, decrease in p or decrease in f will indepen-
dently raise the monetary incentive to free-ride. As long as p (t+ f) < t < ∞, this
will lead to an increase [decrease] in the share of free-riders n∗ in any stable [instable]
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 is quite intuitive: if the monetary temptation to free-ride becomes bigger,
the threshold θˆ(n) rises. The θˆ-curve in figure 3.1 shifts upwards for any level of n,
which in turn results in a higher equilibrium share of n∗ for any stable equilibrium.
Digression: Beliefs and Broken Windows
As we focus on the case where agents have learned about the actual level of free-riding
n, we neglect an important aspect: In our framework, ‘belief management’ – i.e. the
manipulation of beliefs – constitutes a possible policy tool. Consider a society in an
equilibrium with frequent free-riding, where all people hold correct beliefs about n:
Take for example the case of an anti-littering norm in a park. A littered park provides
a clear signal about the behavior of others and indicates that norm-violations are
widespread. Society finds itself in a ‘littering equilibrium’. If, however, every morning
a cleaning squad clears the park, this could – over time – induce a downward bias in the
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beliefs about n. The anti-littering norm would be perceived stronger than it actually is;
the threshold θˆ(.) would fall and some people, who would have littered in a more dirty
park, may refrain from littering. If behavior adapts this way, the initial off-equilibrium
beliefs could turn into correct ones. Hence, belief manipulation constitutes a tool to
induce one particular equilibrium state.
In this vein, our model also provides an alternative explanation to the broken win-
dow effect : It has been claimed that public signs of disorder trigger further breaches of
the public order. ‘If a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest
of the windows will soon be broken. [...] One unrepaired broken window is a signal that
no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing ’ (Wilson and Kelling, 1982,
p.31).19 Translated into the terminology of our model: Agents form beliefs about the
law enforcement policy and signals for a high level of n are assumed to signal low levels
of p (respectively f). In our framework, however, the endogenous strength of a social
norm provides a different channel, explaining conditional cooperative behavior: Clear
indications of social disorder signal that norms for pro-social behavior are weak – or
weaker than expected. Consequently, the inhibition threshold for anti-social behavior
as street-crime declines and triggers further norm violations (Kahan, 1997, 2005; Liu,
2003). Reversing this logic, policy can signal strong(er) social norms, by ‘fixing bro-
ken windows’. Expressing strong community disapprobation of minor misbehavior can
then induce a positive bandwagon effect (Kahan, 1997). The discrimination between
competing explanations of conditional cooperation is finally an empirical task, left for
future research.
3.3.2 Social Equilibrium State
Equation (5) defines a correspondence which maps a policy into – typically several
– equilibrium levels of n∗. In order to avoid the technical difficulties linked to the
multiplicity of equilibria, we can ‘turn around’ this mapping. Instead of asking which
policy induces which equilibrium, we can also ask, which equilibrium n∗ is supported
by which (tax) policy. Rearranging (5), we get
t(n) =
F−1(n)c(n) + pf
1− p , (7)
19This explanation also formed the basis for the zero-tolerance policy of the former New York city
mayor Rudolph Guiliani. Compare also Kahan (1997) and Posner (1997, p.367).
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with t(n) : [0, 1] → [0,∞]. Hence, for any n∗ ∈ [0, 1], the continuous function t(n)
yields one tax t∗ such that for t∗ = t(n∗) the population share n∗ is an equilibrium
according to (5). Stated differently, t∗ is the equilibrium tax rate associated with n∗.20
Finally we turn to the public good g. Let the marginal rate of transforming the
private good into g be constant and equal to unity. For a given policy (p, f) the public
costs for law enforcement are given by d.21 The level of the public good is equal to
the total amount of contributions (‘tax revenues’) plus the expected payments of the
punished free-riders minus enforcement costs d,
g = (1− n) t+ np (t+ f)− d. (8)
Substituting (7) and rearranging, we get the public good level as a function of n,
g(n) = t(n) (1− n (1− p)) + npf − d. (9)
This function defines g∗ = g(n∗), the revenues for an equilibrium share n∗ and the
corresponding equilibrium tax t(n∗). We now can define a social equilibrium state as
follows:
Definition 1 (i) With an enforcement policy (p, f) as well as c(n), d and F (θ) ex-
ogenously given, a social equilibrium state e = (n∗, t∗, g∗) is a combination of a share
of free-riders n∗ ∈ [0, 1], a tax t∗ = t(n∗) and a public good level g∗ = g(n∗) defined by
(5), (7) and (9). (ii) A social equilibrium state e characterized by n∗ is called stable
if t′(n∗) ≥ 0. (iii) The set of possible social equilibrium states in a society is charac-
terized by S = {(n∗, t(n∗), g(n∗)) : 0 ≤ n∗ ≤ 1} with S ∈ [0, 1]× [0,∞]× R ∪ {+∞}.
Note that any social equilibrium state e is fully characterized by the equilibrium share
of free-riders n∗, as all components of e are functions of n∗, i.e. e = (n∗, t(n∗), g(n∗)).22
The characterization of a stable equilibrium state then follows immediately from Propo-
sition 2: Since a tax increase raises n∗ in any stable equilibrium, there must also hold
t′ ≥ 0.
20For the case of multiple equilibria, t(n) is non-injective, since there are different equilibrium levels
n∗ ∈ [0, 1] which are supported by the same tax t∗.
21Since the punishment policy is exogenously fixed, we can treat these costs as an exogenous
parameter. When we later endogenize the choice of p, we will consider d as a function of p.
22By this definition we exclude corner solutions with t∗ > t(1) from the set of possible social
equilibrium states. Corner solutions at n∗ = 0 are ruled out by the assumption t ≥ p (t+ f).
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Figure 3.2: Social Equilibrium States
A graphical representation of the set S is given in figure 3.2. While the shape of
t(n) and g(n) obviously depend on exogenous factors – in particular F (θ) and c(n)
– the example of figure 3.2 depicts some general properties which hold for any possi-
ble scenario within this model framework. Consider first the equilibrium state where
nobody free-rides. One can show that in this state the function t(n) has its global
minimum.23 From (7) we can derive
t′(n) =
1
1− p
(
∂F−1
∂n
c(n) + F−1 c′(n)
)
. (10)
Making use of (7), we get from (9)
g′(n) = t′(n) (1− n (1− p))− F−1(n) c(n). (11)
As F−1(n) = 0, there always holds g′(0) = t′(0) > 0. Hence, at n∗ = 0, a tax
increase triggers more norm deviations but raises at the same time more revenues. At
a certain tax level, however, the first order effect of a tax increase is counterbalanced
by the decline in contributions due to the increase in free-riding, and the system is
at the peak of the Laffer curve. In figure 3.2, the corresponding level of free-riding is
indicated by nG. As t∗ is further increased – i.e. if we move from nG further to the
right – this will result in a decrease in g∗. This range of n∗ is therefore characterized
23Since the term F−1(n) c(n) is positive for any n ∈ (0, 1], it immediately follows from (7) that
t(n) > t(0) for all n ∈ (0, 1].
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by t′ > 0 together with g′ < 0.
In the case of figure 3.2, we then reach a level of norm violations na, where t′(na) = 0.
For n∗ > na the sign of t′ becomes negative, and we get into a range of unstable
equilibrium states (compare Definition 1(ii)). At a share of free-riders nb, with t′(nb) =
0, the sign of t′ turns around again, reflecting a range of stable equilibrium states
characterized by a high fraction of free-riders.
From figure 3.2 one can also see that in this model the multiplicity of equilibria is
a local rather than a global property. Only in the range of t < t∗ < t¯ there are several
– in this case, three – possible equilibrium levels of n∗ respectively g∗.24 Given there
exists a t – that is, if there is a range of t∗ characterized by at least two stable equilibria
– it follows that t > t(0) (since t(n) has its global minimum at n∗ = 0). Hence, there
always exists a range of taxes, t(0) ≤ t∗ < t, where a tax policy induces one unique
equilibrium share of free-riders. We will come back to this point in the next section.
Figure 3.3: Laffer curve
We can represent the set of social equilibrium states in an alternative way, plotting
all possible equilibrium tax levels t∗ (horizontal axis) against the corresponding public
good level g∗ (vertical axis). Figure 3.3 shows that in the case of multiple equilibria the
24Let us consider the lowest and the highest equilibrium tax, where the θˆ(n)-curve (4) is tangential
to F−1(n) (compare figure 3.1) and hence t′(n) = 0. (A tangential point n∗ is defined by ∂F
−1(n)
∂n =
−θˆ(n) c′(n)c(n) . Using this condition in (10), we get t′(n) = 0.) These tax levels are defined by t :=
min{t(n) : t′(n) = 0} respectively t¯ := max{t(n) : t′(n) = 0}, for n ∈ [0, 1].
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resulting Laffer curve of this system is folded. As we have discussed above, raising the
tax from t(0) would first be accompanied by an increase in g∗. On the downward-sloping
side of the Laffer curve, however, there is a discontinuous jump in the revenues at t¯. For
any tax above this level, equilibria are unique and characterized by a weak social norm,
widespread free-riding and low levels of public good provision.25 Hence, at this level of
taxation, a small change in the tax policy may trigger a huge increase in the evasion
level. If one policy would be associated with more than three equilibria, there would
exist several such levels of taxation where minor tax increases induce discontinuous
changes in revenues. While standard theory considers a range with monotonically
increasing tax revenues followed by monotonically decreasing tax revenues, our analysis
suggest that the concept of a continuous Laffer curve may be misleading. A Laffer curve
could be characterized by several upward- and downward-sloping ranges, with several
peaks and several discontinuous jumps in the revenue level.
3.4 Welfare Economics
In this section we address the question of policy choice in a framework with social
norms. We take the enforcement policy as exogenously given and focus on the welfare
maximizing choice of a tax policy. In section 3.6 we will also endogenize the choice of
the detection probability p. Applying standard welfare economics in this framework,
two conceptual difficulties emerge. First: How can a social planner ‘choose’ between
several equilibrium states? and second: How shall we incorporate norm-based payoffs
into the concept of social welfare?
3.4.1 Tax Policy and Equilibrium Selection
As we have discussed in section 3.3, this model is in general characterized by multiple
equilibria. In contrast to standard taxation problems, a planner can therefore not
‘automatically’ pick a combination of a tax and a public good level, since for one
tax policy society could coordinate on several equilibria, resulting in different budget
balancing public good levels. As different equilibria are associated with different levels
of welfare, the question of equilibrium selection arises. How can the planner induce
one particular social equilibrium state e ∈ S?
25The backward bending part of the Laffer curve in the range of t < t∗ < t¯ represents the unstable
states of the system.
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One strategy is based on belief management, as discussed in section 3.3. Another
possibility is related to the salience of certain equilibria. Consider the case, where
society is in an equilibrium state e, with t∗ < t. From the discussion of figure 3.2 and
3.3 we know that such a tax policy induces one unique equilibrium share n∗. If the
planner (marginally) increases the tax above t, the coordination problem arises again.
Note, however, that there is always a potential equilibrium state e′, with n′ being in the
neighborhood of the former equilibrium share of free-riders.26 It seems plausible, that
such a close-by equilibrium state is more salient than alternative, more distant states.
If agents coordinate according to this concept of salience, the social equilibrium state
in the neighborhood of the previous one becomes a focal point equilibrium (Schelling,
1960). With stepwise tax policy changes, a planner can move along the Laffer curve
(Figure 3.3) and society can be guided into any targeted (stable) equilibrium state.27
In the following, we will neglect any problems of equilibrium selection and assume that
the planner (respectively the law enforcing authority in section 3.6) can induce any
stable equilibrium state.
Let us add a remark on the applicability of such stepwise policy adjustments. Re-
alistically, an adaptation process from one to another equilibrium state would take
quite some time. In this case, the transformation phase could be characterized by
welfare levels which are even below the original (suboptimal) equilibrium state. From
the perspective of dynamic welfare optimization, it could therefore indeed be optimal
to stay in an inefficient equilibrium rather than engage in a very costly transforma-
tion. To stress the importance of this point, consider as an example the pattern of
tax evasion in post-Soviet Russia. As Rothstein (2000) points out, many Russians do
not consider tax evasion as a serious crime, since they are convinced that most citizens
violate tax laws. In terms of our model, n is high and c(n) is low: The economy is
in the range of the Laffer curve associated with ‘bad’ equilibria.28 According to our
model, one measure to raise tax compliance consists in a radical tax cut, accompanied
by a policy which signals that for this low level of taxation most Russians will comply
with tax laws. Tax payers would change their behavior and society converges towards
a low-tax-low-evasion equilibrium. Given that initially evasion would remain at a high
level, the transition period to this new equilibrium state would be characterized by a
period of extremely poor revenue levels. In the context of political constraints to raise
26Remember that t(n) and g(n) are continuous functions in n.
27If there are more than three equilibria for one tax, there may be equilibrium states which can not
be implemented by stepwise tax adjustments. However, all equilibrium states in the neighborhood of
n∗ = 0 which are characterized by t′(n) ≥ 0 can always be implemented.
28Additionally, a significant mass of θ-types may be concentrated around zero.
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a minimal level of tax revenues, the government would be locked in a suboptimal mid-
tax-high-evasion state – even if it would be desirable to engage in the transformation
from a long term perspective.
3.4.2 Welfarist versus Non-Welfarist Methods of
Policy Assessment
How to undertake a social welfare analysis in the context of ‘social preferences’ (Fehr
and Falk, 2002), i.e. if agents are governed by incentives beyond the mere monetary
self-interest? More specifically, how should a utilitarian welfare function look like, if
individuals’ utility is defined over ‘social’ arguments29, such as the (payoff) inequality
between different agents (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), or – as
in our case – the emotional costs of norm violations? While the thorough and detailed
discussion, which is appropriate in order to address this fundamental point, is beyond
the scope of this chapter, we only provide a brief discussion of two possible approaches
to our specific problem.30
A Welfarist Approach
In standard social welfare analysis, any social evaluation of a situation is based on
individual preferences. If a policy decreases the utility of an agent, this must be
reflected in the social welfare measure. One possible measure of social welfare is that
of classical utilitarianism, the sum of individuals’ utilities. In our case, this sum also
includes the disutility free-riders suffer from breaking the norm – the utility losses
based upon an emotional, self-imposed sanction. Shavell (2003, p.5) discusses that
‘it is of no moment from the perspective of welfare economics’, that such sources of
(dis)utility are ‘different in their character from conventional springs of utility and
disutility’. According to this view, we should follow a purely welfarist concept, in
the sense that social welfare is exclusively based upon individuals’ preferences. The
29Arguments in a utility function are social, if they depend on other individuals’ actions respectively
payoffs.
30Compare Bernheim and Rangel (2005) for a detailed discussion of welfare economics in the
context of non-selfish agents. A related strand of literature discusses the concept of social welfare
in the presence of bounded-rational (but selfish) agents. Compare O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003),
Camerer et al. (2003), Kanbur et al. (2004).
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planners’ taxation problem then becomes
max
t
W = − (1− n) t− np (t+ f)− c(n)
∫ θˆ(n)
0
θ dF (θ) + δv(g). (12)
Due to the multiplicity of equilibria, the first-order condition to this problem does in
general not fully characterize the welfare optimal equilibrium state. Hence, it will be
more convenient to ‘turn the problem around’ and solve for n∗. Using (7) and (9) we
can rewrite (12) as31
max
n∗
W = d− g(n∗)− c(n∗)
∫ θˆ(n∗)
0
θ dF (θ) + δ v (g(n∗)) . (13)
The first order condition for an interior solution is given by
δv′ (g(nw)) = 1 +
Ψ(nw)
g′(nw)
, (14)
with g′ 6= 0 and
Ψ(n∗) = c(n∗) θˆ(n∗) + c′(n∗)
∫ θˆ(n∗)
0
θ dF (θ). (15)
is derived in the Appendix. Condition (14) defines nw and thereby ew = (nw, tw, gw),
a social equilibrium state which is optimal according to this welfarist approach.32 One
can interpret (14) as a Samuelson condition for the optimal choice of a tax tw = t(nw)
which induces the optimal equilibrium share of free-riders nw and results in the public
good gw = g(nw). On the left hand side (LHS) of (14) we find the marginal utility
from the public good. The right hand side (RHS) depicts the marginal costs of the
public good provision. The first term on the RHS, unity, reflects the monetary costs
associated with the contributions (taxes plus fines) to the public good. The second
term characterizes the non-monetary cost, the marginal change in the disutility related
to the sanctions the free-riding agents incur (relative to the change in the public good):
In a stable equilibrium, a rise in the tax triggers more free-riding. Consequently, more
agents will suffer from feeling guilty. However, an increase in n∗ lowers the costs of a
norm deviation. While this second order effect, expressed in the second term of Ψ, is
negative, we will focus on the case where the first order effect dominates and Ψ ≥ 0 (in
the relevant range of n∗). This restriction is also rationalized by the fact that negative
31Expressing the problem this way, we assume that the planner is able to establish one specific
social equilibrium state e ∈ S, characterized by n∗. Compare section 4.1.
32In principle, there could be several solutions to (14). See the Appendix for a discussion.
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values of Ψ would render equilibrium states on the downward-sloping side of the Laffer
curve welfare optimal.33 As for g′ > 0 the second term on the RHS of condition (14)
is then positive, the non-monetary costs add to the monetary costs of public good
provision – the RHS in (14) is bigger than one.
A Non-Welfarist Approach
Are there any reasons to deviate from this welfarist approach? There seems to be a
normative conflict in the welfare approach discussed above. In our context, a deviation
from the social norm is equivalent to a violation of formal law. Given that society has
agreed on establishing this legal norm, it appears inconsistent to consider the disutility
from a law violation as social costs. To illustrate this point, consider the example of
tax evasion: if evaders suffer from feeling guilty about the tax fraud, a planner may
not incorporate the related disutility in the welfare function.34
Given that c′ < 0, a free-rider would ceteris paribus – i.e., not considering the decline
in the public good – prefer if others would also deviate from the norm and thereby
reduce their emotional disutility. In principle, we could interpret this as anti-social
preference in the sense of Harsanyi (1982), who suggests to exclude such anti-social
preferences from a utilitarian social welfare function.35
As a consequence of these points, one could suggest to exclude the emotional
disutility from the social welfare function and follow a non-welfarist approach: indi-
viduals’ behavior is generated by one set of preferences, whereas the social planner
evaluates it using different preferences. Note that non-welfarist concepts, where social
welfare is evaluated according to some other criterion than individuals’ utility, are
common in many fields of public economics: If a planner is not only concerned about
individual well-being but also about horizontal equity (Musgrave, 1990), this also
represents a deviation from welfarism. Further examples are the analysis of merit
33Compare the discussion of the second order condition to (14) in the Appendix.
34Note that this argument has some critical normative implications, since it would also suggest to
not consider the monetary punishment of norm-violations as social costs.
35A quantitative argument not to consider the emotions as a part of social welfare comes from recent
findings in emotions research. While many studies show, how (anticipated) emotions affect economic
behavior (e.g. Bosman and van Winden, 2001, 2002, Hopfensitz and van Winden, 2005), there is
also evidence suggesting that people tend to systematically overestimate emotions when they make
decisions (Loewenstein and Schkade, 1999; Gilbert et al., 2002; Wilson and Gilbert, 2003). Emotions
associated with an action choice turn out to be often less strong than anticipated. In our case, this
would mean that ‘decision disutility’ associated from guilt would be higher than the ‘experienced
disutility’. (Compare the discussion of a moment-based concept of utility in Kahneman, 2000).
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goods (Besley, 1988) and the literature on so called ‘sin taxes’ (O’Donoghue and Rabin,
2003, Kanbur et al., 2004).36
In our specific case, we can express the problem of a non-welfarist planner, who
excludes the emotional sanctions, as
max
n∗
W = d− g(n∗) + δ v(g(n∗)). (16)
The first order condition for an interior optimum is then given by
δv′ (g(nnw)) = 1. (17)
This condition defines nnw, respectively an equilibrium state enw = (nnw, tnw, gnw)
which is optimal according to this non-welfarist approach.37 As the non-welfarist ap-
proach only takes into account the monetary costs of public good provision, the non-
monetary component has been dropped from the Samuelson condition (compare (14)
from above). Therefore, a non-welfarist planner considers lower marginal costs of pub-
lic good provision than a welfarist planner. Accordingly, the optimal social equilibrium
state enw is characterized by a higher public good level, as compared to gw, which is
optimal according to the welfarist analysis: gnw > gw. This also implies that the tax
tnw as well as the share of free-riders nnw are higher in the non-welfarist optimum:
tnw > tw, nnw > nw.
3.5 Voting with Social Norms
How is individual voting behavior respectively the voting outcome influenced by a social
norm? This is the central question we address in this section by extending the voting
concept from Lindbeck et al. (1999) to our framework. Our approach differs from
Lindbeck et al. (1999), who study the extent of income redistribution (respectively
unemployment benefits), in two main points: We consider heterogeneity in the voting
incentives related to the social norm, while they study heterogenous incentives related
to different income levels. Moreover, we will focus on the welfare properties of the
voting outcome – a point which is omitted in Lindbeck et al. (1999).
36Compare also Bernhein and Rangel (2005). For a discussion of the Pareto criterion in the context
of such non-welfarist approaches compare Kaplow and Shavell (2000).
37If δ becomes very large, the optimum is given by the ‘corner solution’ characterized by g′ = 0.
Compare the discussion of the second order condition to this problem in the Appendix.
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Let us first define
Ui(n
∗) := max{ui(1, n∗), ui(0, n∗)}. (18)
Ui depicts the utility agent i derives in an equilibrium state e ∈ S characterized by
n∗. An agent then prefers the state e over e′ ∈ S associated with n′ as long as
Ui(n
∗) > Ui(n′). We make the following definition:
Definition 2 A social equilibrium state e˜ = (n˜, t(n˜), g(n˜)), characterized by n˜, is a
voting equilibrium if e˜ ∈ S is a stable social equilibrium state and there exists no other
stable equilibrium state e′ ∈ S which is preferred against e˜ by a majority.
In the voting mechanism underlying this definition, we assume that voters do not only
compare different tax levels, but different equilibrium states. They chose between a
‘package’ e˜ = (n˜, t(n˜), g(n˜)) and any (stable) alternative state e′. Hence, we follow
Lindbeck et al. (1999) and neglect any problems of equilibrium selection.
3.5.1 Marginal Incentives for Voters
Let us turn to the incentives for the voters. The marginal impact of a change in the
equilibrium state – that is, the joint change in n∗, t∗ and g∗ – on an individual who
complies with the norm, is given by
∆ui(1, n
∗) ≡ ∂ui(1, n
∗)
∂n∗
= −t′(n∗) + δv′(g(n∗)) g′(n∗). (19)
For a free-rider, we get
∆ui(0, n
∗) ≡ ∂ui(0, n
∗)
∂n∗
= −pt′(n∗)− θic′(n∗) + δv′(g(n∗)) g′(n∗). (20)
The (locally) most preferred equilibrium state is then given by the state n∗ which
maximizes Ui(n
∗), characterized by ∆ui(x∗, n∗) = 0 for agent i’s equilibrium strategy
x∗. Depending on whether she will contribute or free-ride in state n∗, this equals
δv′(g(n∗)) =
t′(n∗)
g′(n∗)
(21)
respectively
δv′(g(n∗)) =
pt′(n∗) + θi c′(n∗)
g′(n∗)
(22)
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and g′ 6= 0.38 In the following we will assume that δ is sufficiently large such that
∆ui(1, 0) > 0 holds. This is sufficient to avoid corner solutions with n
∗ = 0.39
Comparing (19) and (20) shows that ∆ui(1, n
∗) < ∆ui(0, n∗) holds for any stable
equilibrium with g′ > 0. The reason for this is straightforward: While contributors
fully bear the costs of a tax increase, free-riders only pay the tax with probability p.
Moreover, the disutility suffered from a norm-violation decreases in n (since c′ ≤ 0).
Hence, individuals who comply with the norm face higher costs of public good provision:
For t′ ≥ 0 and g′ > 0 the RHS of (21) is bigger than the RHS of (22). This implies
that cooperators will always prefer an equilibrium state with a lower tax t∗ respectively
a lower level of n∗ than free-riders. Finally, since v′ > 0 it follows from (21) that a
cooperator always prefers a stable equilibrium state (t′ ≥ 0) in the upward-sloping
range of the Laffer curve (g′ ≥ 0).
We will now discuss local voting equilibria in different ‘regions’ of S. We then
compare the different local voting equilibria, and show which one is the globally most
preferred equilibrium state. In order to provide a compact analysis, we only consider
a scenario with at most three equilibria per policy, as described by figure 3.2.
3.5.2 Local Voting Equilibria
As expressed in the above definition, we only consider voting equilibria which are
stable. Hence, for a society with at most three equilibrium levels of n∗ for a given
policy, voting equilibria are theoretically possible in the range of n∗ ∈ [0, na], with na
such that t¯ = t(na) and t′(na) = 0, as well as in the range of n∗ ∈ [nb, 1], with nb such
that t = t(nb) and t′(nb) = 0 (compare figure 3.2 and 3). Let us first focus on the range
with a low level of norm-violations, n ≤ na.
Voting Equilibrium with a Strong Social Norm Due to the preference structure
in our model, the heterogeneity in θ does not transform into heterogenous incentives
for norm-adhering agents. Hence, all contributors would prefer the same state charac-
terized by (21). If contributors are in a majority, this state also constitutes the local
voting equilibrium.
38The second order conditions are discussed in the Appendix.
39Note that for very large δ, there also exists a corner solution at g′ = 0.
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Proposition 3 Consider all social equilibrium states e ∈ S with n∗ ∈ [0, na] and
na ≤ 1
2
. Given there exists an interior solution to (21), there always exists a unique
local voting equilibrium e˜a = (n˜a, t(n˜a), g(n˜a)) characterized by ∆ui(1, n˜
a) = 0. For e˜a
there holds 0 < n˜a < na and g′(n˜a) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 characterizes a unique local voting equilibrium for low levels of n∗, where
cooperators always form a majority. The state e˜a constitutes a local optimum for all
individuals who comply with the norm in the equilibrium state n˜a. All those who
deviate from the social norm, i.e. agents with θi > θ(n˜
a), would prefer a higher
tax (respectively a state with a higher level of n∗). However, since n˜a < 1
2
, this latter
group is in a minority: e˜a wins against any other social equilibrium state in the range of
n∗ ∈ [0, na]. Technically, the equilibrium corresponds to a median voter equilibrium.40
In this equilibrium, however, the decisive voter with the median θ-value prefers the
same equilibrium state as all other cooperative agents with θi ≤ θ(n˜a).41
As discussed above, a norm adhering agent would never vote for a state on the
downward-sloping side of the Laffer curve. Therefore g′(n˜a) > 0 holds in the voting
equilibrium. Moreover, as long as ∆ui(1, 0) > 0, cooperators will vote for a tax such
that n˜a > 0 – there is a positive share of free-riders in the voting equilibrium.
Voting Equilibrium with a Weak Social Norm Social equilibrium states in the
range of n∗ ∈ [nb, 1] are also potential voting equilibria. However, for states with a low
degree of norm compliance the existence of a voting equilibrium as characterized in
definition 2 is not guaranteed. A pairwise comparison of different equilibrium states,
for example, could result in voting cycles, since preferences in this range of n∗ are
typically not single peaked. Hence, the voting outcome depends on the majority voting
procedure. Since we do not gain any insights from the analysis of different possible
equilibria associated with different voting rules, we will simply consider the case that
there exists a local voting equilibrium e˜b =
(
n˜b, t(n˜b), g(n˜b)
)
as a result of one particular
voting procedure.
40Preferences are single peaked in the range [0, na] for at least half of the population. For a more
detailed discussion compare the Appendix.
41In a previous version of this chapter, where we considered a positive payoff from norm-adherence,
the median voter result became more obvious, as we then considered heterogeneity among contributors.
Since this only changed our results quantitatively, we dropped this model feature.
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3.5.3 Global Voting Equilibrium
Given that there is scope for two local voting equilibria – one with a majority who
adheres to the norm and one with widespread free-riding – the question emerges, which
of these two is the global voting equilibrium? In comparing these two equilibrium
states, e˜a and e˜b,42 we have to take into account that agents’ decisions depend on n
and θ. We have to differentiate between three possible types of individuals: (1) Those
with θ < θˆ(n˜a), who violate against the norm in both voting equilibria, (2) those with
θˆ(n˜a) ≤ θ < θˆ(n˜b), who cooperate in e˜a but free-ride in e˜b, and finally (3) agents with
θ ≥ θˆ(n˜b), who comply with the norm in both equilibria. Here we restrict ourself to
the realistic case of g(n˜a) > g(n˜b). Moreover we assume t∗(n˜a) > t∗(n˜b) – which makes
it harder for e˜a to be preferred.43 When
An agent characterized by θi < θˆ(n˜
a) prefers e˜a over e˜b iff
δ
(
v(g(n˜a))− v(g(n˜b))) ≥ p (t∗(n˜a)− t∗(n˜b))+ θi (c(n˜a)− c(n˜b)) , (23)
that is, if the benefits from a higher public good level outbalance the costs from a higher
(expected) tax and the stronger internal sanction (c(n˜a) > c(n˜b) since n˜a < n˜b and
c′ ≤ 0). Remember that we here consider a scenario of mild sanctions, characterized
by a low punishment probability p. Moreover, these players are those with very low
levels of θi. Therefore, the two terms on the RHS of (23) should be relatively small.
A conditional contributor with θˆ(n˜a) ≤ θi < θˆ(n˜b) prefers e˜a over e˜b iff
δ
(
v(g(n˜a))− v(g(n˜b))) ≥ t∗(n˜a)− p (t∗(n˜b) + f)− θic(n˜b) (24)
Note that, in contrast of the first type of agents, the difference in (expected) tax pay-
ments between the two states is likely to be higher for these second type of individuals –
they contribute t∗(n˜a) in the equilibrium where the norm is strong, while they free-ride
in the other equilibrium and have expected payments p
(
t∗(n˜b) + f
)
. However, these
agents suffer from internal sanctions in the state e˜b. Hence, this last term in (24) will
reduce the costs for a switch from e˜b to e˜a.
Finally, individuals with a strong norm internalization θi ≥ θˆ(n˜b) prefer e˜a over e˜b
iff
δ
(
v(g(n˜a))− v(g(n˜b))) ≥ t∗(n˜a)− t∗(n˜b) (25)
42As we have said before, e˜b typically depends on the voting procedure. In order to show that e˜a is
the global voting outcome, it must dominate any possible possible voting outcome in the range [nb, 1].
43Theoretically we could also get g(n˜a) < g(n˜b) and/or t∗(n˜a) < t∗(n˜b).
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These agents comply with the norm and contribute taxes in both equilibria.
Let us denote the right hand side of condition (25) by rhs(25) (and the analogous
notation applies to the other two conditions). If the public good preferences are such
that
δ ≥ max {rhs(23); rhs(24); rhs(25)}
(v(g(n˜a))− v(g(n˜b))) (26)
holds, conditions (23)–(25) are all satisfied and e˜a would be unanimously preferred
against e˜b. In this case, e˜a is the global voting equilibrium. Note, however, that (26)
is only a sufficient condition; even if two out of conditions (23)–(25) were violated, e˜a
would still be preferred by a majority, if the one group of agents which prefers e˜a over
e˜b accounts for a majority. In the following we will assume that public good preferences
are sufficiently strong such that e˜a is the global voting equilibrium.
3.5.4 Social Welfare
Is the voting outcome efficient? We answer this question by comparing the voting
equilibrium to the optimal equilibrium states, discussed in section 3.5. Since we did
not discriminate between the two welfare approaches, we consider both, first the non-
welfarist and later the welfarist concept.
Optimality in Terms of the Non-Welfarist Approach
From Proposition 3 we know that the voting equilibrium e˜a is characterized by condition
(21). The welfare optimal equilibrium state according to the non-welfarist approach,
enw, is given by (17). Comparing these two conditions, we get the following result:
Proposition 4 A non-welfarist planner will always set a higher tax as compared to the
tax in the voting equilibrium: t(nnw) > t(n˜a). In the optimal non-welfarist equilibrium
state more people free-ride and a higher level of public goods will be provided as compared
to the voting equilibrium: nnw > n˜a, g(nnw) > g(n˜a).
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The evaluation of the (monetary)
costs of public good provision are different between the planner and the decisive voter.
One the one hand, the planner considers the mean costs of taxation: if taxes rise, only
the 1− n norm-adhering agents and the np detected free-riders bear the full marginal
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costs. On the other hand, the decisive voter is a cooperator: She complies with the
social norm and contributes t. Hence, she is confronted with the full marginal tax
increase, t′. Since t′ > g′ for any stable state with n > 0, the costs faced by the decisive
voter are higher than the mean costs. A norm-adhering voter will therefore prefer a
state with a lower tax and a lower level of free-riding as compared to the optimal non-
welfarist equilibrium state. Since these equilibria are in the upward-sloping range of the
Laffer curve, a lower tax also transforms into a lower public good level, g(n˜a) < g(nnw).
Hence, there will be an underprovision of public goods in the voting equilibrium.
Optimality in Terms of the Welfarist Approach
Does the result of Proposition 4 carry over to the welfarist approach? While this
is not clear at first sight, the comparison of the voting equilibrium with the welfare
optimal equilibrium state characterized by (14) yields a clear finding: We get the same
qualitative result for both welfare criteria.
Proposition 5 A welfarist planner will always set a higher tax as compared to the
tax in the voting equilibrium: t(nw) > t(n˜a). In the optimal welfarist equilibrium state
more people free-ride and a higher level of public goods will be provided as compared to
the voting equilibrium: nw > n˜a, g(nw) > g(n˜a).
Proof. See Appendix.
Although the welfarist planner also incorporates the non-monetary welfare costs
reflected by Ψ, the marginal costs of public good provision for the decisive voter are
still higher than the marginal welfare costs considered by the planner. More formally,
t′ > g′ +Ψ for any stable equilibrium state. For the same reason as above, the voting
outcome is inefficient. There will be a suboptimal low level of taxation, free-riding and
public good provision in the voting equilibrium.
Underprovision of Public Goods
Hence, majority voting will result in an equilibrium state which is inefficient from
the perspective of both welfare concepts. The voting equilibrium is characterized by
a suboptimally low level of taxation, a suboptimally low level of free-riding and an
underprovision of public goods. This result is driven by the fact that the marginal
costs faced by the decisive voter are different from the social costs of public good
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provision. Note that this does only indirectly rely on the impact of the social norm.
The mechanism which drives a wedge between the planner’s and the (decisive) voter’s
incentives would prevail in any voting equilibrium, where the population is divided into
contributors and free-riders.
To the best of the authors knowledge, this mechanism has not been discussed and
provides a quite general contribution to the literature on collective choice over tax
respectively redistribution policies, which neglects the case of tax evasion (Romer,
1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). The standard textbook-result on
inefficient public good provision is driven by either the difference between the median
voter’s public good preferences and the mean preferences or the discrepancy between
the median voter’s income and the mean income (compare e.g. Persson and Tabellini,
2000). Both of these differences are typically exogenous. In our case, however, all
agents have identical preferences for the public good, and the difference in the median
voters’ marginal costs and the mean marginal costs are to some extent endogenously
formed: The voting outcome defines a tax, for which agents – depending on their level
of θ – decide on whether to free-ride or to contribute. The (exogenous) heterogeneity in
θ together with the endogenous level of taxation then translates into an (endogenous)
heterogeneity in behavior, which results in different costs of taxation. This effect drives
a wedge between the decisive voters’ costs and the mean (social) costs of public good
provision, resulting in an underprovision of public goods.
As we have mentioned above, this result only relies indirectly on the impact of the
social norm. In future research we will discuss the underprovision result in a more
compact framework.44
3.6 Public Law Enforcement
In this final section we analyze public law enforcement within this framework. More
precisely, we study the endogenous choice of p, the detection respectively punishment
probability. Following the tax enforcement literature, we assume that p is determined
by a revenue maximizing authority, while f is exogenously fixed at a finite level. Of
course, one could always enforce full cooperation by setting the fine f sufficiently high.
In democratic societies, however, there is typically strong resistance against excessively
44For example, we assume c(n)′ = 0. As we know from Proposition 1 (ii), there would then exist one
unique equilibrium for any policy, which would in turn transform into one unique voting equilibrium.
Moreover, the sign of Ψ from (15) would be unambiguously positive.
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strong sanctions. With respect to pecuniary sanctions, there arise further constraints
on f : Taking into account agents limited liability, high fines may not be credible.
We consider the following timing: First, the planner (respectively voters) deter-
mines a tax t. At a second stage, the law enforcement authority determines p by
investing an amount d(p) into the provision of auditing.45 Finally, agents choose their
actions. The public good is then determined by the resulting net revenues, defined as
total revenues (including fines) minus the costs of law enforcement. Using d = d(p) in
(8), we get
g(n, p, t) = t (1− n) + np (t+ f)− d(p). (27)
The function d(.) is increasing and strictly convex for 0 ≤ p < 1 and describes how
much the authority has to invest in order to implement a certain detection probability.
3.6.1 The Enforcement Subgame
Let us take the outcome of the first stage of the game – the tax t – as exogenously given
and focus on the enforcement subgame. Applying backward induction, we first study
the agents’ behavior. Since at this last stage the policy variables are exogenously given,
the individual decision is still determined by the threshold in (4) and the equilibrium
share of free-riders n∗ is given by (5). The law enforcing authority then chooses a
detection policy p which maximizes total net revenues, taking into account the impact
on n∗. We choose an indirect approach to this problem, using the technique introduced
in section 3.3. Taking t as exogenous, we can use (5) in order to derive the detection
probability as a function of n and t,
p(n, t) =
t− F−1(n)c(n)
t+ f
, (28)
where we assume that p(.) ∈ [0, 1) holds. The function p(n, t) defines a detection policy
p∗ which is needed in order to support the equilibrium n∗ (for a given t), p∗ = p(n∗, t).46
Substituting (28) in (27), we can express the problem of the authority as
max
n∗
g(n∗, p(n∗, t), t) = (1− n∗) t+ n∗ p(n∗, t) (t+ f)− d(p(n∗, t)). (29)
As in section 3.5, we study the optimization in an indirect manner: Instead of analyzing
the direct choice of p, we rather allow the authority to select one equilibrium level n∗
45We do not consider commitment problems.
46Compare the analogy to t(n∗), defined in section 3.3.
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with the associated detection policy p(n∗, t), characterized by (30). As before, we
neglect any problems of equilibrium selection. The first order condition for an interior
solution to the problem is given by
−t+ (t+ f)
(
p(n+, t) + n+
∂p(n, t)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
n=n+
)
= d′(p(n+, t))
∂p(n, t)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
n=n+
(30)
where d′ = ∂d
∂p
and ∂p
∂n
is derived in the Appendix.47 Equating marginal revenues
and marginal costs of a joint change in p∗ and n∗ (a marginal shift in the equilibrium
state), condition (30) defines an equilibrium share of free riders n+ = n(t) as an implicit
function of t, induced by the revenue maximizing enforcement policy p+ = p(n+, t).
Substituting n+ and p+ in (27), we get g+ = g(n+, p+, t), the maximum net revenue
which can be enforced for a given tax t. With this, we can make the following definition:
Definition 3 (i) Taking f , c(n), d(p) and F (θ) as exogenously given, a revenue max-
imizing social equilibrium state e+ = (t, n+, p+, g+) is a combination of a tax t, a share
of free-riders n+ = n(t), a detection probability p+ = p(n+, t) and a public good level
g+ = g(n+, p+, t) defined by (30), (28) and (27). (ii) A revenue maximizing social
equilibrium state e+ is stable, iff ∂p(n
+,t)
∂n+
≤ 0. (iii) The set of revenue maximizing
social equilibrium states in a society is characterized by S+ = {(t, n(t), p(t), g(t)) : 0 <
t ≤ ∞ | (t ≥ p (t+ f)) ∧ (p(t) ∈ [0, 1))} with S+ ∈ (0,∞]× [0, 1]× [0, 1)×R ∪ {+∞}.
The state e+ characterizes the outcome of the enforcement subgame for a given
tax t. From Proposition 2 we know that in any stable equilibrium n∗ is decreasing
in p. From this follows part (ii) of the definition. Part (iii) defines the set of all
possible revenue maximizing equilibrium states in the society. We will come back to
this definition in the following.
Before we turn to a comparative static analysis of this equilibrium framework, we
introduce a graphical representation of the system. In figure 3.4 we present an example
of the functions p(n∗, t) and g(n∗, p∗, t), where t is fixed and n∗ varies on the horizontal
axis. The revenue maximizing equilibrium state is defined by the peak of the net
revenue curve g(.), which determines n+, p+ and g+.
47There we also show that the problem is concave in the relevant range of n∗.
Voting and Public Good Provision 92
Figure 3.4: Revenue Maximizing Equilibrium
Comparative Statics – The Fine How is n+ respectively p+ affected by an exoge-
nous change in the level of the fine f? In the Appendix we show that
dn+
df
< 0. (31)
As the fine gets higher, the revenue maximizing authority chooses to enforce a lower
level of free-riding. In terms of figure 3.4, the peak of the g(.)-curve shifts to the left.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: A marginal increase in p has a stronger
deterrent effect the higher the fine is. Hence it becomes ‘cheaper’ to enforce a higher
level of cooperation and n+ will fall as f rises.
The change in the equilibrium enforcement policy p+ is ambiguous. As f increases,
the same level of cooperation can be enforced with a lower detection probability. Hence,
the p(.)-curve depicted in figure 3.4 shifts downward for all n+, tending to lower p+. As
a second order effect, however, the planner will reduce n∗ by increasing p+(see above).
In equilibrium, the revenue maximizing enforcement policy p+ is partially substituted
by an increase in f , only if the first order effect dominates. For this case we would get
dp+
df
< 0.
Comparative Statics – The Social Norm In this framework we can also study
how the formal norm enforcement changes with the strength of the informal, social
norm. We consider an exogenous shock in the distribution such that agents experience
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an increase in their θ-level and the new distribution function first-order stochastically
dominates the initial one. Let us denote the inverse function of the initial cumulative
distribution as F−1(n, φ) (with φ normalized to unity in the initial distribution). We
can express the shock in the distribution of θ as an increases in F−1 for any n ∈ [0, 1],
i.e. ∂F
−1
∂φ
≥ 0. In the Appendix we show that
dn+
dφ
< 0. (32)
After a positive shock in the social norm, the authority will enforce an equilibrium
state e+ with a low level of free-riding as compared to the state before the shock. The
intuition for this result is similar as above. If all agents become more sensitive towards
the social norm, a norm deviation is accompanied by a stronger internal sanction.
Hence, the same equilibrium level of cooperation can be enforced with lower external
sanctions. Law enforcement becomes ‘cheaper’, in the sense that the marginal costs to
enforce an equilibrium level n∗ fall with a stronger social norm.
Again, the overall impact on the equilibrium level of p+ is ambiguous. The first
order effect, discussed above, is clearly negative. From this perspective, formal law
enforcement and informal norm enforcement are substitutes. In terms of figure 3.4,
the p(.)-curve shifts downward after a positive norm-shock. After a shock in the norm
sensitivity, however, a revenue maximizing authority will enforce a lower level of free-
riding (compare above). Hence, the planer would move along the new p(.)-curve to the
left and p+ would increase. If this latter effect is small, the first order effect dominates
and we get
dp+
dφ
≤ 0. (33)
In this case, a strengthening of the social norm would lead to a higher level of law
compliance enforced by a less strict punishment policy. The informal institution – the
social norm – would partially substitute the formal institution – the external enforce-
ment policy. Stated differently, intrinsic incentives ‘crowd out’ the extrinsic incentives
provided by revenue-maximizing authority. Turning around this reasoning, it also holds
that society will invest more into law enforcement as the social norm erodes.
For the alternative case, where the second order effect in dp+/dφ dominates, and
the sign becomes positive, the law enforcing authority would find it optimal (in terms
of revenue maximization) to provide a stricter enforcement after a positive shock on
the social norm. Hence, a strengthening in the informal institution would trigger
higher investments in the formal institution. Although these two mechanism work as
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substitutes in the enforcement of cooperation, they could be complementary in the
revenue maximizing equilibrium state.
Comparative Statics – The Tax Finally, we study the impact of an (exogenous)
tax increase on the revenue maximizing equilibrium state. In turns out that the sign
of dn
+
dt
is ambiguous. In equilibrium, a higher tax could either lead to more or less
free-riding. There are several effects, pointing into opposite directions: On the one
hand, a tax increase raises the incentives to free-ride. Therefore a stricter deterrence
policy is needed to enforce the same equilibrium level of cooperation. Consequently
the marginal costs of law enforcement for a given level n∗ rise. On the other hand,
enforcing the same level of cooperation, raises more revenues as the tax is higher.
Hence, marginal revenues could rise (for a given level n∗). Depending on the shape of
d(.) respectively the level of n and t, either the one or the other effect dominates.
If dn
+
dt
> 0, the change in the equilibrium policy p+ is ambiguous as well. The first
order effect points into the opposite direction as the second order effect. However, if
dn+
dt
< 0 we would get the unambiguous result dp
+
dt
> 0. In this case, the authority
would strongly increase p+ as a reaction to a tax increase, and thereby implement a
lower level of free-riding.
Note that the ambiguity of the effect of a tax increase on the level of free-riding is
similarly reported in the standard literature on tax evasion. Empirical studies, on the
one hand, often document a positive correlation between the tax rate and the level of
evasion. However, there are several studies which report the opposite finding.48 On
the other hand, the standard theory of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972),
discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, delivers no clear prediction. Only for the case
of absolute decreasing risk-aversion, Yitzhaki (1974) predicts a decrease in evasion as
a response to a higher tax rate. In chapter 2 we have shown that for norm guided
taxpayers, this result may turn around, such that the aggregate impact on the level
of evasion becomes ambiguous. While the result derived in this section is similar, it is
driven by a completely different mechanism, based on the endogeneity of the auditing
rate p.
48Compare the survey in Andreoni et al. (1998).
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3.6.2 The Complete Game
Finally, we turn to the welfare optimal choice of a tax policy in the 1st stage of the
game. In order to shorten the discussion, we only consider a non-welfarist approach
to the problem.49 Note that for a given tax t, definition 3 determines one unique
equilibrium state e+. We can therefore set up the problem in the following (direct)
way:
max
t
W = −{(1− n+) t+ n+ p+ (t+ f)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
+ δv(g+) (34)
s.t. n+ = n(t), p+ = p(n+, t), g+ = g(n+, p+, t)
By the choice of t, the planner picks the optimal equilibrium state from the set S+.
Let us define the expression in the curly brackets in (34), the gross revenues, as R. An
interior solution t+ is then characterized by the following first order condition:
δv′ =
dR
dt
dg+
dt
(35)
where dg
+
dt
and dR
dt
are derived in the Appendix and the second order condition is
assumed to hold.
Condition (35) together with definition 3 provides the subgame perfect solution
to the full game, given by (t+, n+, p+, g+), i.e. an optimal tax t+, a share of free-
riders n+ = n(t+), a revenue maximizing policy p+ = p(n+, t+) and the public good
level g+ = g(n+, p+, t+). While in section 3.3, we only considered the endogenous
determination of n∗, we now have an equilibrium which characterizes a tax and a
punishment policy, the resulting level of free-riding and the budget balancing public
good level. The only remaining exogenous components of the model are c(.), d(.), the
distribution F (θ) and the fine f .
Equation (35) represents the Samuelson condition for the optimal choice of t+ (re-
spectively g+) in the complete game: The (sum of the) marginal benefits from the
public good are set equal to the marginal rate of transformation. Here, this rate is
given by the marginal gross revenues relative to the marginal increase in the net rev-
enues – which directly transforms into the marginal increase in the public good. In
contrast to section 3.4, the planner now takes into account the social costs of law en-
49In the Appendix we show that all results derived in this section do carry over for the welfarist
approach.
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forcement. Since the law enforcing authority conditions its policy p+ upon the tax t+,
any change in taxes will alter d(p+) and thereby the net revenues, which determine
the budget balancing public good level.50 If in the optimal equilibrium state dp
+
dt
> 0,
we get dR
dt
> dg
+
dt
. In this case the marginal increase in gross revenues would be higher
than the marginal increase in the public good. Therefore, the marginal costs of the
public good provision would be bigger than one.
What is now the difference in the optimal policy of the (non-welfarist) planner of
section 3.4, who considers the detection probability as fixed, and the planner in the
present section, who takes into account the impact of the tax policy on the authorities
choice of p+? Comparing conditions (17) and (35) we can formulate the following
result:
Proposition 6 Iff dp
+
dt
> 0, the public good level g+ provided in the equilibrium state e+
will be lower as compared to gnw, the public good level characterized by (17): g+ < gnw.
Iff dp
+
dt
< 0, the opposite holds true: g+ > gnw.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result evidently follows from the discussion of the Samuelson
condition above. Considering the enforcement policy as exogenously given (section 3.4),
the (marginal) increase in gross revenues directly transforms into a higher level of public
goods. However, if the planner takes into account the endogenous enforcement policy,
a wedge is driven between (marginal) net and gross revenues increases. Depending on
the direction in the equilibrium response of p+ to a tax change, the marginal costs of
public good provision will either raise or fall. Thus, public good provision will be lower
or higher as compared to the optimal state discussed in section 3.4.51
Voting Equilibrium Let us briefly study the case where the tax is determined
by majority voting, as discussed in section 3.5. Hence, instead of a planner, voters
determine the tax at the first stage of the game. We can then study, whether our
underprovision result derived above carries over to this extended framework. Applying
the analysis from section 3.5, the equilibrium tax which is preferred by a cooperating
50Note that we can write g = R− d(p).
51We can not directly compare the level of t, p respectively n between the equilibrium states enw
and the optimal e+. However, if the (exogenous) level of p in section 4 is assumed to be equal to p+,
one can show that t+ < tnw and n+ < nnw holds for dp
+
dt > 0.
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agent is given by
δv
′
=
1
dg+
dt
. (36)
Assuming that the decisive voter in the global voting equilibrium complies with the
norm (i.e. the logic behind Proposition 3 can be applied to this framework), the above
condition – together with definition 3 – characterizes the new voting equilibrium state
e˜+ =
(
t˜+, p˜+, n˜+, g˜+
)
.52 Comparing now condition (35) with (36) we can derive the
following result:
Proposition 7 Iff dn
+
dt
> 0, the underprovision result from Proposition 4 still holds:
According to the non-welfarist approach, majority voting in the complete game will
result in a suboptimally low level of public goods: g˜+ < g+.
Proof. See Appendix.
For the plausible case where dn
+
dt
> 0, the mean marginal costs of public good
provision considered by the planner are lower than the costs faced by the decisive
voter. Therefore, our main result from section 3.5 also holds in the extended model
version. Only for the special case where dn
+
dt
< 0 the result would turn around and we
would get an oversupply of public goods in the voting equilibrium.53
3.7 Conclusion
In many situation which are regulated by formal law, deviant behavior is not only
associated with the possibility of a formal, legal sanction – e.g. a fine imposed by a law
enforcing authority – but also with decentralized, informal sanctions: Law obedient
citizens my express their disapproval or stigmatize those who do not comply with the
law (Rasmusen, 1996; Arbak, 2005). However, people also adhere to legal regulations
in situations when there is nobody around who could impose informal sanctions. In
these situations, compliance can be explained by internalized social norms. If a norm
is internalized, it is associated with self-imposed sanctions, related to emotions like
guilt or remorse (Elster, 1989a, 1989b). In this chapter, we picked up this idea and
52For a formal derivation of this result we would have to repeat the complete analysis from section 5
for this extended equilibrium framework. As there are no reasons, why voting in the extended version
of the model should deliver any qualitatively different results, the analysis is not repeated here.
53For this case, the mean marginal costs of taxation are very high, since a tax increase raises the
share of contributors. Moreover, the raise in taxes is accompanied by a stricter enforcement policy
(dp
+
dt > 0), which strongly raises the costs of taxation for free-riders.
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studied how the interplay of internal sanctions together with legal norm enforcement
may induce an agent to abstain from law violations.
While our framework applies to the broad class of public good problems where
free-riding is associated with legal sanctions, one can interpret the approach as a tax
evasion model with discrete choice. We demonstrate the interdependence in free-riding,
respectively evasion behavior, which typically results in a multiplicity of equilibria.
Since small changes in the tax rate can induce strong changes in aggregate free-riding
respectively evasion behavior, the Laffer curve within such a system is characterized
by discontinuous jumps in the level of revenues. In contrast to a conventional, ‘well-
behaved’ tax-revenue relationship, the Laffer curve could also consist of several upward-
and downward-sloping segments. Hence, instead of asking ‘on which side of the Laffer
curve we are’, one could also ask where the nearest or where the highest ‘peak’ is
located.
The main focus of this chapter was the analysis of voting and public good provision
in the context of social norms. Our study suggests that in the context of free-riding,
majority voting will result in inefficient levels of taxation and public good provision.
In the standard literature, where public good contributions are considered to be fully
enforceable, majority voting results in inefficient outcomes, if the median voter’s pref-
erences and the mean preferences differ. In our case, agents’ preferences for the public
good are ex-ante identical. However, individuals differ in their sensitivity towards the
social norm, which results in different propensities to free-ride. As long as there exists
a voting equilibrium where free-riders and cooperators coexist, these two types face dif-
ferent marginal costs of public good provision: Cooperators fully bear a (marginal) tax
increase, whereas free-riders only pay taxes if they get detected. The mean marginal
costs considered by a social planner will always be between these two levels. Hence,
a voting equilibrium where the cooperators form a majority will be characterized by
an inefficiently low level of taxation, resulting in an underprovision of public goods.
The opposite holds true for a voting equilibrium where the free-riders account for a
majority. In this latter case, taxes would be too high and there would be an overpro-
vision of public goods. Though we have demonstrated this result for a very specific
framework, we also have discussed that this finding generalizes to all voting equilibria
where cooperators and free-riders coexist.
What can we say about the empirical relevance of this result? There is ample
evidence which indicates that tax evasion is lower in jurisdictions with direct demo-
cratic institutions, as compared to indirect democratic systems (e.g. Weck-Hannemann
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and Pommerehne, 1989; Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996). This result is
typically explained by assuming that political participation results in a stronger ‘tax
morale’ and thereby a higher level of compliance: If taxpayers are closely involved in
the political decision process, so goes the argument, their perceived moral obligation
to pay taxes is higher as compared to an indirect decision process (Pommerehne and
Weck-Hannemann, 1996; Torgler, 2005). Although this argument appears convincing,
our analysis suggests an alternative explanation: If we assume that politicians in a
representative democracy will implement a welfare optimal fiscal policy (i.e., the me-
dian voter does not immediately determine the fiscal policy), the associated level of
taxation would be higher than the level implemented by majority voting (given that
cooperators form a majority). The lower level of tax evasion observed in jurisdictions
with direct democratic systems would then be simply due to a lower level of taxation.
However, this level of taxation – and thereby also the associated level of evasion – could
be inefficiently low from a welfare perspective! Hence, it is not necessarily true that
direct democratic institutions are more efficient simply because they induce a higher
level of tax compliance. Even if a change from an indirect to a direct democratic
system induces an increase in tax morale, it remains unclear whether overall efficiency
increases, since such an institutional change shifts power towards the median voter and
thereby induces a political distortion. Clearly, further research is required in order to
clarify whether this objection is legitimate.
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Appendix
Appendix to Section 3.3
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Remember that we assume t − p (t+ f) ≥ 0 and
that – per assumption A1 – c(n) takes finite positive values. From (4) then follows
that 0 ≤ θˆ(n) ≤ ∞. For the inverse of the cumulative distribution functions F−1(n),
we know F−1 : [0, 1] → [0,∞] with F−1(0) = 0 and F−1(1) = ∞. Therefore we get:
θˆ(0) ≥ F−1(0) and θˆ(1) ≤ F−1(1). Since F−1(.) as well as θˆ(.) are continuous functions
defined over the unit interval [0, 1], mapping n into [0,∞], there exists at least one fix-
point n∗ ∈ [0, 1] where θˆ(n∗) = F−1(n∗) and hence n∗ = F (θˆ(n∗)) holds. For at least
for one n∗ there must also hold ∂F
−1
∂n
≥ ∂θˆ
∂n
. Hence, there exists at least one stable
equilibrium.
(ii) If c′(n) = 0 for all n ∈ [0, 1], it follows that the threshold θˆ(n) is a constant θˆ
for any n. It follows from above that there exists exactly one fix-point n∗ ∈ [0, 1]
where θˆ(n∗) = F−1(n∗) and hence n∗ = F (θˆ(n∗)) holds. Since we assume f(θ) > 0,
∂F−1
∂n
> ∂θˆ
∂n
= 0 must hold for any n. Hence, the equilibrium is stable.
Proof of Proposition 2. A locally stable equilibrium is characterized by (6). From
(4) and the assumptions on f(θ) and F (θ) one can easily show that
∂F−1(n)
∂n
T ∂θˆ(n)
∂n
⇔ 1
f(θˆ(n))
T −θˆ(n)c
′(n)
c(n)
. (A.1)
Using the implicit function theorem on (5) we get
dn∗
d (t− p(t+ f)) =
f(θˆ(n∗))
c(n∗) + c′(n∗) θˆ f(θˆ(n∗))
. (A.2)
From A2 we know that c′(n) ≤ 0. Using (A.1) one can easily see that the denominator
of (A.2) is non-negative [negative] for any locally stable [instable] equilibrium. Hence,
for any stable [instable] equilibrium, the fraction n∗ raises [falls] with an increase in
(t− p(t+ f)).
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Appendix to Section 3.4
A. Welfarist Approach
Derivation of Ψ Using the Leibnitz Rule of integral differentiation, the derivative
of the integral term in (13) is given by
−c′(n∗)
θˆ(n∗)∫
0
θ dF (θ)− c(n∗)dθˆ(n
∗)
dn∗
θˆ(n∗) f(θˆ(n∗)). (A.3)
Taking into account that t∗ = t(n∗) in (4) and simplifying, we get
dθˆ(n∗)
dn∗
=
1
c(n∗)
[
t′(n∗)(1− p)− θˆ(n∗)c′(n∗)
]
.
Substituting t′(.) from (10), and using ∂F
−1
∂n
= 1
f(θˆ(n))
we can rewrite dθˆ
dn
as
dθˆ(n∗)
dn∗
=
1
c(n∗)
[
c(n∗)
f(θˆ(n))
+ F−1(n∗)c′(n∗)− θˆ(n∗)c′(n∗)
]
.
Since for any equilibrium n∗ there must hold F−1(n∗) = θˆ(n∗), the second and third
term in the squared brackets chancel out. Finally, substituting dθˆ
dn
into (A.3) and
reversing signs yields Ψ as defined in (15).
Multiple Solutions As we have already stated in the main text, there might exist
several solutions to (14). Numerical simulations show, however, that for reasonable
high levels of δ there is a unique optimum. If there are multiple solutions, we exclude
them by focusing on stable equilibrium states in the upward-sloping range of the Laffer
curve. Such states are characterized by g′ > 0 and t′ > 0, which always holds in the
broader neighborhood of n∗ = 0. In this range of n∗, we typically get g′′ < 0 (compare
figure 3.2).
Second Order Condition The second order condition (SOC) to the problem (13)
is given by
ψ
g′′
g′
+ δv′′ (g′)2 +
dΨ
dn
< 0. (A.4)
where we made use of (14) While the sign of the third term is ambiguous, the second
term is negative since v′′ < 0. Assuming that δ (and thereby the second term) is
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sufficiently large, and that the third term is not too strongly positive, the SOC holds
if the first term is negative. We can identify several possible cases, where the sign of
term 1 is negative:
(1a) ψ < 0, g′ > 0, g′′ ≥ 0. (2a) ψ > 0, g′ > 0, g′′ ≤ 0.
(1b) ψ < 0, g′ < 0, g′′ ≤ 0. (2b) ψ > 0, g′ < 0, g′′ ≥ 0.
As discussed above, we focus on solutions in a range where g(.) is concave. Hence, we
neglect the cases (1a) and (2b). In case (1b), ψ < 0 and raising taxes and thereby
n∗ lowers total norm-based disutility. Stated differently, in this case a tax increase
has a positive non-monetary welfare effect. There could be solutions to (14) where
the planner would choose an equilibrium on the downward-sloping side of the Laffer
curve (g′ < 0) in order to raise n and thereby lower norm-based welfare-costs of the
free-riders. Since this does not seem to be very plausible, we exclude this scenario from
our analysis. (Theoretically, there could also exist an optimum with ψ < 0, g′ > 0,
g′′ ≤ 0. Since such a solution is only possible for very low levels of δ, and since then
the SOC is unclear, we neglect this case.) Finally, for the case (2a), ψ > 0. In such
a situation, any increase in n (associated with a higher tax) will raise the norm-based
welfare costs. The planner will operate in the upward-sloping side of the Laffer curve,
with g′ > 0 and the SOC holds for g′′ ≤ 0. (Theoretically there could also be an
optimum in the range where g′ < 0. Since then the SOC becomes unclear, we exclude
this case by assumption.)
B. Non-Welfarist Approach
As in the welfarist approach, there might also here be several solutions to (17). As
above, we exclude all instable equilibria and states with g′ < 0. The SOC to (17) is
given by
g′′ (δ v′ − 1) + δv′′ (g′)2 < 0.
As an interior solution to (17) is characterized by δ v′ = 1,the SOC is fulfilled since
v′′ < 0.
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Appendix to Section 3.5
Individual Voting Decision – Second Order Conditions The second order con-
ditions for (19) and (20) are given by
−t′′ + δ (v′′ g′2 + v′ g′′) < 0
respectively
−pt′′ − θic′′ + δ
(
v′′ g′2 + v′ g′′
)
< 0,
where we have omitted the functions’ arguments. In a range of n where both t and g
are concave, the SOC for norm-adhering agents is fulfilled. If δ is large enough, the
SOC should also hold for free-riders – for low levels of θi even for c
′′ < 0. (For very high
values of θi, θic
′′ could be the dominant effect. However, high θ-types will typically
cooperate.)
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us denote nG such that g′(nG) = 0. From (11) follows
that t′(nG) > 0. Since per definition t′(na) = 0, there has to hold nG < na. Moreover,
t′(nG) > 0 and g′(nG) = 0 also implies that (i) ∆ui(1, nG) < 0 and remember that
we assume (ii) ∆ui(1, 0) > 0. Since ∆ui(1, n
∗) is strictly decreasing in n∗ (second
order condition), it immediately follows from (i) and (ii) that there exists one unique
n˜a ∈ (0, nG) with ∆ui(1, n˜a) = 0. As na ≤ 12 , we can then state: 0 < n˜a < nG < na ≤ 12 .
Since for at least half of the population Ui(n
∗) is single peaked in the range n∗ ∈ [0, na],
there can not exist any alternative state e′ with n′ ∈ [0, na], which is preferred against
e˜a by a majority.
Discussion of Proposition 3. Comparing (19) with (20) yields ∆ui(0, n
∗) >
∆ui(1, n
∗) for any stable equilibrium. For all free-riders with θi < θˆ(n˜a) there must
hold ∆ui(0, n˜
a) > ∆ui(1, n˜
a) = 0 since ∂
2ui(0,n)
∂n∂θ
> 0. They would prefer an equilibrium
with a higher level of taxation and free-riding. The same could hold for agents with
θˆ(n˜a) ≤ θi < θˆ(na), who cooperate in the voting equilibrium. Note that Ui(n) is not
continuously differential for all n ∈ [0, 1]. For every agent i, there exists a level of n
where θi = θˆ(n). At this level of n, ui(1, n) and ui(0, n) intersect, resulting in a kink in
Ui(n). For higher [lower] levels of n, agent i would free-ride [cooperate]. Therefore, an
agent who cooperates in the voting equilibrium e˜a, could turn into a free-rider for an
equilibrium n′ with n˜a < n′ ≤ na, which theoretically could result in Ui(n′) > Ui(n˜a)
(since there holds ∆ui(0, n
∗) > ∆ui(1, n∗) for any stable equilibrium). Stated differ-
ently, for agents with θi < θˆ(n
a) preferences are not necessarily single peaked. However,
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assuming na ≤ 1
2
assures that this group is always in a minority. There can never exist
an alternative e′ which is preferred against e˜a by a majority.
Proof of Proposition 4. Note that the LHS of conditions (17) and (21) are
identical for any n. Using (10) and (11) one can easily show that t′(n∗) > g′(n∗) for
any n∗ ∈ (0, na]. Comparing the RHS of (17) and (21) it immediately follows from
g′(n˜a) > 0 (Proposition 3) that
t′(n˜a)
g′(n˜a)
> 1,
since n˜a ∈ (0, na). As t′ > 0 and g′ > 0 holds for n˜a as well as for nnw, v′′ < 0 implies
t(nnw) > t(n˜a), nnw > n˜a and g(nnw) > g(n˜a).
Proof of Proposition 5. In order to proof Proposition 5 we simply have to show
that t′(n∗) > g′(n∗) +Ψ(n∗) holds in the relevant range of n∗ ∈ (0, na]. Substituting Ψ
from (15) and g′ from (11), we can rewrite this condition as
t′(n∗)− t′(n∗) (1− n∗ (1− p)) + F−1(n∗)c(n∗) > θˆ(n∗) c(n∗) + c′(n∗)
θˆ(n∗)∫
0
θ dF (θ).
Since for any equilibrium n∗ there must hold F−1(n∗) = θˆ(n∗), the condition simplifies
to
n∗ t′(n∗) (1− p) > c′(n∗)
θˆ(n∗)∫
0
θ dF (θ)
which holds for any n∗ ∈ (0, na], since t′(n∗) > 0 and c′ ≤ 0. Hence, the RHS of (21)
is higher than the RHS of (14). As t′ > 0 and g′ > 0 holds for n˜a as well as for nw,
v′′ < 0 implies t(nw) > t(n˜a), nw > n˜a and g(nw) > g(n˜a).
Appendix to Section 3.6
Second Order Condition to (30): The SOC to problem (30) is given by
SOC := 2
∂p(n, t)
∂n
(t+ f) +
∂2p(n, t)
∂n2
(n (t+ f)− d′)− d′′
(
∂p(n, t)
∂n
)2
< 0. (A.5)
From (28) we can derive
∂p(n, t)
∂n
= − Ω
t+ f
(A.6)
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with
Ω :=
∂F−1
∂n
c(.) + F−1(.)c′(.) (A.7)
From the proof of Proposition 2 we know that Ω is positive in any stable equilibrium,
and therefore ∂p
∂n
< 0. Hence, the first and the third term (since d′′ > 0) in (A.5) are
negative. From the first order condition follows that the expression in the brackets in
the second term must be negative. A sufficient condition for the SOC to hold is then
∂2p
∂n2
> 0. This is assumed to hold for stable equilibrium states.
The Enforcement Subgame
Comparative static analysis w.r.t. the fine f From (28) we get
∂p
∂f
= − p
t+ f
≤ 0. (A.8)
As the fine gets stronger, one can implement the same equilibrium n∗ with a lower
detection probability.
Using (28) and (A.6) we can simplify the first order condition (30) and get
−F−1(.)c(.)− nΩ + d
′(.)
t+ f
Ω = 0. (A.9)
Applying the implicit function theorem on (A.9) and substituting for (28), (A.6) and
(A.8) we get
dn+
df
= − 1
SOC
Ω
(t+ f)2
(−d′(.) + d′′(.) p) < 0
with SOC < 0 as defined above in (A.5). Note that Ω must be positive in a stable
equilibrium (Proposition 2). Since d′′ < 0, the expression in the round brackets is
negative. Therefore we get dn
+
df
< 0. With this result, we can derive from (28)
dp+
df
=
∂p(n+, .)
∂f︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
∂p
∂n
dn+
df︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
T 0
where the signs follow from (A.6) and (A.8). Hence, the sign of dp
+
df
is unclear. Only if
the first order effect dominates, dp
+
df
< 0.
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Comparative static analysis w.r.t. the distribution of θ Let us express the
inverse of the cumulative distribution function as F−1(n, φ) with φ = 1 for the initial
distribution of θ. We study a shock in the distribution such that ∂F
−1(n,φ)
∂φ
≥ 0 for all
n ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the new distribution function first-order stochastically dominates the
initial one. Substituting F−1(n) = F−1(n, φ) in (28) and (A.9) we can derive
∂p
∂φ
= −∂F
−1
∂φ
c
t+ f
< 0
and with that
dn+
dφ
= − 1
SOC
{
−∂F
−1
∂φ
c+ F−1c
[
1
Ω
(
∂2F−1
∂φ∂n
c+
∂F−1
∂φ
c′
)
− d
′′Ω
t+ f
]}
,
where we made use of condition (30) and (A.7). It is sufficient for dn
+
dφ
< 0 to hold, if
the expression in the squared brackets is negative. Since d′′ > 0 and for stable equilibria
Ω > 0, this holds if the only term which could be positive, ∂
2F−1
∂φ∂n
c, is not too large. We
assume that this is fulfilled for the equilibrium state e+.
From (28) we get
dp+
dφ
=
∂p(n+, t)
∂φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
∂p
∂n
dn+
dφ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
T 0
as ∂p
∂φ
< 0 and ∂p
∂n
< 0 (in stable equilibria). Hence, dp
+
dφ
is only negative, if the first
order effect dominates.
Comparative static analysis w.r.t. the tax t From (28) we can derive
∂p
∂t
=
f + F−1(.)c(.)
(t+ f)2
> 0. (A.10)
Applying the implicit function theorem on (A.9), we get
dn+
dt
= − 1
SOC
Ω
(t+ f)2
{
−d′ + d′′f + F
−1(.)c(.)
t+ f
}
T 0 (A.11)
where made use of (28), (A.6) and (A.10). The two terms in the curly brackets have
different signs, hence, the sign of dn
+
dt
is ambiguous. (Note, that the result of Proposition
2, ∂n
∗
∂t
≥ 0, does not apply here, since there the detection probability was exogenously
given.)
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The change in the equilibrium policy p+ is given by
dp+
dt
=
∂p(n+, t)
∂t︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
∂p
∂n
dn+
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
+/−
T 0. (A.12)
The Complete Game: Non-Welfarist Approach
First Order Condition From the definition of R follows
dR
dt
= 1− n+ (1− p+)− dn+
dt
(
t− p+ (t+ f))+ n+dp+
dt
(t+ f) . (A.13)
Since g+ = R− d(p+), we can derive
dg+
dt
=
dR
dt
− d′dp
+
dt
. (A.14)
Proof of Proposition 6. From (A.14) immediately follows that dg
dt
< dR
dt
iff dp
+
dt
> 0.
Therefore, the right hand side in (35) is bigger than one (as in a reasonable equilibrium
there holds dg
+
dt
> 0). Iff dp
+
dt
< 0 =⇒ dg
dt
> dR
dt
and the right hand side in (35) is smaller
than one. Proposition 6 then follows from v′′ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. Substituting (A.6), (A.10) and (A.12) in (A.13), we get
dR
dt
< 1⇔
−n+ (1− p+)− dn+
dt
(
t− p+ (t+ f) + n+Ω)+ n+f + F−1c
t+ f
< 0.
Substituting now p+ from (28) in the first term, the first and the third term on the
LHS cancel out. As Ω > 0 in a stable equilibrium and since t ≥ p+ (t+ f), the LHS
is negative iff dn
+
dt
> 0. Hence, dn
+
dt
> 0 ⇔ dR
dt
< 1. With dR
dt
< 1, the RHS in (35) is
smaller than the RHS of (36). From v′′ < 0 then follows g˜+ < g+.
The Complete Game: Welfarist Approach
The problem of a welfarist planner is given by
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max
t
W = −{(1− n+) t+ n+ p+ (t+ f)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
− c(n+)
θˆ(n∗)∫
0
θ dF (θ) + δv(g+)
s.t. n+ = n(t), p+ = p(n+, t), g+ = g(n+, p+, t).
The first-order condition to this problem is given by
δv′
dg+
dt
=
dR
dt
+Ψ+ (A.15)
Using the Leibnitz Rule we get
Ψ+ = c′(n+)
dn+
dt
∫ θˆ
0
θdF (θ) + c(n+)
dθˆ
dt
θˆf(θˆ). (A.16)
Substituting n+ and p+ in (4) we can derive
dθˆ(n+, p+)
dt
=
(
(1− p)− dp+
dt
(t+ f)
)
c(n+)− (t− p+ (t+ f)) c′ dn+
dt
c(n+)2
. (A.17)
Note that in contrast to section 3.3, the sign of dθˆ
dt
is unclear. However, there has to
hold sign
{
dθˆ
dt
}
= sign
{
dn+
dt
}
. From this follows, that the sign of Ψ+ is ambiguous,
since the two effects in (A.16) point into opposite directions.
Comparing now condition (A.15) with (36) we can show that the underprovision
result from Proposition 5 still holds if dn
+
dt
≥ 0 and ∫ θˆ
0
θdF (θ)− θˆ2f(θˆ) > 0. If we use
(A.13) and (A.17) we get dR
dt
+Ψ+ < 1⇔(
(1− p)− dp
+
dt
)[
θˆf(θˆ)− n+
]
− dn
+
dt
(
t− p+ (t+ f) + n+Ω) <
−c′(n+)dn
+
dt
(∫ θˆ
0
θdF (θ)− θˆ2f(θˆ)
)
From the proof of Proposition 7 we know that the expression in the round brackets in
the first term is zero. As we assume that the expression in the round brackets on the
RHS of the inequality is positive, this condition holds for dn
+
dt
≥ 0. In this case, the
majority voting outcome in the complete game will result in an suboptimal low level
of public goods, also from the perspective of the welfarist approach.
Chapter 4
Social Norms and the Evolution of
Conditional Cooperation∗
4.1 Introduction
Starting with Sonnemans et al. (1999), Keser and van Winden (2000) and Fischbacher
et al. (2001), economic research on voluntary public good provisions has highlighted
the role of conditional cooperative behavior : Agents who follow this behavioral pattern
condition their cooperation on the cooperativeness of others respectively on their be-
liefs about others behavior. The relevance of this conditional strategy, which is well
documented in the social psychology literature (e.g. Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; Dawes
et al., 1977), has been also demonstrated in field experiments: Frey and Meier (2004a,
2004b) find that charitable giving follows a conditional pattern. Individuals are willing
to donate more money, the more other people they expect to donate. Similarly, Croson
(2005) shows that voluntary contributions in a fundraising campaign of a US public
radio station could be substantially increased by informing potential donors about the
high contribution level of previous contributors.1
One approach to explain these observations is based upon the role of social norms.2
Social norms are rules of conduct, which are enforced by internal or external sanctions
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Mathias Spichtig, Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosys-
tem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam.
1Further evidence on conditional cooperation is surveyed by Ga¨chter (2005).
2There are further theoretical approaches which account for these observations: Theories of fairness
and inequity aversion (Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), theories of
reciprocity and intentions (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2005) as well as
conformity models (Bernheim, 1994) are all able to explain conditional cooperation. Compare Fehr
and Falk (2002) for a comprehensive review.
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(Ullmann-Margalit, 1977; Elster, 1989a, 1989b). If the magnitude of these sanctions are
positively related to the degree of norm compliance, a social norm for cooperation can
trigger conditional cooperation. This relationship is typically studied using the concept
of internalized social norms, which is modelled as a ‘preference for norm compliance’.
The strength of these pro-social preference – related to the level of norm internalization
respectively the norm sensitivity of an agent – is thereby considered as exogenously
given.3 We deviate from this tradition and use an indirect evolutionary approach to
study the endogenous formation of norm sensitivity. In this vein, we endogenously
derive the distribution of preference considered in section 2 and 3 of this thesis. For
the case of evolutionary adaptation to a ‘heterogenous environment’, where agents are
exposed to cooperative as well as to non-cooperative environments, we find those levels
of norm sensitivity to be evolutionary successful, which induce conditional cooperative
behavior.
In contrast to standard evolutionary game theory, which studies the direct evolution
of genetically encoded strategies, indirect evolutionary approaches, pioneered by Gu¨th
and Yaari (1992) and Gu¨th (1995), allow for cognition and rationality in the evolution of
behavior and the underlying preferences. The main idea of an indirect approach is the
following: Rational actors play a game and their preferences induce certain strategies.
These strategies lead to a certain payoff which determines the ‘success’ of an actor. This
success, related e.g. to income and social prestige, determines what is called fitness in
biology. More successful players, i.e. agents with a higher social prestige, will then get
more frequently imitated than others. This way, the preferences of successful players
spread in the population while those of less successful actors get eliminated. Hence,
the approach provides a method to endogenously study the formation of preferences.4
We first introduce a model of voluntary public good provision within a large scale
society, which corresponds to a simplification of the framework studied in chapter 3 of
this thesis. In their decision whether to cooperate or to free-ride, individuals trade off
the benefits from free-riding with the costs related to norm-enforcing sanctions. The
impact of these sanctions on the utility of an agent varies along two dimensions: First,
we allow for preference heterogeneity with respect to the level of norm internalization,
which transforms into different levels of sensitivity towards the sanctions. Second,
the extent of sanctions varies with the degree of cooperation in the population. The
higher the share of norm compliance, the stronger are the sanctions. As we have
addressed above, this will induce conditional cooperative behavior: Agents with an
3Compare e.g. Akerlof (1980), Lindbeck et al. (1999), Naylor (1989), Rege (2004).
4See also Bester and Gu¨th (1998) as well as Dekel et al. (2004) and the references cited therein.
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intermediate level of norm sensitivity will condition their cooperation on the behavior
of the other members in the society. In turn, this behavior opens the scope for multiple
equilibria. The society could coordinate either on a state with a strong social norm
and far-reaching cooperation or on a state with weak norm-enforcement and widespread
free-riding.
The agents’ evolutionary success is determined by income respectively social status.
While the direct payoff from free-riding clearly dominates that of cooperation, the
sanctions associated with free-riding have a negative impact on social status. This effect
is driven by social exclusion or stigmatization respectively the economic consequences
of these sanctions.5 Therefore, the gain in social prestige related to the higher income
of a defector can be offset by the status loss associated with the punishment of a
norm-violation. Whether free-riding or cooperation is evolutionary more successful
then depends crucially on the level of cooperation in the society, which determines the
strength of the status-impact of the sanctions. In course of the evolution, individuals
learn about the success of different agents with different levels of norm sensitivity.
Accordingly they adapt their own preferences, i.e. their level of norm sensitivity, where
more successful preference-types get more frequently imitated. Individual behavior, the
level of cooperation within the population and the strength of sanctions then evolves
indirectly, along with the endogenous change in preferences.
We first study the evolution of norm-sensitivity within a framework, where agents
adapt to one particular environment associated with one equilibrium state of the
public good game. If the status impact of sanctions is sufficiently strong, norm-
enforcement may counterbalance the fitness advantage of free-riders for high levels
of norm-compliance. In this case, there is scope for an evolutionary equilibrium with
an intermediate level of norm compliance, where free-riders and cooperators coexist.
However, such an equilibrium is never evolutionary stable. Typically, the evolutionary
pressure would induce a decline in the norm sensitivity and cooperation would break
down.
This picture dramatically changes once we study evolution within a ‘heterogenous
environment’. While in biology, the idea that subjects may face different ‘habitats’ is
quite common,6 this idea has been hardly reflected in evolutionary economics. We in-
troduce this idea, linking the multiplicity of equilibria, which arises in our basic model,
5Compare Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002) on monetary punishment and Masclet et al. (2003) as well as
Falk et al. (2005) on ‘informal’ sanctions.
6Compare, among many others, Christiansen (1975), Levins (1968), Maynard Smith and Hoekstra
(1980), Via and Lande (1987).
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to the evolutionary process. We consider the case where the population faces some-
times an equilibrium state with strong norm-compliance and sometimes an alternative
state with widespread norm violations. Agents will then interact in both, in mainly
cooperative and in mainly non-cooperative environments, where the fitness-impact of
sanctions is strong in the former and weak in the latter habitat. Consider for example
the case of an anti-littering norm. Consider for example an individual, which crosses
one public park on her daily way to work and promenades in a different park, every day
after lunch. Assume that the first park is more or less clean, whereas the second one is
littered. In such a heterogenous environment, we encounter three possible strategies:
Individuals with a high level of norm sensitivity will unconditionally cooperate. They
follow the anti-littering norm in both parks. Types with a low level of norm sensitivity,
however, will free-ride in both parks: they litter, no matter what other individuals do.
In contrast, individuals with an intermediate level of norm-sensitivity, however, will
act as conditional cooperators: They cooperate in the ‘clean habitat’ but free-ride in
the ‘littered’ environment. Thereby, they dominate both unconditional strategies. In
the environment with a strong social norm – the clean park – conditional cooperators
adhere to the norm and avoid social sanctions, which makes them more successful as
free-riders. In the environment where the norm is weak – the littered park – they
free-ride and earn a higher fitness payoff than unconditional cooperators. Hence, types
with an intermediate norm-sensitivity are better adapted to a heterogenous environ-
ment as their preferences allows them to react flexibly to different social situations.
Conditional cooperation dominates the unconditional strategies, which are specialized
for one particular habitat. As we consider the pattern of norm-enforcement as exoge-
nously given, we do not directly contribute to the literature on the evolution of social
norms.7 However, we provide a simple and intuitive explanation for the evolutionary
origin and stability of conditional cooperation, which is novel in the literature.
While evolutionary economic approaches typically focus on discrete heterogeneity in
trait values (e.g. different preference types),8 we study the evolution of a continuously
distributed trait – the norm-sensitivity. As already noted above, our indirect evolution-
ary analysis therefore constitutes an evolutionary underpinning of the distribution of
preference types considered in chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis. We thereby use a method
from quantitative genetics, originally introduced by Lande (1976). Lande’s approach,
takes into account for externalities in the evolutionary success of one preference type,
which also emerges in our framework: As the distribution of norm sensitivity changes,
7Bowles and Gintis (1998), Boyd and Richerson (2002), Gintis (2003), Henrich and Boyd (2001).
8Compare e.g. Basin et al. (2004).
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this induces different equilibrium states which renders the impact of social sanctions
on status either stronger or weaker. Different distributions thereby lead to variations
in the environment with implications for the success of one particular type. While the
method we apply is novel in evolutionary economics, it provides a more tractable tool
for our analysis than the approach based on standard replicator dynamics (Weibull,
1995). Moreover, we can show that our findings are quantitatively similar to the results
one would derive according to such alternative evolutionary dynamics.
The chapter is structured as follows. We first study a simple model of social norms
and cooperation in a large population. In section 4.3 we introduce an evolutionary
approach from quantitative genetics. We then apply this method to our model and
discuss the evolution of social norms and cooperative behavior in a homogenous respec-
tively in a heterogeneous environment. Section 4.5 presents a simple model extension,
which accounts for the endogenous formation of norm enforcing sanctions. Section 4.6
provides a critical discussion of our findings and section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Social Norms and Cooperation
Consider a large society represented by a continuum of individuals [0, 1]. Each agent
i chooses xi ∈ {0, 1}, to contribute to the public good (xi = 1, ‘cooperate’) or not to
contribute (xi = 0, ‘free-ride’). The material payoff y(xi) for strategy xi is given by
y(xi) = −xic (1)
where c > 0 depicts the material costs of the public good contribution. The action xi
also determines a payoff z(xi, n), where n depicts the share of free-riders in the society.
This payoff is defined as
z(xi, n) = (xi − 1) s(n) (2)
where s(n) relates to the sanctions an agent incurs, if he violates the cooperation norm.
The origin of these sanctions could in principle be internal, external or a mixture of
both. In the context of internalized social norms (Elster, 1989), emotions represent
an internal sanctioning mechanism. If an agent has internalized a cooperation norm,
free-riding would be associated with emotions as guilt, remorse or the loss of self-
esteem.9 External sanctions could be monetary or non-monetary, e.g. related to social
9For a review on the role of emotions in economic theory compare Elster (1998). Compare also
Bowles and Gintis (2003), van Winden (2001).
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disapproval.10 For the moment, we will not study the origin of these sanctions – i.e.
why people engage in (costly) norm-enforcement activities – and simply assume that
there is a mechanism which induces a certain punishment for free-riders. In section
4.5 we discuss a model extension which endogenously explains the origin of such norm-
enforcing sanctions.
Throughout the whole chapter we employ the following assumption:
Assumption A1:The finite-valued function s(n) is continuously differentiable in n.
For n ∈ [0, 1] there holds s′(n) ≤ 0. Moreover s(0) > 0 and s(1) = ε.
Allowing the sanctions to depend on other agents’ behavior captures the idea that
the degree of norm compliance (co)determines the strength of norm-enforcement and
thereby the strength of the social norm. Following the literature (e.g. Akerlof, 1980;
Lindbeck et al. 1999), we here assume s(n) to be decreasing in n: A deviant agents
is supposed to suffer from weaker internal sanctions, as free-riding becomes more and
more widespread: One feels less guilty violating an anti-littering norm in a dirty park
as compared to a clean park. The equivalent is supposed to hold for external sanctions
(Rege, 2004).11 For the case of perfect norm compliance (n = 0), sanctions are strictly
positive. In a society where everybody free-rides, however, the cooperation norm has
completely eroded. The norm-based moral connotation of ‘wrong’ (free-riding) and
‘right’ (contributing) have vanished and sanctions are infinitesimal.
4.2.1 Preferences
Let the preferences of agent i, defined over y(.), z(.) and the public good payoff v(g),
be given by an additive separable utility function12
ui(xi, n) = y(xi) + θiz(xi, n) + v(g(n)), (3)
with the individual specific parameter θi ∈ [−∞,∞]. The public good is defined by
g = g(n), g′ < 0, and v′ > 0. We can interpret the parameter θi as the degree of norm
sensitivity. While a player with θi = 0 is solely concerned about the direct pecuniary
10For evidence on the role of non-monetary sanctions compare Masclet et al. (2003), Rege and
Telle (2003, 2004). A theoretical analysis of social sanctions is provided by Holla¨nder (1990) and Rege
(2004).
11For experimental evidence supporting this assumption, compare Falk et al. (2005), Masclet et
al. (2003).
12This simple preference structure allows us to show the main points of our analysis as clear as
possible. Our results do also hold for more complex preferences.
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payoff from the game (and the public good), an agent with θi > 0 also considers the
norm-based payoff.13
Taking n as well as g as given,14 player i will cooperate iff ui(1, n) > ui(0, n), which
holds for θis(n) > c. Hence, an agent will contribute to the public good, if the utility
loss from the sanction dominates the costs of cooperation. This implies the threshold
θˆ(n) :=
c
s(n)
, (4)
which divides society into norm-adhering and norm-breaking individuals: Those with
θi > θˆ(n) cooperate, while those with θi ≤ θˆ(n) free-ride. The action choice of an agent
is then determined by her norm sensitivity θi and the share of free-riders:
xi = x(θi, n) =
0 for θi ≤ θˆ(n)1 for θi > θˆ(n) (5)
Note that the threshold θˆ(n) is non-decreasing in n,
∂θˆ(n)
∂n
≥ 0 (6)
since s′(.) ≤ 0. As more agents deviate from the norm, the sanctions associated with
a norm violation become smaller. Hence, an agent who cooperates for low levels of n
may turn into a free-rider for higher levels of n. Those individuals with θi ∈ (θˆ(0), θˆ(1)]
condition their cooperation on the behavior of others. They act as conditional cooper-
ators (Keser and van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001). Agents with θi ≤ θˆ(0),
however, would always free-ride, irrespectively of other subjects’ behavior. Allowing
for a heterogeneity in θ-types, the model therefore captures the two main patterns of
behavior typically found in empirical studies (compare Ga¨chter, 2005).
13Agents with θi < 0 could be interpreted as ‘punks’; they would derive benefits from a norm-
violation. As will become clear in the following, we only include this latter group for technical
convenience. Excluding non-negative values of θ would not change any of our results.
14In a large society the decision of a single individual has a negligible impact on the share of
free-riders and on the public good level.
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4.2.2 Equilibrium
Let the cumulative distribution function of the parameter θ be given by Φ(θ). We
assume that Φ(θ) is continuously differentiable on the interval [−∞,∞], the corre-
sponding density function φ(θ) has full support and φ(θ) > 0
Assumption A2: (i) The inverse function of the cumulative distribution is given
by Φ−1(n) for n ∈ [0, 1], with Φ−1(0) = −∞ and Φ−1(1) = ∞. (ii) ∃ n ∈ (0, 1) :
Φ−1(n) > θˆ(n).
A social equilibrium state in such a society is given by a share of free-riders n∗, char-
acterized by the fixed point equation
n∗ = Φ(θˆ(n∗)). (7)
Lemma 1 For any s(n) and Φ(θ) as characterized in A1 and A2(i) there always exists
an equilibrium with n∗ = 1. If A2(ii) holds, there always exists at least one further
equilibrium with 0 < n∗ < 1.
Proof. We can rewrite condition (7) as Φ−1(n∗) = θˆ(n∗). From A2(i) we know that
Φ−1(1) = ∞ and from s(1) = ε follows θˆ(1) → ∞. Hence, there always exists an
equilibrium with n∗ = 1. From A1 we know s(0) > 0 ⇒ θˆ(0) > 0 which implies
θˆ(0) > Φ−1(0). From this follows that there must exist at least one n∗ ∈ (0, 1) where
Φ−1(n∗) = θˆ(n∗) holds as long as A2(ii) is fulfilled, since both θˆ(n) and Φ−1(n) are
continuously increasing functions defined over the unit interval.
An equilibrium constitutes a self-supporting share of norm-violators: The threshold
θˆ(n∗) is such that the population share with θi ≤ θˆ(n∗) is exactly n∗. There always
exists one equilibrium where nobody contributes, n∗ = 1. The cooperation norm
has eroded, everybody free-rides and society fails to provide the public good. Given
that assumption A2(ii) holds, the strength of the norm sensitivity is distributed such
that there exists a level of free-riding n where the maximum level of norm sensitivity
among free-riders, Φ−1(n), is above the cooperation threshold θˆ(n). In this case, the
system is characterized by multiple equilibria. In addition to the equilibrium where
the public good provision fails, there is at least one equilibrium with a positive share of
contributors. A graphical representation of two possible scenarios is provided in figure
4.1. While for the example depicted in the left graph A2(ii) is fulfilled, it does not hold
for the example in the right graph. In the first case, there is a multiplicity of equilibria,
in the latter there is only an equilibrium with n∗ = 1.
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium Share of Free-Riders
Given that the distribution Φ(θ) is common knowledge, society immediately coor-
dinates into one of the possible equilibria. Alternatively one could consider Φ(θ) to be
unknown, but assume that agents can induce the behavior of other members in society
from the public good level. In a repeated game, agents would learn about the share
of free-riders. As long as players base their next period’s decision on this share – i.e.
cooperate in period t iff θi > θˆ(n
t−1) and free-ride otherwise – society would converge
into an asymptotically stable equilibrium, characterized by
∂Φ−1(n∗)
∂n
≥ ∂θˆ(n
∗)
∂n
. (8)
In the scenario depicted in the left graph in figure 4.1, there exist two instable equi-
librium states – the one with an intermediate level of n∗ and another one at n∗ = 1
– and two stable equilibria: one with a high level of cooperation and another one
where free-riding is widespread. In the graph on the right hand side of figure 4.1 the
only equilibrium, n∗ = 1, is also stable, since the cumulative distribution intersect the
θˆ(n)-curve ‘from below’ (and therefore condition 8 holds).
In the evolutionary analysis of section 4.4, we will neglect instable states, assuming
that in the long-run society always coordinates on a stable equilibrium state.
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4.3 Evolutionary Quantitative Genetics
In the following we will study the evolution of the distribution Φ(θ). For this purpose,
we introduce a technique from evolutionary quantitative genetics,15 first analyzed by
Lande (1976). This approach provides a tractable method to study an evolutionary
process within a continuously polymorphic population, i.e. to address the evolution of
a type distribution.
Consider a large population which is heterogeneous along one trait α. The trait
value is normally distributed with mean α¯ and variance σ2, α ∼ F (α, α¯, σ2). To sim-
plify notation, we will denote the distribution function by F (α) and the corresponding
density function by f(α). Let the fitness of an α-type for a given distribution with
mean α¯ be given w(α, α¯). The mean fitness of the population is then
w¯ =
∫
w(α, α¯) dF (α). (9)
Here we allow for frequency dependent fitness. Fitness is called frequency dependent,
if the fitness of a α-type does also depend on the composition of the population.16 In
economic terms, frequency dependence is given if one group of subjects – respectively
the strategy played by these α-types – creates an externality on other subjects’ fitness.
Consider for example a predator that hunts on a prey structured in different size
classes and all predators are specialized to hunt on only one size class. If hunting has a
significant effect on the prey populations, then the evolutionary success of a predator
is dependent on how many other predators are specialized on the same class.17
Within one generation, the change in the trait mean value in response to selection
is defined as
∆α¯ = α¯s − α¯, (10)
15Compare Falconer and Mackay (1995) and Roff (1997) for an introduction to quantitative genetics.
A critical review is provided by Pigliucci and Schlichting (1997).
16Of course, frequency dependent fitness depends also on the variance. In order to ease notation,
we have suppressed this variable in w(.).
17A trait with frequency independent fitness would be the case of different breathing technics,
which lead to different capabilities in oxygen uptake. Whatever distribution of effective and ineffec-
tive breathers we assume, their cumulative impact on atmospheric oxygen is insignificant to change
the amount of oxygen potentially available to other individuals. Hence, the fitness of each type is
independent of the distribution of the different types.
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where α¯s, the mean trait value after selection, is defined as
α¯s =
∫
α
w(α, α¯)
w¯
dF (α). (11)
The logic expressed in (11) is similar to standard replicator dynamics. While the initial
frequency of a type was f(α), the post-selection frequency of this α-type, w(α,α¯)
w¯
f(α),
will be higher for types with above-average fitness. Hence, in the computation of α¯s,
more successful types will get a higher weight than less successful types. If, for example,
the studied trait is body size and e.g. large individuals (with high α-values) are more
fit than short individuals, the average body size in the population would increase due
to natural selection: α¯s > α¯ and ∆α¯ > 0.
The analysis so far describes selection within one generation. In order to address the
(inter-generational) evolution of the trait α, we follow Lande (1976) and introduce the
following structure of reproduction: First, only selected individuals produce the next
generation of offspring. Second, sexual reproduction is assumed with random partner
choice. That is, two random subjects who survived selection mate, produce offsprings
and die thereafter. For a reasonable selective pressure18 this mechanism transforms
the initial distribution back to a normal distribution with constant variance σ2 but
a different mean. Starting from a normal distribution with mean α, selection will
first lead to a distribution, which deviates from the normal distribution. The mean of
this (non-normal) distribution after selection is given by α¯s from (11). After random
mating and reproduction, however, the distribution of α-values in the new generation
is again normal with F (α, α¯s, σ
2). While the variance is unaffected by this process, the
mean of the distribution changes from α¯ to α¯s. The direction of evolution is therefore
determined by selection, characterized in (10) and (11). This now allows us to analyze
the evolutionary process in more detail.
From (9) we can derive the change in mean fitness from a marginal change in α¯,
∂w¯
∂α¯
=
∫
w(α, α¯)
∂f(α)
∂α¯
dα +
∫
∂w(α, α¯)
∂α¯
dF (α). (12)
While the first term characterizes the direct change in the mean fitness due to a change
in the composition of the population, the second term depicts the indirect, frequency
dependent fitness impact. From the density of the normal distribution we can easily
compute ∂f(α)/∂α¯. Substituting in (12) and rearranging yields19
18For a detailed discussion see Lande (1976).
19The derivation of (13) and (14) is provided in Appendix A.
Evolution of Conditional Cooperation 120
∆α¯ =
σ2
w¯
∫
w(α, α¯)
∂f(α)
∂α¯
dα (13)
which can be also expressed as
∆α¯ =
1
w¯
∫
[w(α, α¯) (α− α¯)] dF (α). (14)
The right hand side in equation (13) respectively (14) characterizes pace and direction
of the evolutionary process. As w¯ > 0, the direction of the evolutionary change in
the mean trait value, α¯, is determined by the sign of the integral in (14). Note, that
the integral term represents only the direct change in mean fitness (the first term in
equation (12)). From (14) therefore follows that the evolution of α¯ is independent of
the frequency dependent fitness change associated with a variation in α¯. If the direct
fitness change is positive, the distribution will evolve towards a higher mean α¯. An
evolutionary equilibrium is reached if ∆α¯ = 0. Such an equilibrium is characterized by∫
[w(α, α¯e) (α− α¯e)] dF (α) = 0, (15)
where α¯e denotes the equilibrium mean trait value.
4.4 The Indirect Evolution of Conditional
Cooperation
We now apply the method introduced in the previous section in order to study the evo-
lution of the distribution Φ(θ) and the associated co-evolution of cooperation. As we do
not believe that the norm sensitivity θ is genetically determined, we interpret evolution
as a cultural process, related to social transmission and learning mechanisms. Fitness
then describes the success of a certain θ-types – related to social status or prestige
– rather than fitness in the biological sense. In course of evolution, individuals learn
about the social status of different θ-type (respectively the behavior of these types)
and accordingly adapt their preferences, i.e. their θ values. Hence, the evolutionary
process endogenously shapes preferences.20 Individual behavior and thereby the level
of cooperation within society evolves indirectly with the change in preferences from
one generation to the next.21
20Compare e.g. Gu¨th and Yaari (1992), Gu¨th (1995), Bester and Gu¨th (1998).
21The term generation thereby describes a population with a given distribution of preferences Φ(θ),
rather than a parent and offspring-population in the biological sense.
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We assume that fitness, apart from the direct pecuniary payoff of the game y(xi), is
also determined by the status consequences of the sanctions imposed on free-riders. If,
for example, norm-violators get stigmatized as untrustworthy and are excluded from
some economic interactions, this results in the decrease of income and social prestige.
In section 4.5 we discuss a model extension which captures an endogenous mechanism
inducing stigma related sanctions. For the moment, however, we take the existence
of such a norm-enforcement mechanism as exogenously given. The fitness impact of
norm-enforcing sanctions is assumed to depend on the share of norm violations n,
characterized by λs(n). The fitness-impact of stigmatization declines with the share of
norm-violators. 22 With this we can express the fitness for an action xi as
23
w(xi) = y(xi) + λ z(xi, n). (16)
If λ = 0, fitness is solely determined by y(.). In case λ > 0, the sanctions do reduce the
evolutionary success of free-riders.24 While the fitness costs of free-riding are λs(n),
agents consider a disutility of θis(n). In the evolutionary process they learn about
the status consequences of their actions and rationally adapt θi. This learning may
take place within the family (vertical transmission of preferences), within peer-groups
(horizontal transmission) or it is guided by societal institutions (oblique transmission).
We assume that the outcome of the adaptation process can be described by the evolu-
tionary model introduced above.25
4.4.1 Evolutionary Adaptation to a Homogenous
Environment
Let θ be normally distributed according to θ ∼ φ(θ, θ¯, σ2), and the corresponding
cumulative distribution is given by Φ(θ, θ¯, σ2). Substituting for y(xi), z(xi, n) and
xi = x(θi, n) from (1), (2) and (5), we can express individual fitness as a function of θ
22Alternatively one could also consider sanctions related to ostracism, e.g. in form of exclusion
from the public good consumption. Note that the impact of ostracism would also depend on the share
of free-riders in society: Getting excluded from public good consumption in a cooperative society,
with a high level of public goods provided, represents a more severe punishment, than exclusion in a
society where cooperation fails.
23We do not include the public good payoff into the fitness function, since this would not alter our
results.
24Note that it is only the heterogeneity in actions – determined by different levels of θ – which
results in fitness differences. Within the group of cooperators and free-riders the heterogeneity in θi
does not result in different levels of fitness.
25In section 4.6 we discuss the crucial differences of this approach to an evolutionary process
according to standard replicator dynamics (Weibull, 1995).
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and θ¯,
w(θ, θ¯) =

−c for θ > θˆ(n∗)
−λ s(n∗) for θ ≤ θˆ(n∗)
(17)
where n∗ = Φ(θˆ(n∗), θ¯, σ2) is an equilibrium, analogous to (7), for a normal distribution
with mean θ¯ (and σ2 is exogenously fixed). Note that individual fitness as described
by (17) is frequency dependent; as the θ-distribution changes, the share of free-riders
n∗ will change and thereby the fitness costs from the norm deviation. As the ap-
proach introduced in section 4.3 takes account of such payoff spillovers, the approach
is applicable to this framework.
The mean fitness is defined by w¯ =
∫
w(θ, θ¯)φ(θ). Using (17), we can express w¯
as26
w¯ = −c+ (c− λ s(n∗))
θˆ(n∗)∫
−∞
dΦ(θ). (18)
Following (14), the evolution of θ¯ is determined by
∆θ¯ =
1
w¯
(λ s(n∗)− c) (θ¯n∗ − θ¯∗) (19)
where θ¯∗ represents the mean level of θ among the n∗ agents who defect in an equilib-
rium (compare Appendix B). As long as 0 < n∗ < 1, we can distinguish between the
following three cases:
∆θ¯ < 0 if λ s(n∗) < c
∆θ¯ = 0 if λ s(n∗) = c
∆θ¯ > 0 if λ s(n∗) > c
(20)
From this the following results derive:
Proposition 1 (i) An evolutionary equilibrium where cooperators and free-riders co-
exist is characterized by λ s(ne) = c and ne = Φ(θˆ(ne), θ¯e, σ2), where 0 < ne < 1
constitutes an equilibrium share of free-riders which is supported by a normal distribu-
tion with mean θ¯e. (ii) In such an equilibrium, w(θ, θ¯e) is the same for all θ and there
holds λ = θˆ(ne). (iii) An evolutionary equilibrium where cooperation fails, ne1 = 1, is
characterized by ne1 = Φ(θˆ(ne1), θ¯e1, σ2), supported by a normal distribution with mean
θ¯e1.
26Note that the integral expression is equal to n∗ = Φ(θˆ(n∗), θ¯, σ2). (Compare Appendix B.)
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Proof. The proof of (i) follows immediately from (19). From (4) we know that
c = θˆ(n∗)s(n∗) must hold for any equilibrium state. λ s(ne) = c then implies λ =
θˆ(ne). Using this in (17) and substituting for (4) proofs (ii). Part (iii) derives from
n∗ = 1 ⇒ θ¯n∗ = θ¯∗. Hence, for ne1 = 1 the term in the last brackets in (19) is zero
and ∆θ¯ = 0.
The evolutionary equilibrium described in part (i) of the proposition is characterized
by a positive share of cooperators such that there is no fitness differential between free-
riders and cooperators. In equilibrium, the preferences of agents with θi = θˆ(n), who
are indifferent between defection and cooperation, coincide with the fitness function
since θˆ(n) = λ. In other words, these indifferent θ-types are ‘perfectly adapted’. In
addition, there is also scope for an evolutionary equilibrium where cooperation breaks
down; in such an equilibrium, the social norm has eroded and everybody free-rides.
From Lemma 1 we know that n∗ = 1 constitutes a possible equilibrium state for
any distribution. Therefore, any level θ¯ could be the mean of the distribution in an
evolutionary equilibrium with ne1 = 1. By the time the whole society free-rides, the
evolutionary pressure on θ¯ to decline vanishes and the system reaches a rest point.27
Let us now turn to the existence of these different types of equilibria.
Proposition 2 (i) Iff λ s(0) > c, there exists an evolutionary equilibrium with 0 <
ne < 1. (ii) There always exists an evolutionary equilibrium with ne1 = 1. If c > λ s(0),
this is the only equilibrium.
Proof. (i) Since c > λs(1) = ε and s(.) is continuously decreasing in n, λ s(0) > c
assures that there exists a level of n where λ s(n) = c holds. Moreover, we can always
find a distribution φ(θ, θ¯, σ2), a function s(n) and a level c, which supports such an
equilibrium share of free-riders ne. (ii) From Lemma 1 we know that n∗ = 1 is
supported by any distribution as long as A1 and A2(i) hold. Proposition 1(iii) implies
that any equilibrium with n∗ = 1 constitutes an evolutionary equilibrium ne1. From
A1 follows c > λ s(0)⇒ c > λ s(n) for all n ∈ [0, 1]. It therefore follows from c > λ s(0)
that there can not exist an equilibrium with ne < 1, as @ n with λ s(n) = c .
A graphical representation of this result is provided in figure 4.2, where we have
plotted λs(n)-curves for two different levels of λ. In the case of the higher curve,
27Theoretically, we could also describe an evolutionary equilibrium with ne = 0. For this case,
n∗ = 0 ⇒ θ¯n∗ = θ¯∗. Hence, the last bracket term in (19) would equal zero and ∆θ¯ = 0. However,
an equilibrium state with n∗ = 0 would only be supported by a distribution with θ¯ →∞. Since this
would violate assumption A2(i), we exclude this case from our analysis.
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λ s(0) > c and there exists an equilibrium with ne < 1. In the case of the lower
curve, there is no intersection with the c-line. The costs of cooperation are higher
than the the fitness impact of sanctions, even for the state where n∗ = 0; free-riding
dominates cooperation in terms of fitness for any level of norm-violations. Starting
from any n∗ < 1, the evolutionary process induces θ¯ to fall and society moves towards
an equilibrium with ne1 = 1.
Figure 4.2: Fitness Payoffs
Finally, we address the stability of the system. An evolutionary equilibrium is locally
stable if ∂∆θ¯
∂n
> 0. If this condition holds, small mistakes in the adaptation process
would not affect the evolutionary equilibrium. Consider for example that, starting
from an equilibrium distribution with θ¯e, some agents would acquire a ‘too’ low level
of θ. In this case, the share of free-riders would exceed ne and the stability condition
would imply ∆θ¯ > 0. An increase in the mean norm sensitivity would then provide
a pressure to adapt ‘back’ towards the initial equilibrium. In our case, however, an
evolutionary equilibrium where cooperators and free-riders coexist can never be stable.
Proposition 3 An evolutionary equilibrium with 0 < ne < 1 is never stable. In
contrast, an evolutionary equilibrium with ne1 = 1 is locally stable.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Due to assumption A1, s′(n) ≤ 0. Hence, any small deviation from ne would tip the
balance in fitness-payoffs between the two strategies. If the level of free-riding would
slightly exceed ne, the norm payoff would become less important and we get c > λ s(n).
Free-riders, i.e. types with low θ-values, earn a higher level of fitness and consequently
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θ¯ decreases. The system moves to an equilibrium with ne1 = 1.28 Note that the system
would return to such an equilibrium after small shocks – e.g. if some agents mistakenly
cooperate – as in the neighborhood of ne1 = 1 there holds c > λ s(ne1) since s(1) = ε.
Hence, θ¯ would decline and thereby trigger an increase in free-riding which would push
behavior back towards the equilibrium ne1.
The analysis provided so far yields an unsatisfactory result. While there may exist
an evolutionary equilibrium where free-riders and cooperators coexist, such an equilib-
rium turns out to be instable. With the pattern of sanctions s(n) considered in A1, the
evolutionary adaptation induces disruptive selection respectively disruptive evolution:
Typically, either one or the other strategy dominates in terms of fitness. The system
either evolves towards an equilibrium where the norm has eroded and everybody free-
rides, or θ¯ →∞ and society would evolve towards full cooperation (compare footnote
27). While this is in conflict with the coexistence of free-riders and cooperators ob-
served in real life social outcomes, we are nevertheless convinced that the crucial model
assumption from A1, s′(n) ≤ 0 – which is quite common in the literature29 – as well
as the fitness function introduced in (16) do make sense and can result in reasonable,
stable, evolutionary outcomes. Here we have studied the adaptation to a homogenous
environment. Agents encounter one particular situation, and evolution shapes their
preferences such that they are fit for this particular environment. In reality, however,
we typically face heterogeneous environments, as social interaction are repeated in
different situations with quite diverse outcomes. The level of cooperation varies for
different collective action problems, along time and along space. In the next section we
show how we can capture such a heterogeneous environment within our model frame-
work. In contrast to the case of a homogenous environment, the evolutionary process
can result in stable equilibria where cooperators and free-riders coexist.
28If, on the one hand, the share of free-riding falls short of ne, we get λ s(n) > c. Cooperators
would be more successful than free-riders, θ¯ would increase and n∗ would decline further. The system
would evolve towards θ¯ →∞. (Compare Footnote 27.)
29Compare e.g. Akerlof (1980), Corneo (1995), Lindbeck et al. (1999), Naylor (1989), Romer
(1984).
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4.4.2 Evolutionary Adaptation to a Heterogeneous
Environment
Consider a society which faces one public good game which is repeated (finitely) many
times within each generation. We focus on the case where there is scope for two
possible equilibria,30 n∗a and n
∗
b . Without loss of generality, we assume that n
∗
a < n
∗
b .
Sometimes cooperation works rather well, sometimes it breaks down (e.g. due to
exogenous shocks). Let the frequency that society coordinates on the equilibrium state
n∗j be given by pij, for j ∈ {a, b}.31 The fitness of a strategy
(
xai , x
b
i
)
is then given by
w
(
xai , x
b
i
)
=
∑
j=a,b
pij
(
y(xji ) + λ z(x
j
i , n
∗
j)
)
, (21)
where xji denotes the action of agent i in equilibrium j. From n
∗
a < n
∗
b and (6) follows
θˆ(n∗a) < θˆ(n
∗
b). Hence, we will observe three different strategies: On the one hand,
agents with θi ≤ θˆ(n∗a) will free-ride in both equilibrium states. Agents with θi > θˆ(n∗b)
on the other hand, will cooperate in both states. A third group of subjects, those
with θˆ(n∗a) < θi ≤ θˆ(n∗b), behaves conditionally cooperative; such individuals would
cooperate in equilibrium state a but defect in b. Making use of (1), (2), (5) and
pib = 1− pia, we can express the success of a type θ in the following way:
w(θ, θ¯, pia) =

−c for θ > θˆ(n∗b)
−piac− (1− pia)λ s(n∗b) for θˆ(n∗a) < θ ≤ θˆ(n∗b)
−piaλs(n∗a)− (1− pia)λ s(n∗b) for θ ≤ θˆ(n∗a)
(22)
with n∗j = Φ(θˆ(n
∗
j), θ¯, σ
2). The crucial difference to the fitness function from (17) is the
fact that intermediate θ-types obtain a fitness-payoff from two different actions. The
success of the conditional cooperative strategy consists of the cooperation payoff for
equilibrium state a plus the payoff from free-riding once the society has coordinated
on state b.
30Remember that there are (at least) two possible stable equilibrium levels of free-riding, as long
as assumptions A2 is fulfilled. Compare Lemma 1.
31The frequency pia could be derived endogenously, according to the basin of attraction of equilib-
rium n∗a relative to n
∗
b . We will come back to this idea in section 4.6.
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From (22) we can compute the mean fitness of the population for a given pia,
w¯ = −c+ pia (c− λs(n∗a))
θˆ(n∗a)∫
−∞
dΦ(θ) + (1− pia) (c− λ s(n∗b))
θˆ(n∗b )∫
−∞
dΦ(θ). (23)
According to (14), the evolution of θ¯ is then determined by ∆θ¯ = 1
w¯
Ψ with32
Ψ ≡ pia (λs(n∗a)− c)
(
θ¯n∗a − θ¯∗a
)
+ (1− pia) (λ s(n∗b)− c)
(
θ¯n∗b − θ¯∗b
)
, (24)
and θ¯∗j captures the mean level of θ among the free-riders in equilibrium n
∗
j . The
evolutionary dynamics on θ¯ are then given by
∆θ¯ > 0 if Ψ > 0
∆θ¯ = 0 if Ψ = 0
∆θ¯ < 0 if Ψ < 0
(25)
We can set up the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Consider a heterogeneous environment with 0 < pia < 1. (i) An
evolutionary equilibrium is characterized by Ψ = 0 with nea = Φ(θˆ(n
e
a), θ¯
e, σ2) and
neb = Φ(θˆ(n
e
b), θ¯
e, σ2) < 1, where nea and n
e
b are supported by a normal distribution with
mean θ¯e. (ii) In equilibrium there holds λs(nea) > c > λs(n
e
b).
Proof. Part (i) follows immediately from (25). Part (ii) derives from (24): Note
that θ¯n∗j > θ¯
∗
j as long as n
∗
j < 1. Hence, the first term in (24) would be negative if
c > λs(nea). Since n
e
a < n
e
b, (6) implies that the second term would be negative as
well. We would get Ψ < 0. Therefore c > λs(nea) can not hold in an equilibrium. Iff
λs(nea) > c, the first term in (24) is positive. In order to get Ψ = 0, the second term
in (24) must be negative, which holds for c > λs(neb).
As long as neb < 1,
33 the distribution in an evolutionary equilibrium supports two
equilibria such that λs(nea) > c > λs(n
e
b). In terms of fitness, cooperation dominates
free-riding in equilibrium state a, since −c > −λs(n∗a). For state b, however, the oppo-
site holds: As free-riding becomes more widespread, the (fitness) costs from sanctions
32The derivation of ∆θ¯ respectively Ψ is analogous to the one of (19). Compare Appendix B.
33There could also exist an equilibrium with neb = 1 and λs(n
e
a) = c. This case represents a
heterogeneous environment with a positive share of cooperation in equilibrium a and a complete
break-down of cooperation in equilibrium state b. As the properties of this case are similar to the
scenarios discussed in the previous subsection, we focus on equilibria with neb < 1.
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are lower than the costs of cooperation. From this follows that conditional cooperators
have more success than ‘unconditional’ cooperators respectively free-riders.
Corollary 1 In an evolutionary equilibrium within a heterogeneous environment with
nea < n
e
b < 1 and 0 < pia < 1, conditional cooperators have a strictly higher fitness than
both, free-riders and cooperators.
Proof. From Proposition 4(ii) we know that λs(nea) > c > λs(n
e
b). Using this in (22)
proofs the Corollary.
Figure 4.3 (on the next page) graphically represents such an equilibrium. The graph
on the left hand side captures a system with a distribution Φ(θ) and a function θˆ(n),
supporting two stable equilibrium states n∗a < n
∗
b < 1. The graph on the right hand
side depicts the fitness difference between the strategies for the two equilibria. As in
this example the advantage of cooperators compared to free-riders in equilibrium state
a, λs(nea)− c > 0, is smaller than the disadvantage in b, λs(neb)− c < 0, the weight on
state a – expressed by pia – must be sufficiently high in order that Ψ = 0 holds.
From figure 4.3 as well as from the analysis above (compare Proposition 2) it is
clear that λs(0) > c is a necessary condition for such an evolutionary equilibrium to
exist. In addition, assumption A2(ii) must be fulfilled, such that there are (at least)
two equilibrium states.
Analogously to before, the necessary conditions for local stability is ∂∆θ¯
∂na
+ ∂∆θ¯
∂nb
> 0.
The formal analysis yields the following result:
Proposition 5 It is sufficient for an evolutionary equilibrium with nea < n
e
b < 1 to be
stable, if −s′(nea) < Γa and −s′(neb) > Γb holds, with
Γj ≡ θ¯
(
λ
(
θ¯nej − θ¯ej
)
λ s(nej)− c
+
θˆ(nej)
2
s(nej)
φ(θˆ(nej))
)−1
Proof. See Appendix B
As we know from Proposition 4, there holds c > λ s(neb). Hence the denominator of
the first term in the round brackets of Γb is negative and we could get Γb < 0. In this
case −s′(neb) > Γb would always be fulfilled. From Proposition 4 also follows Γa > 0.
Therefore s′(nea) = 0 would be sufficient for −s′(nea) < Γa to hold.
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Figure 4.3: Evolutionary Equilibrium in a Heterogenous Environment
Since the stability of an evolutionary equilibrium as characterized by Proposition
4 is in general ambiguous, we conducted a series of numerical simulations. We could
not find even one single parameter combination, where the stability condition did not
hold. Even in the case where one of the two (sufficient) conditions in Proposition 5
were violated, the equilibrium proved to be stable. We are therefore confident, that
evolutionary equilibria within a heterogeneous environment are stable for a wide range
of parameters.
The intuition for this finding is straight forward: Small shocks would not change the
result from Corollary 1. Conditional cooperation would still perform more successfully
than the two unconditional strategies. As conditional cooperators have intermediate
values of θ, preferences in the ‘middle’ of the θ-range are more successful and dominate
more extreme – either low or high – θ-values. In contrast to the evolutionary adaptation
to a homogenous environment, there is no scope for disruptive evolution. Hence, in
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contrast to the analysis of the previous subsection, we find (potentially) stable equilibria
where cooperators and defectors coexist.
The evolutionary dominance of conditional cooperators is the main result of our
analysis. Holding extreme ‘anti-social’ (low θ values) or extreme ‘pro-social’ prefer-
ences (high θ values) induces agents to play one particular strategy, irrespectively of
the other agents behavior. In a stable evolutionary equilibrium within a homogenous
environment, one of these two strategies will dominate the other. In a heterogeneous
environment, there is scope for a third type of strategy, that of conditional cooperation.
If individuals adapt to such a heterogeneous habitat, where they face either a ‘good’ or
a ‘bad’ outcomes, the unconditional strategies prove less successful that the conditional
strategy. Agents who free-ride in ‘bad’ equilibrium states but cooperate in a ‘good’
states, dominate the (unconditional) cooperators in the former and the free-riders in
the latter environment. As compared to conventional one-game-one-equilibrium sce-
narios, such heterogeneous environments appear as a more realistic description of social
interactions. Therefore, the evolutionary pressure to adapt to several possible outcomes
provides a simple explanation for the evolutionary success of conditionally cooperative
behavior.
4.5 Extension: Endogenous Social Sanctions
In this section we describe a model extension which provides an endogenous explanation
for the origin of norm-enforcing sanctions. While the integration of this extension into
the above analysis is left for future research, we briefly discuss some basic results which
support that sanctions are decreasing in n (our assumption A1).
Assume that, next to the public good game described in section 4.2, subjects play
a second game. Each agent gets randomly matched with one other member of society.
One of the two, the proposer labeled P , can choose a strategy p ∈ {e, l}; either P
enters the game and proposes an economic interaction or she leaves the game. If the
proposer chooses this latter option l, both players earn a zero payoff. In case player
P enters the game, the second player, responder R, chooses a strategy r ∈ {+,−}.
When the responder decides for a cooperative move, + , both players earn a payoff
a > 0. Alternatively, player P could also decide for an explorative move, − , such that
P earns a payoff b < 0, and R gets d > a. In this case, however, the second mover
suffers from the violation of the social norm for cooperation, similarly as in the public
good game. He would obtaining an emotional payoff −θi, associated to purely internal
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sanctions.34 The extensive form of the game, which can be interpreted as a discrete
variation of the trust game (Berg et al. 1995), is represented in figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Trust Game
Given that player P can observe the type of R, we get the following subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium {p∗, r∗}
{e,+} if θi > d− a
{l,−} if θi ≤ d− a
(26)
For θi > d − a, the responders’ norm sensitivity θi is strong enough to overcome the
pecuniary temptation to exploit the proposer. Player P will propose an interaction, R
behaves cooperatively and both players earn a payoff a. If θi < d− a, the first mover
will not enter the game since R would exploit him. Hence, if the matched responder
has a norm sensitivity above the threshold θ˜,
θ˜ ≡ d− a, (27)
the proposer enters the game and leaves it otherwise.
Let us now turn to the more interesting case where types are non-observable. Re-
member that we consider the type distribution Φ(θ) to be common knowledge. In order
to study a link between trust and the public good game, we introduce the following
structure: (a) Agents play the public good game myopically. (b) After the public good
game, they get randomly matched with finitely many other members of society. In
each match the chance of being the proposer is equal to the chance of becoming the
responder. (c) With probability λ, the action of R in the public good game is observed
and becomes public knowledge. It is obvious that the behavior of myopic agents in the
34The norm strength is assumed to be independent of responders behavior in other matches.
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public good game is still characterized by xi = x(θi, n) from (5). We now provide a
brief analysis of the trust game.
As in the case of complete information, the strategy of a responder is given by
r =
− for θi ≤ θ˜+ for θi > θ˜ (28)
Given that the proposer receives no signal about the responder’s type – i.e., the re-
sponder’s action in the public good game remains unobserved – his expected payoff
(based on Bayesian beliefs) of entering the game is
E[e] = Φ(θ˜)b+
(
1− Φ(θ˜)
)
a. (29)
With a probability of Φ(θ˜) he would face a responder with a θ-value below θ˜ who would
exploit him. With probability 1−Φ(θ˜) the responder would cooperate. As long as the
share of exploiting responders in the population is below a certain level,
Φ(θ˜) ≤ a
a− b , (30)
the proposer enters the game since E[e] > E[l] = 0.35 If the responder’s action xi was
observed, this provides the proposer with a signal about the type θi of player R. Given
that player R was observed free-riding in an equilibrium state n∗, his θ-type must be
below θˆ(n∗). The expected payoff of trusting a free-rider is then
E[e|xR = 1] =
b for θˆ(n∗) ≤ θ˜Φ(θ˜)
n∗ b+
n∗−Φ(θ˜)
n∗ a for θˆ(n
∗) > θ˜
(31)
where we have substituted for n∗ = Φ(θˆ(n∗)). From this immediately follows that
the signal which derives from the observation that R was free-riding, is more infor-
mative, the lower n∗. In an equilibrium with a low level of free-riding, the threshold
for norm-violations is rather low. Those who deviate from the cooperation norm in
a society with a high level of cooperation must have a particularly low level of θi. If
the cooperation threshold for the public good game θˆ(n∗) drops below the threshold
θ˜, observing someone cheating is an unambiguous signal that this type will exploit a
partner in the trust game. In such an equilibrium n∗, a proposer would not enter the
35Remember that E[l] = 0.
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game if the matched partner was observed free-riding. If, however, norm-violations in
the public good game are more widespread, θˆ(n∗) > θ˜. For such equilibrium states n∗
there are free-riders with θˆ(n∗) > θi > θ˜, who would defect in the public good game
but cooperate in the trust game. Given that this latter group is big enough such that
E[e] > 0, proposers enter the game despite their partner is a free-rider. This occurs,
as long as the following condition holds:
Φ(θ˜) ≤ a
a− bn
∗ (32)
In an equilibrium state n∗ where (32) holds, a player P enters the game in any case,
since then condition (30) is also fulfilled. The higher n∗, the less informative is the
signal about the θ-type of player R. If n∗ = 1, the signal is completely uninformative
and condition (32) boils down to the basic condition (30).
This preliminary analysis yields the following insights: 1) If n∗ is low enough, a
free-rider will get excluded from the game, if his norm-violation in the first game is
observed. 2) The higher λ, the likelihood of getting observed, the more often a free-rider
would get excluded. 3) In the case of exclusion, all observed free-riders – irrespectively
of their level of θi – miss the chance to earn a positive payoff. 4) The higher n
∗, the
more likely a free-rider gets into the game and reaps a positive payoff. 5) If condition
(30) is violated, the norm sensitivity in society is too low. Trust breaks down and
proposers will never enter the game.
Note, that the properties of the exclusion mechanism induces sanctions on free-
riders, which are roughly in line with the form λs(n) used in the fitness function (16).
The evolutionary adaption of θ would then be driven by the agent’s learning that their
action in the public good game has a payoff impact in a future game. The social
norm would work as a mechanism to take into account the (pecuniary) consequences
neglected by myopic agents.
As the payoff structure in the Nash equilibrium of this second game does not exactly
correspond to the fitness payoffs considered in section 4.4, the results of our evolution-
ary analysis can not immediately be applied to the ‘combined game’, based on this
model extension. In future research we will apply the evolutionary analysis to the joint
equilibrium payoffs from the public good and the trust game.
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4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 The Applicability of a Quantitative Genetic Approach
In section 4.4 we have applied a method from quantitative genetics to a cultural, social
learning process. According to this approach, originally studied by Lande (1976), the
trait θ follows a normal distribution and the frequency of a trait changes according to
the fitness-differential, w(θ)/w¯. If the fitness of a θ-type relative to the mean population
fitness is greater than unity, the frequency of these types will increase (and shrink
otherwise). The resulting (non-normal) distribution is then transformed back to a
normal distribution with a new mean. This methodology provides a tractable tool
to study the evolution of a (normal) distribution, which also allows us to incorporate
frequency dependent fitness components. Of course, the application of this method
has several limitations.36 In our case, it implies an imperfect learning process, as the
initial variance in θ is maintained during the course of evolution. Hence, by using this
method we exclude the case where all agents adapt one unique θ value (e.g. θ = λ).
In an evolutionary equilibrium those agents with θi > λ (θi < λ) are in some sense
‘overadapted’ (‘underadapted’), since they consider the impact of norm-enforcement
to be stronger (weaker) than the actual (fitness-) impact of these sanctions. One could
justify this implication by a systematic noise embedded in the social learning process.
If the errors in the adaptation process are normally distributed, the deviations from
the perfect adaptation in θ would maintain a normal distribution Φ(θ).37 However,
as our analysis – at least section 4.4.1 – is also applicable for a distribution with an
infinitesimal small variance, this point is only of minor importance.
36If, for example, there would be an evolutionary pressure on low and high θ-types to grow, this
would suggest an evolution towards a bimodal distribution, which is excluded by assumption in the
Lande approach. However, a disruptive evolution pointing in two directions can not occur in our
framework.
37Once an evolutionary equilibrium is reached, these errors should of course decline, such that the
variance of the distribution shrinks to zero.
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4.6.2 Replicator Dynamics
Would our results still hold if standard replicator dynamics are at work? Consider any
initial distribution of θ and let the frequency of a type, f(θ), evolve according to
f˙(θ) = f(θ) [w(θ)− w¯] (33)
(compare Weibull, 1995). From the analysis in section 4.4.1 immediately follows that
any distribution which supports an equilibrium share ne with λs(ne) = c also consti-
tutes an evolutionary equilibrium according to (33). If λs(ne) = c holds, there are no
fitness-differences between free-riders and cooperators (compare Proposition 1) and we
would get w(θ) = w¯ ⇒ f˙(θ) = 0 for all θ. Similarly, the stability properties of such an
equilibrium 0 < ne < 1 carries over. Any small deviation from ne would either lead to
a break down in cooperation or a move towards full cooperation.
The comparability of the adaptation to a heterogeneous environment analyzed in
section 4.4.2, turns out to be slightly more complicated. Intuitively, it is clear that
the evolutionary success of conditional cooperation also holds under the evolutionary
process described by (33). Therefore, the share of agents who follow a conditional
cooperative strategy would increase. In an evolutionary equilibrium there must hold
w(θ) = w¯ for all θ-types with f(θ) > 0. This can only hold if the whole population
consist of conditional cooperators. Hence, the evolutionary process described by (33)
will eliminate all preferences which induce unconditional strategies. In equilibrium all
agents will cooperate in one equilibrium (n∗a = 0) and defect in the other state (n
∗
b = 1).
While this outcome qualitatively resembles the results of our analysis, there is no scope
for the coexistence of free-riders, unconditional and conditional cooperators according
to the standard replicator dynamic approach.
4.6.3 Heterogeneous Environments
Alternatively to the interpretation of a heterogeneous environment provided in section
4.4, one could also reinterpret a heterogeneous scenario in terms of two identical, ‘par-
allel’ public good games within one generation. Consider for example one anti-littering
norm and two completely identical public parks. On the one hand, park a is rather
clean, the norm is perceived as strong and agents predominantly comply with the social
norm. Park b, on the other hand, is littered, and society is in a stable equilibrium with
widespread free-riding. The probabilities pia and pib then reflect the agents’ likelihood
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of playing on one particular playground – i.e. in one specific park. Note, that this
probability is considered to be independent of their type. In reality, different θ-types
may sort in different environments. One park may be cleaner than the other, because
the visitors in this park are more sensitive towards the anti-littering norm than the vis-
itors of the other park. In the current version of the model, we abstract from this case,
related to the level of viscosity within a population (Myerson et al., 1991). The main
point of our analysis would also hold for a segregated society (a viscous population),
as long as there are some agents who interact in different environments.38
Next to the incorporation of population viscosity, there is another interesting way
one could endogenize the probability of facing one particular equilibrium outcome:
We could relate pij to the relative size of the basin of attraction for equilibrium state
n∗j . From the discussion in section 4.2 it is clear, that the basin of attraction for one
stable fixed point n∗j is defined by the position of the surrounding instable equilibria
(fixed points). For the case of two stable equilibria, as depicted in the left graph in
figure 4.3, it is the location of the instable equilibrium with an intermediate level of
free-riding, which separates the distinct basins of attraction. As an increase in the
mean θ¯ would shift the Φ(θ)-curve upwards, the level of free-riding for the instable
fixed point would increase. Hence, with an increase in the mean norm sensitivity, the
basin of attraction for the equilibrium with a low level of free-riding becomes larger and
the one of the other equilibrium shrinks. Accordingly, the probability pia (pib) would be
increasing (decreasing) in θ¯. This effect would only quantitatively alter the properties of
an evolutionary equilibrium in a heterogeneous environment. Endogenous probabilities
pij, however, could add some restrictions on the existence of an evolutionary equilibrium
in a heterogeneous environment.
4.7 Conclusion
While the impact of heterogenous environments on evolutionary processes is well stud-
ied by biologists (e.g. Christiansen, 1975; Levins, 1968; Maynard Smith and Hoekstra,
1980; Via and Lande, 1987), this issue has been so far neglected in evolutionary eco-
nomics. In this chapter we take a first step to close this gap in the literature, studying
the indirect evolution of cooperation within a heterogenous environment. We consider
a society with a social norm for cooperation and an established sanctioning mechanism
38A minimal degree of migration, i.e. population mobility between different environments, is suffi-
cient to support this case. Compare Mengel (2005), for a recent evolutionary analysis of social norms
in the context of migration.
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for free-riders. The power of these norm-enforcing sanctions depends on the level of
norm-compliance, thereby raising the scope for multiple equilibria. Society may coor-
dinate on a cooperative equilibrium, where norm-compliance is high and sanctions are
strong, or on a state with widespread free-riding and week norm-enforcement. These
equilibria then determine the habitat-structure for the evolutionary process. Accord-
ingly, the success of an agent – in terms of fitness – is determined by the payoff from
interactions in both, cooperative and non-cooperative environments.
In our model framework, there arise three possible strategies, associated with dif-
ferent levels of norm-sensitivity: Agents who base their decisions mainly on the pecu-
niary payoff of the game free-ride in both environments, whereas individuals with a
strong norm-sensitivity cooperate in both habitats. In contrast to these unconditional
strategies, agents with a medium-level of norm-sensitivity follow a conditional strategy:
they will cooperate in the one but free-ride in the other habitat. It is straightforward
to show, that conditional cooperation dominate the unconditional strategies. In the
cooperative environment, conditional cooperators follow the norm and avoid the pun-
ishment a free-riders incurs. In the habitat where the norm has eroded and sanctions
do hardly play a role, conditional cooperators reap the same payoff as a free-rider,
which dominates that of an (unconditional) cooperator. Hence, the preferences under-
lying conditional cooperation are well adapted to a heterogeneous environments. An
intermediate level of norm sensitivity allows individuals to react flexibly to different
environments. Thereby, they dominate unconditional strategies, which are specialized
on one particular habitat.
As it seems quite realistic to consider human interaction to take place in heteroge-
nous environments, where cooperation sometimes fails and sometimes works quite well,
our approach provides a simple and plausible explanation of the evolutionary forces
which shape conditional cooperative behavior. The main limitation of our approach, is
the exogenously given pattern of norm-enforcement. In future research we will extend
the present framework accounting for an endogenous sanctioning mechanism. This will
allow us to study the robustness of our result in the broader context of the evolution
of social norms.
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Appendix
Appendix A (Section 4.3)
For the density of the normal distribution, f(α), one can easily derive
∂f(α)
∂α¯
= f(α)
(α− α¯)
σ2
. (A.1)
Making use of this term in (12) and rearranging, we get
∂w¯
∂α¯
=
1
σ2
∫
[αw(α, α¯) f(α)− α¯ w(α, α¯) f(α)] dα+
∫
∂w(α, α¯)
∂α¯
dF (α). (A.2)
From (9) respectively (11) follows that the first expression in the first integral equals
α¯sw¯, and the second expression is α¯w¯. We arrive at
∂w¯
∂α¯
=
w¯
σ2
(α¯s − α¯) +
∫
∂w(α, α¯)
∂α¯
dF (α). (A.3)
Rearranging and substituting for (10) yields
∆α¯ =
σ2
w¯
(
∂w¯
∂α¯
−
∫
∂w(α, α¯)
∂α¯
dF (α)
)
(A.4)
which is equivalent to (13). Making use of (A.1) we can then express (13) as
∆α¯ =
1
w¯
∫
[w(α, α¯) (α− α¯)] dF (α). (A.5)
Appendix B (Section 4.4)
The mean fitness is given by
w¯ = −λ s(n∗)
θˆ(n∗)∫
−∞
dΦ(θ)− c
∞∫
θˆ(n∗)
dΦ(θ). (A.6)
As Φ(θˆ(n∗)) = n∗, we can rearrange w¯ and get
w¯ = − (1− n∗) c− n∗λ s(n∗). (A.7)
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From this follows (18).
As we have demonstrated in the section 4.3, only the direct fitness impact of a
change in θ¯ is important for the evolution of this variable. The indirect effect – related
to the frequency dependent fitness from s(n) – is irrelevant. Hence, we follow (14) and
derive
∆θ¯ =
σ2
w¯
(c− λ s(n∗))
θˆ(n∗)∫
−∞
∂φ(θ, θ¯, σ2)
∂θ¯
dθ. (A.8)
For the density of the normal distribution we get analogously to (A.1)
∂φ(θ, θ¯, σ2)
∂θ¯
=
1
σ2
(
φ(θ)θ − φ(θ)θ¯) . (A.9)
With this, we can rewrite ∆θ¯ as
∆θ¯ =
1
w¯
(λ s(n∗)− c)
θˆ(n∗)∫
−∞
(
φ(θ)θ¯ − φ(θ)θ) dθ, (A.10)
where the first term in the integral is equal to n∗θ¯. The second expression in the
integral depicts the mean level of θ for agents with θi ≤ θˆ(n∗). Using
θ¯∗ ≡
θˆ(n∗)∫
−∞
θdΦ(θ) (A.11)
we finally arrive at (19).
Proof of Proposition 3. From ∆θ¯ we get
∂∆θ¯
∂n
= − 1
w¯
∂w¯
∂n
(λ s(n∗)− c) (θ¯n∗ − θ¯∗) (A.12)
+
1
w¯
λ s′(n∗)
(
θ¯n∗ − θ¯∗)+ 1
w¯
(λ s(n∗)− c)
(
θ¯ − ∂θ¯
∗
∂n
)
From Proposition 1 we know that an equilibrium with 0 < ne < 1 is characterized
by λ s(ne) = c. Therefore, the first and the third term in (A.12) vanish in such an
equilibrium. Since s′(n) ≤ 0 and θ¯n∗ > θ¯∗ for n∗ < 1, there holds ∂∆θ¯
∂n
≤ 0. Hence, an
evolutionary equilibrium with ne < 1 is never locally stable.
In an equilibrium with ne1 = 1, θ¯n∗ = θ¯∗. Therefore, the first and the second term
in (A.12) vanish in such an equilibrium. Making use of the Leibnitz Rule of integral
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differentiation and (4), we get
∂θ¯∗
∂n
=
∂θˆ(n)
∂n
θˆ(n)φ(θˆ(n)) = −θˆ(n)2 s
′(n)
s(n)
φ(θˆ(n)). (A.13)
Using this we can rewrite the third term of (A.12) as
1
w¯
(λ s(n)− c)
(
θ¯ + θˆ(n)2
s′(n)
s(n)
φ(θˆ(n))
)
(A.14)
where we have substituted for (4). Note that s(ne1) = ε and θˆ(ne1) → ∞. Hence, for
ne1 = 1, the term in the first brackets would equal −c and the second term would be
−∞ (note that s′(.) ≤ 0). From this follows ∂∆θ¯
∂n
≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Analogously to (A.12) we can derive from (23)
∂∆θ¯
∂na
+
∂∆θ¯
∂nb
= − 1
w¯2
(
∂w¯
∂na
+
∂w¯
∂nb
)
Ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+
1
w¯
pia
λ s′(n∗a) (θ¯n∗a − θ¯∗a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ (λ s(n∗a)− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂
(
θ¯n∗a − θ¯∗a
)
∂n∗a︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
 (A.15)
+
1
w¯
(1− pia)
λ s′(n∗b) (θ¯n∗b − θ¯∗b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ (λ s(n∗b)− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
∂
(
θ¯n∗b − θ¯∗b
)
∂n∗b︸ ︷︷ ︸
−

Since in an evolutionary equilibrium Ψ = 0 (compare Proposition 4), the first term
on the right hand side of (A.15) vanishes. As s′(n) ≤ 0, the first term in the two
squared brackets is negative. From the properties of the normal distribution follows
that θ¯n∗j = θ¯
∗
j for n
∗
j = 0 and n
∗
j = 1. Moreover, one can show that
(
θ¯n∗j − θ¯∗j
)
reaches
its maximum at n∗j =
1
2
. Hence, we get
∂
(
θ¯n∗j − θ¯∗j
)
∂n∗j
T 0 for n∗j T
1
2
. (A.16)
For the case n∗a < 0.5 < n
∗
b < 1, this implies that the second term in the both
squared brackets is positive, since in an evolutionary equilibrium as characterized in
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Proposition 4 there holds λ s(nea) > c > λ s(n
e
b). If
−λs′(nej) <
λs(nej)− c
θ¯nej − θ¯ej
∂
(
θ¯nej − θ¯ej
)
∂nej
(A.17)
holds for j ∈ {a, b} the sign of the two squared brackets is positive. Making use of
(A.13) we get
−λs′(nej) <
λs(nej)− c
θ¯nej − θ¯ej
(
θ¯ + θˆ(nej)
2
s′(nej)
s(nej)
φ(θˆ(nej))
)
After some rearranging one arrives at the following two conditions
−s′(nea) < Γa
−s′(neb) > Γb
with
Γj := θ¯
(
λ
(
θ¯nej − θ¯ej
)
λ s(nej)− c
+
θˆ(nej)
2
s(nej)
φ(θˆ(nej))
)−1
. (A.18)
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